THE RENAISSANCE OF METAPHORICAL THINKING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SECOND GENERATION OF COGNTIVE CULTURAL LINGUISTICS

INTRODUCTION

There are two ways of doing cognitive linguistics. They are referred to as the first and second generation of the cognitive sciences. The first emerged from the Hixon Symposium after the Second World War. Scholars from different disciplines met at the California Institute of Technology to discuss the implications of a new theory that the human mind functions as a computer. Some of the noted scientists from psychology, neurology, linguistics, and mathematics discussed their perspectives on this new paradigm. What marked all of these scientists as a group was their belief that the brain is comparable to the computer and what they wanted to discover was the software of the mind, the programs that make humans perform as they do. This paradigm dominated the cognitive sciences for decades. It led to several new disciplines such as computational linguistics, mathematical models of language, mathematical models of the mind, and formal linguistics. These scholars are referred to as the first generation of the cognitive sciences. Their philosophical theories were based on the belief that the mind and the body function independently of each other (the Cartesian Paradigm) and that language is essentially a symbolic code that is refers to state of affairs in the world.. Noam Chomsky even referred to his formal model of language as Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky, 1966). Thirty years after the creation of the cognitive sciences, a model of language began to emerge. This new model came from the realization that language is largely metaphorical and that metaphor plays a major role in how human beings think (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This new approach was called cognitive linguistics, but it was not the same kind of approach to language used by Noam Chomsky and his students at MIT. This new kind of cognitive linguistics was based on the second generation of the cognitive sciences. Its new leaders were interested in how human beings think and the role that language plays in cognition. Fauconnier (1994, 1997) and his colleagues (Fauconnier and Sweetser, 1996; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) demonstrated that the concept of mental spaces was needed to account for linguistic mappings of counterfactuals. He referred to these as source and target mental spaces. This same model accounted for metaphorical blends in which inputs from two semantic domains (the surgeon and the butcher) were placed in a third mental space where they were blended. The result was a metaphorical expression (The surgeon is a butcher). New structures emerged from these blends that were not present in the original inputs which led Fauconnier and Turner (2002) to investigate the creative nature of these cognitive blends. Language in this new framework is not a formal linguistic code, but a way of organizing concepts. What followed from this new insight was an interdisciplinary conference on metaphor (Ortony, 1996), and new linguistic models by Langacker (1991, 1996) on cognitive grammar. The framework used in this book is based on the paradigm of the second generation of cognitive linguistics, the concept of the embodied mind. Actually, there are two different trends within this new approach to the cognitive sciences. One of them is more concerned with how thought is embodied (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and N??ez, 2000) whereas the other is concerned with cognitive mappings and blending in the theater of the mind (Fauconnier, 1985, 1997ç Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Overlapping these two trends is the work of Ronald Langacker (1991; 1997) with his model of cognitive grammar. Before discussing the second generation of cognitive linguistics, it is important to review some of the features that characterize the first generation of the cognitive sciences.

THE BRAIN IS THE HARDWARE; LANGUAGE IS THE SOFTWARE

In 1948, a very important series of meetings took place at the California Institute of Technology. These meetings mark the first generation of the cognitive sciences. This gathering was known as the Hixon Symposium (Jeffress, 1951) and it brought together researchers from a wide range of disciplines under the auspices of the Hixon Fund to discuss the cerebral functions of behavior. What these researchers had in common was an attempt to provide a new understanding of how human beings perceive the world in the way that they do. John von Neumann provided the metaphor of the brain as a computer. Warren McCulloch added to this analogy by discussing several parallels between the human brain and other logical devices. Karl Lashley challenged the dogma of classical behavioralism with commentary on the problems associated with ordering behavior serially. The problem was that the classical model of behavior could not explain how human beings accomplish tasks that are organized serially. What emerged from this symposium was the belief that higher levels of organization do take place in the mind and that the organization of language plays a significant role in all cerebral activity. As Lashely noted, behavioral sequences have to be planned and organized in advance of the executions. The organization of these sequences includes higher level functions that are responsible for prompting utterances. Hence, it became obvious from those attending this symposium that the human brain contains an overall plan or structure that enables its components to process information independent of specific feedback from the environment. Furthermore, these central brain processes precede and regulate the ways in which an organism orchestrates complex human behavior. Contrary to the tenets of behaviorism, this organization emanates from within the brain. It comes from a central component, the brain, rather than from its peripheral inputs. This new view of the mind was one in which the brain consisted of a composite of interacting systems (Jeffress, 1951: 135). After Lashely gave his presentation on how the mind is organized, the paper by von Neurmann took on added significance. The human brain demonstrated many parallels with computer systems. Both had central processing units; both had interacting subcomponents, both used a special language to organize and orchestrate behavior, and both were logical systems. The latter point was introduced by Warren McCulloch at the symposium and enhanced in later research in conjunction with Walter Pitts, a logician. They demonstrated that the human cell functions in conjunction with other nerve cells in neural networks that can be modeled in terms of logic. These neural systems, they argued, can be seen as logical statements that function within a propositional calculus. This was the same kind of binary logical network that was used in computer machine language. The machine that now dominates the machine metaphor is the computer. This event began at the Hixon Symposium.

In 1945, the mathematician John von Neumann demonstrated that although a computer may have a simple, fixed structure, it was able to execute any kind of computation if properly programmed. Why is this important? Why did it matter that a machine was built as a general purpose solver, the same machine controlled for different purposes by different software? It turns out that this phenomenon was unique to the history of mankind. For the first time in human history, machines were not built for a specific purpose. Up until that time, machines were built to perform only one function. However, with the advent of the computer, the machine remained the same and its software converted it into a special purpose devise. Now, why is this event important? Why are cognitive scientists by this? What implications do they so intriguing in being able to use software to program the same hardware and make it function as different machines? The answer is quite simple. Human beings want to understand who they are and how they think. They want to be able to test their ideas on how the mind functions. The computer provides them with that opportunity. It enables them to create theories in the form of computer programs and to simulate them by running them through the computer. The scientists who attended the Hixon Symposium shared this ideal (Jeffress, 1951). .

Generations, Computer Languages	Computer Functions	Commentary and Explanations
First Generation	(1GL) Machine Languages These are computer programs that consist of binary instruction string (1, 0).	These programs were geared to specific computers and were dependent on the hardware on which they were used. Introduced in the 1940s.
Second Generation	(2GL) Assembly Language	Assembler Instead of programming a computer by means of ones and zeros, programmers substituted mnemonics for machine language. It is easier for humans to program with letter combinations than with binary numbers. Assembly language was introduced in the early 1950s.
Third Generation	(3GL) Special Procedural Higher Level Computer Languages - Fortran, Cobol, Basic, Pascal, C, Ada, Visual Basic, C++	These higher computer languages were procedural languages designed to function efficiently on certain kinds of tasks. Fortran worked well with mathematical concepts, and Cobol was oriented to business applications. In procedural languages, the software determines what can be done and not the user. Procedural languages consist of a series of procedurals (subprograms or functions or subroutines) that execute when called. Data may be executed locally within a procedure or globally by means of calling procedures used in Fortran and C language. Pascal is a block-structured procedural language that employs scope rules and nested block structures for storing and accessing data. C and C++ are object based languages that implement data abstractions and permit object oriented programming.
Fourth Generation	(4GL) Non-Procedural Higher Level Computer languages known as 4GL - spreadsheet languages, database languages, decision support systems, statistics, simulation, Mathcad, and presentation graphics. In non-procedural languages, it was the user who determined what is to be done.	The first and most successful of these fourth generation languages was the spreadsheet language. It met with great success in the business community. Database languages were used to program the Viking spacecraft to Mars. Later, it appeared as DB II and was eventually improved into a multi-relational database language.
Fifth Generation	(5GL) Natural Language - Visual Basic, knowledge base systems, and AI.	These languages encapsulate many of the functions of natural language and hence play a significant role in artificial intelligence, and knowledge based software.

The lower the generational language (GL), the more instructions that the programmer has to write, As one moves to higher GLs, more structure is built into the computer language, the easier it is to implement the program and the quicker it is to learn. This hierarchy from lower to higher generational languages is based on how user friendly such systems are. Fourth generational languages are meant to improve productivity, make computer programming power available to non-programmers and typically feature integrated database management system, report generations, and report generators. Fifth generational languages attempt to mirror natural language abilities (Wexeblat, 1981).

WHY METAPHORS ARE IMPORTANT TO COGNTIVE LINGUISTICS

Since the time of Aristotle, metaphor was referred to as novel instances of poetic language. This way of looking at language persisted for over two millennia. Metaphor was seen to be a matter of language, not thought. It was argued that everyday language had no metaphor. That was the domain of literal language. This traditional view is wrong. Metaphor is not about language, it is about thought. Metaphors are about how human beings conceptualize their worlds and function within them. Metaphors are about concept and concepts are important because they structure what human beings perceive, how they get around in the world, and how they relate to other people. The generalizations that are captured by metaphor are not in language, but in thought. They have to do with conceptualizing one mental domain with another. They have to do with cross-mappings from one domain to another. Everyday abstract concepts such qas time, states, change, causation, and purpose are metaphorical. Hence, this is why Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued that the human conceptual system is largely metaphorical. This is because the way in which human beings think and the way that they act are largely metaphorical. Not surprisingly, human beings communicate through language by means of conceptual systems that are essentially metaphorical. Consider, for example, the conceptual metaphor of the ARGUMENT IS WAR: Your claims are indefensible He attacked the weak point in my argument I demolished his argument His criticism was right on target I have never warn an argument against him He shot down all of my arguments The ARGUMENT IS WAR METAPHOR is one that plays a central role in Europeans cultures and it structures the actions that we perform in arguing. The essence of a metaphor is to understand and to experience one kind of conceptual domain in terms of another and these concepts are metaphorically structured. The experiences of war are structured into Arguments Since the concept of war is metaphorically structured, then the activity of arguing shares this metaphorical structure. Lakoff and Johnson want to make a distinction between conceptual metaphors and related metaphors based on that concept. In order to characterize these differences, they state conceptual metaphors in the form of capitalized letters. ARGUMENT IS WAR. They also want to point out that these metaphorical concepts belong to a semantic domain that is structured within a system of thought.

From Conceptual Metaphor to Metaphorical Linguistic Expressions The Experience War The Conceptual Metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR Metaphorical Expressions Your claims are indefensible He attacked the weak point in my argument I demolished his argument His criticism was right on target I have never warn an argument against him He shot down all of my arguments Metaphorical Correspondence The structure of an argument corresponds to the structure of war Metaphorical Entailment The experience or the concept of war is used to structure the concept of war as an argument. The linguistic expressions about arguments correspond to the conceptual metaphor of war. Similarly, one's way of acting and interacting with others during an argument correspond to the concept of war.

Another conceptual metaphor is TIME IS MONEY You are wasting my time This procedure will save you hours We don't have the time to give to the project How are you spending your time? This problem cost me an hour. We invested a lot of time on this. We don't have the time to spare We are running out of time You need to budget your time Put aside some time to relax Was that worth your while? Do you have much time left? You need to use your time more profitably. I lost a lot of time when the system broke down Thank you for your time. What one finds in these analogical expressions is that there are three conceptual metaphors: TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE TIME IS MONEY TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY

Another conceptual metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) focus on is the Conduit Metaphor. They cite an article by Michael Reddy (1979) in which Reddy argues that linguistic expressions are containers for meanings. This is not a new metaphor. It can be found in numerous textbooks on language by European scholars and many of them cite the introduction of the railroad as the basis for this way of looking at language. Railways systems are marked by strategic railway stations where passengers and goods are either allowed to enter into the system of travel or depart from it. One of the most important aspects of the railway system was the delivery of the mail and merchandised goods. These items were put into containers, taken to railway stations, put onto the trains, and delivered to their various destinations. Those at the receiving end would go to the railway station, collect the shipped goods, and open the containers to retrieve the items. It is believed that this is the genesis of the conduit metaphor. What is new about the metaphor, however, is the realization that the conduit metaphor is a conceptual metaphor, one that organizes and directs the way in which people think about communication. Lakoff notes that it was the paper by Reddy (1979) that projected him into a serious investigation of conceptual metaphors. The Conduit Metaphor: WORDS ARE CONTAINERS OF MEANINGS. Can you get your idea across to him? I gave you that idea Your reasons came through to us. He has difficulty in putting his ideas into words. He has a good idea He captured it into words Try to pack more thought into fewer words The meaning is right there in the word His words carry little meaning He forced his meaning into that word His words seem empty This sentence is without meaning His ideas are buried here somewhere in this paragraph The conduit metaphor of WORDS ARE CONTAINERS OF MEANINGS is one of the ruling metaphors behind the first generation of cognitive linguistics (Gardner, 1987). They strongly believed in language as a symbolic system in which words contained meanings. These symbolic systems existed independently of people or the contexts of a situation. Advocates of cognitive linguistics, the second generation of the cognitive sciences, has replaced this metaphor with one known as cognitive blending (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). More will be said on this new framework later on.

ORIENTATIONAL METAPHORS

Metaphors of space play an important part in language. These orientational metaphors account for how human beings position themselves in the world. They are metaphors that mark verticality (up and down), symmetry (left and right), horizontalness (front and back), and proximity (near and far). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have provided some interesting examples of how these orientational metaphors structure emotions, feelings of control, and quantity.

HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN

That boosted my spirits
My spirits rose
You are in high spirits today.
That gave me a lift
He is feeling depressed
My spirits sank
I am feeling rather low today
She fell into a depression

CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN

Get up
Wake up
I am already up
He rises early in the morning
He fell asleep
He dropped off to sleep
He is under hypnosis
He sank into a coma
He is under anesthesia

HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN

He is at the peak of his health
He is in top shape
He fell ill
He is sinking fast
He came down with the flu
His health is declining
He dropped dead
Lazarus rose from the dead

HAVING CONTROL IS UP; BEING CONTROLLED IS DOWN

He is in control over them
He is on top of the situation
He is our superior
He is in a superior position
He is at the height of his power
He is in the upper echelon
He ranks above me
He is under my control
He fell from power
His power is on the decline
He is my inferior

MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN

The prices are going up
The sales are going up
His income rose again
The prices are going down
His income fell
He is underage
Turn the heat down

HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN

He has a lofty position
He is going to rise to the top
He is at the peak of his career
He is climbing the corporate ladder
This promotion marks your upward mobility
He is at the bottom of the social hierarchy
She fell in status

GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN

Things are looking up
It was a peak year
He does high quality work
Things are bad; they are going down

VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN

He is high-minded
He has high standards
He is upright and honorable
He was underhanded
He stooped to doing that
What he did was beneath him
That was low-down behavior

FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP AND AHEAD

What are the upcoming events?
What is coming up next week?
What's up? (= What is happening?)

All of these metaphors are based on what has been called "the embodied mind." It is based on the assumption that human beings organize and structure thought in terms of their bodily experiences. What this philosophy does is challenge the old Cartesian adage that separates the body from the mind. In embodiment theory, the human mind is in the body and processes information through bodily behavior. This model is enactive; it does not separate the mind from the body. They both participate in the acts of knowledge. What Lakoff and Johnson (1980) are referring to by means of these orientational metaphors is the fact that human beings are organized spatially and participate in a world that reflects their orientation.

The Biological Orientation of Human Beings Structure their Concepts of Self
Parameter	Oppositions	Propensity
Verticality	Superior Inferior	Superior is directed towards the head; inferior is directed away from the head. There is a predisposition among humans for superiority. This is the basis for the orientational metaphors of CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN and HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN.
Horizontalness	Anterior Posterior	Anterior marks a position in front of the body; posterior marks a position behind the body. There is predisposition among humans for anteriority. This is the basis for the orientational metaphor of FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP AND AHEAD
Symmetry and Centrality	Lateral	Lateral refers to a side away from the midline. This is the basis for the orientational metaphor of RIGHT IS GOOD; LEFT IS BAD
Proximity	Proximal	Distal Proximal is associated with movement towards the torso; distal is associated with movement away from the torso. This is the basis of the orientational metaphor of KNOWN IS NEAR; UNKNOWN IS FAR AWAY

The propensity for the mind over the body is associated with the parameter of verticality in which Europeans praise qualities and actions associated with the mind: CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN and HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN. This predilection for some human qualities over others has been discussed by Robert St. Clair (Giles and St. Clair, 1987). It turns out that orientational metaphors structure the way in which social groups mark others as insiders or outsiders.

Language as a Value-Laden Medium of Expression in Culture
TRAITS	IN-GROUP (GOOD)	OUT-GROUP (BAD)
Intelligence	People in the in-group are seen as being very smart, highly intelligent, and industrious	People in the out-group are considered to be lacking in these qualities of intelligence. They are called by such names dumb, retarded, cretins, and idiots
Agility	People in the in-group are praised for their mental agility	People in the out-group appear to be praised for their agility, but they are only complimented on their physical prowess,
Humane	Those who belong to the in-group are seen as real and true human beings	Those assigned to the out-group are deemed to be at the edge of humanity and are accused of acting like animals and savages. They may be even lowered to the stage vermin and other low life
Religion	Ever since the Reformation, those in the in-side pride themselves in going to church and being good Protestants	Those relegated to the out-group are accused of having no God. They are called pagans, and heathens
Adulthood	Those in power are the adults and so they have defined themselves as being the center of the in-group. Adults know how to behave; they can be trusted	Those who are not adults cannot be trusted; They act like children, babies. Hence, they are members of the out-group. They need adult supervision.
Gender	In patriarchal societies only males constitute the in-group. Only males can be trusted to lead. Those who are in the out-group are not real leaders	Weak leaders are not real males, they are effeminate, and they have been emasculated. They act like females.

Every culture has its own way of naturalizing human behavior by means of orientational metaphors. Hence, it is time to turn to the concept of the embodied mind and the role that it plays in the cognitive sciences.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMBODIED MIND

As noted earlier, orientational metaphors can be found in all human languages. These metaphors are used by humans to orient themselves and they have much to do with the concept of space. Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1994, and 1998) has developed a whole phenomenological philosophy on how the human body influences and controls how human beings think about philosophy. He is a phenomenologist who was troubled by the Cartesian duality in which the mind and the body functioned as dual system. He argued that philosophers underestimated the significance of the body and its importance to philosophical thought. They are not aware of the role that embodied inheritance plays in the way that human beings think. Perception by means of the body is how human beings come to know the world. Hence, all perception is intrinsically cognitive. Descartes, he noted, was wrong in prioritizing the mental over the physical. Instead of the Cartesian adage of "I think, therefore I am" Merleau-Ponty suggests a different perspective: "I perceive, therefore I am." He argues that "we are our bodies." What he means by this is that there is no meaning which is not embodied, nor is there any matter that is not meaningful (Crossley, 1994). The mind is inseparable from the body. The perceiving mind is an incarnated body (Merleau-Ponty, 1994). Human beings never know things in their totality; what they know is always from the perspective of the body. Space, for example, is not an abstract concept, but one that is always related to the body that is situated in a world. It is always seen from the perspective of the body. It is not necessary in this phenomenology for an individual to be aware that he is perceiving (Merleau-Ponty, 1998). Human actions are largely habitual (tasks of skill). They are learned through imitation and responsiveness within an environment and a community. This intelligence is irremediably embodied. The human body understands the acquisition of a habit or skill. A movement, he argues, is learned when the body has understood it. It is learned when it has incorporated that experience into its world and is able to respond to it. Hence, Merleau-Ponty differs substantially from most European philosophers when he deals with dichotomies. They are never polarities. Such polarities lead to solipsism. They are always connected to each other such as the relationship of touching and being touched or looking at others and being looked at. These are reversible processes. They are always connected to each other. The belief that cognition is a mental representation has been a central tenet of the cognitive sciences. In this framework, the mind is thought to operate by manipulating symbols that represent features of the world (Gardner, 1987). In their work on the Embodied Mind, Francisco Varela and his colleagues (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991) present a different view of the mind. Cognition, they argued, is not the representation of a predetermined world by a prearranged symbolic mind. What actually happens is an enactment of the world and the mind that are predicated on historical events, personal and social actions that are needed to perform in that world. This being is the world requires an embodiment of the mind. This model is enactive because the mind is present in embodied everyday experiences. The human brain encounters about 20% of signals from the outside world and conjoins this with 80% of old templates, filters, memories, and beliefs about the world. George Lakoff dedicated his book (Lakoff and N??ez, 2000) to Francisco Varela. He and his colleague, Mark Johnson (1987) have worked within the paradigm of the embodied mind and have overcome many of the problems that Merleau-Ponty left unresolved. For example, Lakoff and N??ez (2000) demonstrate that contrary to popular opinion, mathematics has its origins not in symbols, but in ideas that are grounded in cognitive schemas and concepts. Mathematics is structured by the human brain and its mental capacities. For the most part, human beings conceptualize abstract concepts in terms of concrete terms and these ideas and modes of reasoning are grounded in the sensory-motor system. Conceptual metaphors provide the mechanisms by which these abstract concepts are understood in terms of concrete ones. The reason why these conceptual metaphors have gone unnoticed as metaphors is because mathematicians have taken them to be literal mathematical expressions. Consider, for example, the concept of putting things into groups. Children have this ability. They can discriminate things as separate groups by the age of four. This ability is inborn. It is a cognitive ability that human beings possess (Lakoff and N??ez, 2000: 15-22). Later, a child will be able to discriminate larger groups of numbers and perform the operations of addition and subtraction on these estimations of number. The basis for mathematical thought is already present in children . Children understand numbers, which are conceptual categories (Dahaene, 1997). Later, they will learn numerals, symbols for numbers (Arabic numerals, Roman numerals, etc.). The main point that Lakoff and N??ez are trying to make is the fact that the cognitive structure of advanced mathematics uses the same kind of conceptual apparatus that one finds in everyday thought. This conceptual equipment is embodied in human beings in the form of image schemas, aspectual schemas, conceptual metaphors, and conceptual blends. A common image schema used in mathematics is the container schema. Human beings are familiar with this schema as they have all experienced the human body as a container. A container has three parts: an interior, an exterior, and a boundary. This structure forms a gestalt, a holistic pattern. The image schema of a container has a built in spatial logic. There is an inside, a boundary, and an outside. What is inside a container is a substance. One may foreground or profile either the substance or the container. One may add an object X and explain its logic by means of the container schema. Let X = a pebble; X is in Y and Y is in Z. A pebble is in the water. Therefore, the pebble is in the glass. A pebble is outside of the water. Therefore, the pebble is outside of the glass. He put a pebble into the glass. Therefore, he put a pebble into the water. He took a pebble out of the glass. Therefore, he took a pebble out of the water. One may have containers situated in other containers and explain the location of objects within this configuration by means of the spatial logic dictated by the container schema. Terry Regier (1996) has built a computational neural model of a number of image schemas that explains the concept of containment that is central in much of mathematics. The container schema can provide the metaphorical foundations for many mathematical concepts such as CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS. A category is a bounded region in space. Objects that are located within a category are its members. Within a category, there may be other bounded regions or subcategories of a larger category. From this Lakoff and N??ez (2000, 44-45) explain some of the basic concepts of logical inference.

THE SPATIAL LOGIC OF THE CONTAINER SCHEMA
Source Domain Container Schema Inferences	Target Domain Category Inference

EXCLUDED MIDDLE Every object X is either in Container Schema A or out of Container Schema A.

EXCLUDED MIDDLE Every entity X is either in category A or out of category A

MODUS PONENS Given two Container Schemas A and B and an object X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B.

MODUS PONENS Given two categories A and B and an entity X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B.

HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM Given three Container Schemas A, B, and C, if A is in B and B is in C, then A is in C.

HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM Given three categories A, B, and C, if A is in B and B is in C, then A is in C.

MODUS TOLLENS Given two Container Schemas A and B and an object Y, if A is in B and Y is outside B, then Y is outside A.

MODUS TOLLENS Given two categories A and B and entity Y, if A is in B and Y is outside B, then Y is outside A.

The space-logic of the Container Schema is both perceptual and conceptual in nature. There is a built in logic in the schema that allows mathematicians to create the concept of containment central to mathematics. Metaphor is not a mere embellishment. It is the basic means by which abstract thought is made possible. These abstract thoughts are typically understood in terms of more concrete concepts by means of metaphor. Hence, metaphorical mappings are systematic and not arbitrary. THE MIND IS A MACHINE He is still grinding out a solution His mind isn't operating today My wheels aren't turning He is a little rusty today I can't think; I am running out of steam.

It is interesting to note that Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1961) has often been cited as the strongest proponent of the machine metaphor. His book, L'homme Machine (1748), openly argues that man is a complicated machine . His belief in the machine metaphor is so strong that he admonishes G. W. Leibniz (1954) for advocating a theory of monadology, which has spiritualized matter rather than materialized the soul. This, he notes, is an unintelligible hypothesis. He even attacks Réné Descartes (1637) and all the Cartesians for making the same mistake. They are in error, he adds, because they have taken for granted two distinct substances in man - the body and the soul. But, no one has seen the soul; it is a matter of faith. Consequently, this leaves one to only consider the body, which is a machine. Man, he argues, is therefore a machine. What is significant about this book by de la Mettrie is that it was the first clear statement of the belief that man is a machine. Many philosophers continue to attribute this mechanistic view of the body to Descartes who strongly denied this concept. This contrast between Descartes and de la Mettrie is further evidenced by their views on the role that the senses play in cognition. De la Mettrie found solace in the writings of John Locke (1956) who believed that knowledge must come from experience. Descartes, on the other hand, argued that neither one's imagination nor one's senses can give one any assurance of anything. The senses, Descartes noted, are fallacious. The ideal method of philosophy for Descartes (1913) was to be found in mathematics. De la Mettrie saw no need for locating consciousness within the soul. The brain, he remarked, has its muscles for thing, as the legs have muscles for walking. This approach to medicine is known as iatromechanics. It is systemic pathology that attempts to deduce all bodily functions from the laws of statics and hydraulics. Iatromechanics existed before de la Mettrie (T?nnies, 1974:20-21), but it was this physician from Saint Malo who legitimated the concept in his famous tome on L'homme la machine. De la Mettrie began his collegiate career ironically in Paris in the humanities and later studied rhetoric at Caens. He was a born orator who had a passion for poetry. Upon his return to Saint Malo in Brittany, he studied natural philosophy and was to later take the advice of his physician who recommended that he study medicine. De la Mettrie became a celebrated doctor because of his intellectual prowess. Early in his career he adhered to a mechanistic view of the body. Thought, he argued, is but a consequence of the organization of the human machine. His writings on this matter were published in several tomes, one of which is L'homme la machine. With the advent of the cognitive sciences (Gardner, 1987) the ontological metaphor of THE MIND IS A MACHINE had a rebirth. The new machine was the computer. It was a machine that was completely new to mankind. Before this time, machines were built for specific purposes. But with the rise of the computer, the hardware remained the same and only the software, the program to run the machine, changed. What was important about this new machine is that it enabled investigators to simulate a wide range of experiments by merely changing the software. These early computers were called general problem solvers. The same machine could function as a different machine just by changing the software that ran the machine. Many ontological metaphors are used to conceptualize a space as a container. What one sees becomes a visual field and this visual field functions as a container that is defined by one's field of vision. The ship came into view I have him in sight I can't see him because the car is in the way He is out of sight He is in the center of my field of vision There was no one in sight Ontological metaphors are used to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states. However, how these are treated within an ontological metaphor differs.

Events Conceptualized as objects A race is an event and is viewed as a discrete entity
For example, "The race began"

Actions Conceptualized as objects Participants in a race (the container) are substances in a container. For example, "He is in the race"
Activities Conceptualized as Substances The activity of running a race is a metaphorical substance and hence is within a container object. For example, "He could not get out of the race"
States Conceptualized as Containers Various kinds of states may be conceptualized as containers. When one is in a state of love, for example, one is contained in that state. In this case, "He is into racing" refers to a state. The runner is contained in that space.

Just as a cup of water is a container which has a substance in it (water), so too can ontological metaphors define objects as containers with substances in them. One may put things (substances) into a container or take them out of a container.

He put a lot of energy into racing
He tried to get of out the race
He came out of the race as a winner
He entered the race

Another kind of ontological metaphor can be found in personification. The metaphor allows human beings to attribute a wide range of experiences to nonhuman entities. These entities are seen as having motivations, characteristics and activities.

His theory explained everything
The facts argued against his theory
Life cheated him of his happiness
Prices are eating up the profits
Cancer caught up with him

In all of these cases, the subjects of these sentences are personified. They are examples of something nonhuman in human terms. Another area is which ontological metaphors occur are in grammar. Linguists no longer look at grammar as a set of formal rules about language. The function of grammar is to organize human concepts. Hence, metaphors also exist within grammar.

GRAMMATICAL METAPHORS
The creation of grammatical categories has been studied by many cognitive linguists (Heine, 1999; Heine, 1991; Dirven and Verspoor, 1997). These studies lead to the realization that metaphors are used to construct new grammatical concepts and categories. This process is called grammaticalization (Heine, Claudi, and Hunnemeyer, 1991).This process is pervasive within language and it accounts for many new grammatical constructions within language. Before the rise of grammaticalization and the realization that grammar is highly metaphorical, linguists had difficulty in explaining simple constructions such as phrasal verbs in English. These are among the more difficult verbal patterns in English that challenge linguistic analysis. These verbs are followed by prepositions and the problem facing linguists has to do with how these prepositions are to be analyzed.

to break in, to break out
to break into, to break out of
to break up, to break down

The problem is one of properly analyzing the morphological forms that follow some verbs. If the preposition that follows the verb is to be treated as part of the verb, then it is called a verbal particle and the whole construction is called a verbal phrase (Spears, 1996).

John looked up the telephone number.
John looked the telephone number up.

Many verbal phrases are followed by particles that can be separated from the head of the verbal construction.

Verb + Prepositional Phrase Construction

John ran up the hill (up = preposition)
John broke into the house (into = preposition)
Oswaldo broke out of prison (out = preposition)

Verb + Verb Particle Construction

John ran up the flag (up = verb particle)
John ran the flag up (up = verb particle
He broke down the door (down = verb particle)
He broke the door down (down = verb particle)

The more intriguing problem occurs within constructions whereby one does not know how to treat the morphological unit following the verb.

John ran up the bill
Mary broke up his marriage
Marcia broke in her new shoes
The war broke out

Is it a verbal particle (verb + particle) or is a preposition that belongs to the following noun phrase (verb + prepositional phrase)? In seeking a resolution to these questions, one should also ask other more revealing questions about these constructions. How, for example, does one explain the development of phrasal verbs in English? Where do they come from? Furthermore, how are these verbal expressions by semantically related? How does one discern whether the morphological unit involved is a verb particles or a preposition? These questions provide the focus of this re-investigation into certain complex verbal constructions in English. In order to better understand phrasal verb construction in English, one must first understand the role of metaphor in English, especially grammatical metaphors. In this essay, it is argued that there are three kinds of constructions in English that merit further clarification: verb + prepositional phrase constructions, verb + verb particle constructions, and two word or hyphenated verb constructions.
As noted earlier, what is significant about the use of metaphor in language is the fact that it is not limited to the creation of lexical items, but it is also used to create new grammatical constructions (Heine, 1987). For example, verbs of motion are used to navigate through physical space. In cognitive linguistics, such verbs belong to a movement schema (Dirven and Verspoor, 1998).

Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Location
John goes to school
John walks home
John runs to the park

The agent performs the action involved in moving towards a destination. There are many ways in which he can perform this action (walks, runs, goes, etc.). Such constructions are basic grammatical patterns and form the source of derived constructions. One may metaphorical extend this pattern by allowing the destination to be an event. The result is a new grammatical construction.

Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Event
Mary goes crazy
Linda goes to the party
Marcelo is going to laugh

The event may be mental (a mood, feeling, concern) or physical (the locale and the event itself). Another kind of grammatical metaphor developing out of verbs of motion describes future events. In this case the physical destination is not a present location, but a future one.

Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Future Locale or Future Time
John goes to S?o Paulo tomorrow
Sara is going to church on Sunday

Grammatical metaphors or grammaticalizations (Heine et al., 1991) are common in language. They provide the basis for new constructions within language. Since these related constructions are common to language, one should ask how they are categorized within linguistic theory. Before discussing prototype theory and its role in cognitive theory, it is important to understand how Verb + Preposition Constructions in English have been transformed historically into Verb + Verb Particle Constructions or even Verb + Clitic Constructions (two-word verbs). There are certain basic constructions that form a prototype for the creation of other kinds of constructions in language. These prototypes generate related senses of a construction that are used metaphorically. With the passage of time, these new constructions take on a meaning of their own and develop into new forms. In the case of Verb + Preposition Constructions, a prototype is employed in the construction of related forms. Eventually, the new forms emerge as two word verbs or Verb + Particle Constructions.

John ran up the hill (verb + prepositional phrase)
John ran up the flag (verb + verb particle)
John ran the flag up (verb + NP + verb particle)

The question now becomes one of distinguishing between two kinds of phrasal verbs, those that allow the verb particle to be relocated after the noun phrase and those which do not. The following examples do not allow such dislocation.

John ran up the bill
Mary broke up his marriage
Marcia broke in her new shoes
The war broke out

Hence, these are verb constructions that give the appearance of being verb + particle constructions, but they are not. They appear to be two-word verbs. They are verb compounds that are reminiscent of noun compounds in which some are hyphenated and some are not. There are three patterns for dealing with compound nouns in English:

Closed Forms: firefly, secondhand, softball, childlike, redhead, and notebook.
Open Forms: post office, real estate, middle class, full moon, and middle class.
Hyphenated Forms: six-year old, six-pack, over-the-counter, etc.

Given this tradition in English, one could argue that two word verbs function as hyphenated verbal forms whereas phrasal verbs do not.

John ran up the hill (V + prepositional phrase)
John ran up the flag (V + Verbal Particle + noun phrase)
John ran up the bill (run-up + noun phrase)

Currently, phrasal verbs are used for both verb + verbal particle and hyphenated verb constructions. Where clarification is need, the former will be referred to as phrasal verbs and the latter as two-word verbs.

John ran-up the bill (two-word verb)

Is there any evidence for such two-verb constructions? The answer is affirmative. One finds that when these constructions are changed into their nominal forms, they appear as hyphenated nouns.

Nominalizations: rip-off, spin-off, tip-off, write-off, show-off, etc.

The implications of these nominalizations merit further investigation (.Thomé-Williams, Ana and Robert N. St. Clair).

He wrote off the expenses. It was a write-off
He ripped off his customers. It was a rip-off

Now that the role of metaphor has been explicated within the context of cognitive linguistics, it is now time to turn to a relate trope, metonymy.

METONYMY
Whereas metaphor involved the combining of inputs from two or more semantic domains, metonymy refers to only one domain and its components. It turns out that metonymy has a greater function in human language than metaphor. In metonymy, one refers to a part to mean the whole of the intended domain or vice versa. Here are some of the common uses of metonymy (Thomé-Williams and St. Clair, 2003):

REFER TO A PART TO DESIGNATE THE WHOLE
Get your face over here. This construction is considered to be rude because it address a part of a person. It is a kind of depersonalization.
She married the crew cut A crew hair cut or a buzz hair cut is a very short kind of hair cut that was popular in the 1950s. In this context, she married a person, but his most outstanding or even disturbing feature is his hair cut.
Give us a hand This expression means that one wants others to join in to do work involving the use of one's hands. This could range from manual labor to simple manual tasks.
Lend me your ears This is a famous expression in Latin literature. It asks of others that they listen.
He wants to save face. This is a metaphorical concept characteristic of several Asian cultures. Its English equivalents is to save one's reputation, one's self image, or identity.

DESIGNATE THE WHOLE TO REFER TO A PART
Do you want more chicken? (piece of a chicken) One is not asking for the whole chicken, but only a piece of it.
He crossed the river (river refers to a part of the river)
The river is an ontological metaphor and as such it contains water that is flowing. One refers to a part of the river to refer to the whole concept of the river
Do you want pizza? (pizza refers to a slice of pizza) One is not asking for the whole pizza pie, but only a portion of it.

DESIGNATE SPECIFIC TO REFER TO A GENERAL CONCEPT
They shot the cutthroat (cutthroat for a murderer) This use of a metonymy refers to the particular act that a murderer committed. This use of metonymy provides a concrete image of the murderer.
I bought some new wheels (wheels for a whole car) This is a common expression in Modern English. When one buys a new set of wheels, it is metaphorically meant to refer to the whole car that came with those wheels. This expression differs from "buying a set of tire" which is not used metonymically.
They hired some new hands This is a reference to workers who do manual labor. Metonymy can be very revealing of people's attitude. A whole individual, in this case, is only seen in terms of the needs of others who want to hire him.
The law will arrest you (the law = policeman) The law is a common metonymical expression in Westerns to refer to the sheriff. Currently, it is used to refer to a policeman or the system of justice.

REFER TO GENERAL TO DESIGNATE SOMETHING SPECIFIC
The thief stole man wallet In this case the general category is thief and there are many kinds of thief. One kind, however, specializes in stealing wallets; viz. the pickpocket. Hence, the general term is used to refer to a special kind of thief.
The doctor operated on him The general category is the doctor. There are many kinds of doctors and the one who operates is called a surgeon. The use of this verb allows one to understand that doctor refers to surgeon.
The professor read his paper
There are many kinds of professors. If one is at a conference of historians or in a history class, the general term could easily be used to refer to a historian.

SUBSTITUTE A ROLE FOR A PERSON
The farmer came to town In some cultures, what one does for a living is an important status marker. One who farms for a living is a farmer. Such individuals live in rural areas and so this expression has several layers of hidden meaning.
The pitcher signed the contract There are many players on a baseball team. One of them is the pitcher. In this expression, the focus is not on the person signing the contract, but on the function that such a person performs for the team.
The catcher missed the ball Once again, there are many players on a baseball team and they perform different functions. One of them is assigned to catching the ball thrown by a pitcher. If anyone should not miss the ball, it is the pitcher. This sentence calls attention to the fact that this person failed to perform his proper function.
The Quarterback threw the ball There are many players on a football team. The one who is assigned to pass or throw the ball is the Quarterback. This sentence merely states that he is performing one of his proper functions.
The swimmer won the race Some people swim for relaxation and some prefer to compete. This use of metonymy specifies not only that one is a swimmer, but a certain kind of swimmer.
The lecturer read his notes One who lectures academically is a lecturer. Some university systems distinguish professors, from readers and lecturers. This sentence specifies the special role being performed.
The waiter disappeared again One who waits on a table is a waiter. In some countries the table is profiled. In Spanish, for example, the word for table is mesa and a waiter is called a mesero. In English, the person who waits on a table is profiled. What this sentence implies is the fact that waiters are not always available to serve their customer.

REFER TO A PRODUCT FOR THE PRODUCER OF THE PRODUCT
He read Goffman Erving Goffman is a noted sociologist from the Chicago School. He wrote numerous books. This producer of those books is used to refer to one or more of his publications.
He saw a Picasso at the museum Pacasso is a noted painter. His works can be found in various museums around the world. This sentence about Picasso refers to one of his paintings.
He played the Stradivarius Stradivarius is the best violin maker in the world. His products still remain and are highly praised. This sentence about Stradivarius is used to refer to one of his products.
He bought a Saturn Saturn is an American car company. It produces a line of different cars. In this sentence, the name of the company is used to refer to one of its products.

SUBSTITUTE THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE FOR ITS USER
He hired a gun to do the job The agent of this sentence hired someone to kill someone else with a gun. He refers to the instrument as a metonym for its user.
They changed the batter In baseball, batters are assigned to a sequence during their inning. A coach has the option to change that sequence of players who are going up to the plate to bat the ball. This sentence refers to the instrumental role that a person performs rather than to the name of that person who is to perform it
He met the skater A person who skates is a skater. The instrument that he uses to glide on ice is called his skates. In this sentence, the functional role of the skates is used to refer to the person who uses them.
The crown demanded an answer One of the functions of a king or a queen is to wear a crown on formal occasions. In this sentence, the instrument of royalty is used to refer to either the king or the queen.

SUBSTITUTE AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR HIS ACTIONS
Nixon bombed Hanoi Nixon was the President of the United States during the Vietnam War. He was also the Commander in Chief of the military and had administrative power over them. In this sentence, the bombing of Hanoi is not attributed to those in his command, but to the administrator of those actions.
Bush attacked Iraq Bush is currently the President of the United States. He is also in the role of the Commander in Chief of the military. Although his military forces bombed Iraq, this sentence refers to the administrator for his actions.
Napoleon lost the battle Napoleon was a European general who fought battles all over Europe. This sentence refers to his actions during one of those battles, the one that he lost. Here, the reference is made about the administrator of those actions.
Stengel won the pennant Stengel is the coach of the New York Yankees. Every year, baseball teams compete for the top position as the best team in the country. This is done by the actions of those under his command. The administrator is referred to in leiu of his actions.

REFER T0 AN INSTITUTION FOR THE PEOPLE REPONSIBLE
The Senate voted on that Bill Congress is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is made up of two voted members from each state in the union. This sentence refers to the institution rather than those elected officials who constitute it.
The Army instituted the draft The US Army is an institution that has the power to request Congress to institute a draft of civilians into the military for purposes of fighting a war. In this sentence, the reference is to the institution rather than to those in that institution who are responsible for initiating the process of a federal mobilization for war.
He fought the government The government is an mega-institution that is composed of many other institutions. In this sentence, the reference is to one of those many institution or even to the mega-institution itself.
The University raised its tuition. Academic universities are institutions that are made up of colleges. The board of trustees and the upper level of administrators of that institution have the power to raise tuition costs. In this sentence the institution is cited rather than those in the institution who control the process.


REFER TO A PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION
The White House denied the report. The White House is one of the federal buildings in Washington D.C. where the office of the President of the United States is located. There are people who work for the President and who issue reports in his name. In this sentence, one refers to the place rather than to those who work there.
Washington gave itself a pay raise again. Washington D. C. is a place where several federal institutions are located such as Congress, the White House, etc. Those who are in Congress, Senators and Representatives, voted themselves an increase in pay once more. The reference is not about the institution, but of the place where the institution is located.
Hollywood is making only adventure films Hollywood is a place in Los Angeles where the movie industry is located. Several film companies are located there. In this sentence, one refers to the play rather than to the institutions.
Wall Street is corrupted Wall Street is the name of a street in New York City where the Stock Exchange is located. Instead of referring to those institutions, the reference metonymically points to the place where those institutions are located.

REFER TO A PLACE FOR AN EVENT
Iraq is becoming another Vietnam Iraq is a country where a major war took place, an intervention brought about by the United States. Vietnam is another place where military actions were incurred by the United States. American citizens felt that the war in Vietnam was unjust. There is a similar ground swell of reaction against the intervention in Iraq. This sentence refers to one place where an event took place to refer to another place where it is believed that a similar event is taking place.
Remember the Alamo The Alamo is a military fort in San Antonio, Texas, where a major battle was fought against Mexican forces. Many lives were lost by Americans in that battle. This sentence addresses the place where the event took place. The place is used to invoke memories or stories of the event.
We are going to have another Watergate The Watergate is a building in Washington D. C. where the Democratic Party housed its headquarters during its presidential campaign against Richard Nixon, the Republican President. Nixon and his inner staff sent a group to break into those headquarters in order to gather counter information. This break-in was foiled and the trail was traced all the way back to the White house. Hence, this sentence refers to the possibility of illegal actions by one political group against another.

SUBSTITUTE THE CONTAINED FOR THE CONTAINER
Pass the salt When one says "pass the salt" he is referring to the container that holds the salt.
Do you want coffee? (a cup of coffee) When one offers coffee to someone, the reference is to a cup and its contents. One offers the substance by referring to its container.
Give me another Coke? (a bottle of Coke) Coca Cola is served in a bottle or a can. When one offers a Coke (a kind of coca cola), one offers the substance by referring to its container.
May I have some water? (a glass of water) Water is served in a glass or in a bottle. One asks for the substance and this implies the concomitant use of a container of that substance.

Metonymy is very revealing in that it portrays how one feels about another person. Lakoff (1987) has an interesting example involving predicate adjectives. He cites an example in which one is referring to a woman by the following expressions:

She is a Cellist
She is a lesbian
She is a communist.

In this case all of these expressions refer to the same person. Each predicate adjective construction refers to a different part of a person. Each makes a different statement about the same person. Predicate adjective constructions share this designative feature with metonymical expressions. Hence, when one says she is a servant, one refers to the function that such a person performs. The expression does not focus on other aspects of that individual. These attributions can be used either pejoratively or positively.

Pejorative Metonymy
She is a servant. One who is paid to serve another is called a servant. In this case, metonymy is used to highlight just one quality or function of that person. Implied in this metonymy is the dichotomy of rich versus poor, privileged versus downtrodden, etc.
He is the new hand The new hand refers to a manual laborer. This person is defined by what he can do for another person. Metonymy is used to highlight only one aspect of a full and competent human being.

Benefactive Metonymy
He is a new Dad Male human beings are complex. They accomplish many functions and play many roles. One of the more pleasant roles is that of being a father for the first time. In this case, the use of metonymy is benefactive. It refers to a positive experience.
She is a new Mother Female human beings are complex. They accomplish many functions and play many roles. One of the more pleasant roles is that of being a mother for the first time. In this case, the use of metonymy is benefactive. It refers to a positive experience.
.
What one accomplishes through metonymy is to foreground some aspect of the total picture because it is important or relevant to the context of the situation. What is highlighted and placed in the foreground may refer to one of several attributes - the function performed, the product resulting from an action, the event that occurred, the institution, or the instrument. It is interesting to note that many morphological affixes share these metonymical properties. Prior to discussing those, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at Predicate Nominative and Predicate Adjective constructions.

OTHER METONYMIC CONSTRUCTIONS: Metonymic relations can be found in both predicate nominative (John is a student) and predicate adjective constructions (John is happy). The former is used to designate membership in a class and the latter to refer to a part of the whole, a clear metonymic function. Examples of the former construction are listed below:

PREDICATE NOMINATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Martin is a student
Mary is a teacher
John is a Brazilian
Tigers are animals

What takes place in a predicate nominative construction? In one sense, one is saying that the individual involved is a member of a class. The class is designated by the predicate nominative construction. What does it mean to say that, for example, that John is a Brazilian? Surely his being is not limited to being a Brazilian. He may be a father, a teacher, an investor, and so on. What one finds in this construction is Venn diagram relationship in which B represents the class of Brazilian and A represents John and the intersection between these two represents the construction, John is a Brazilian. What does this mean? It means that one is dealing with reference to a part (being Brazilian) to the whole of a person (John). Hence, predicate nominatives are metonymic expressions. Predicate nominatives also refer to functions (John is a farmer), an event (Iraq is another Vietnam), or an institution (Washington raised the minimal wage), etc.
The other kind of construction that merits closer investigation is the predicate adjective pattern. In this case, one is making a statement about some quality related to a larger more comprehensive entity. Examples of predicate adjective constructions are cited below:

PREDICATE ADJECTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
John is sad What this sentence states is that John is in a state of sadness. John is the container and sadness is the substance that he contains. The more interesting question is whether or not sadness and happiness are binary adjectives. One may be either sad or happy, but one can be neither sad nor happy. If sadness and happiness are substances within a container, they function as polar adjectives. Either one substance or the other can be contained within John. However, one may say that John is both happy and sad. He is happy about one thing and sad about another. Hence, happy and sad cannot be said to function as bipolar or binary adjectives. They are states within a continuum of emotions.
John is tall Being tall is a state. What is interesting about this state is that it cannot be changed. It is a permanent state. In some languages, there are two kinds of linking verbs. One for temporary states and another for permanent states. In Spanish, for example, one may contrast the two which are translated into English as "John is tired."
Juan est? cansado (Verb = ESTAR) John is feeling tired.
Juan es cansado (Verb = SER) John is always tired.
Mary is pregnant Being pregnant is a binary adjective. One is either pregnant or not pregnant. There are very few binary adjectives in English.

The predicate adjective refers to some quality and this could also be represented by a Venn diagram. What is interesting about these constructions within the framework of metonymy theory is that both express the qualities of a whole person, a whole thing, or a whole event. Hence, regardless of whether these qualities are innate or ascribed, they are metonymic relationships.

MORPHOLOGICAL METONYMY: There are many metonymic relations that can be found among morphological derivations. These are called metonymic suffixes. These suffixes have grammatical meanings. Most investigations of suffixes have focused on how they change grammatical categories. This concern is understandable from a semasiological point of view. However, when one looks at how concepts are used to construct words, new patterns of meaning emerge. Those which are of interest to this investigation are those suffixes which function metonymically. This is accomplished by those suffixes that highlight a part of the whole. What is highlighted may be a function, an attribute, or a subcomponent of the system.

THE AGENTIVE SUFFIX: There are many suffixes that are added to verb to refer to the performance of a role associated with that verb. The one who works a farm performs the act of farming and is called a farmer. The following examples from English demonstrate how productive this process is. By means of an agentive suffix, a verb is transformed into a new word in which only a part of a person is defined by as a function. There are several interesting patterns of agentive suffixes in English and in and these are illustrated below:

Verb Form
Agentive Form Commentary: The agentive Suffix is an Aspectual Marker
dance
sing Dancer
singer All agentive forms are created from verbs.
Walk
Farm
Bake
Tan
Walker
Farmer
Baker
Tanner

Many English names have agentive suffixes. This is because people in the lower classes were identified by what they did for a living. There were three classes of people: clerus (clergy), milites (military), and labores (workers). Members of the working class were identified by their functions, by how they served the upper classes.

CITIZENSHIP SUFFIX MARKER: There are suffixes in English that designate that one is a citizen of a certain country. Being a citizen is only a part of the many attributes that a person may possess. Consequently, this suffix functions metonymically.

Country Citizenship Suffix Commentary: Suffixes function as aspect markers
Brazil Brazilian A person from Brazil is a Brazilian
Cuba Cuban A person from Cuba is a Cuban
Guatemala Guatemalan A person from Guatemala is a Guatemalan
New York New Yorker A person from the New York is a New Yorker
Spain Spanish A person from Madrid is a Madridian.
Washington Washingtonian A person from Washington is a Washingtonian
Texas Texan A person from Texas is a Texan

Metaphor and metonymy play dominant roles in grammar. Many expressions that appear to be regular grammatical patterns are, in essence, based on figurative language. For example, predicate nominative and predicate adjective constructions are metonymic in nature. They refer to the relationship of the parts to a whole within a single semantic domain.

John is a student (Predicate Nominative)
John is happy (Predicate Adjective)

These expressions refer to a part of the many attributes of the subject of the sentence. In addition, these metonymic constructions can be used for metaphorical expressions.

John is an animal
The surgeon is a butcher.

As noted earlier, what makes these metaphoric expressions different from metonymic ones is that they bring together ideas, social scripts, patterns of behavior, and social roles from two separate domains and unite them into a blended cognitive mental space. In this blended space, some of the features of the inputs are used and others are not used. The result is a unique new expression, a metaphor, in which new features and patterns emerge.

PROTOTYPE THEORY AND LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES
How are categories defined? The major breakthrough in cognitive grammar occurred when both anthropologists and psychologists replaced the philosophical concept of a logical grammar with a more pragmatic model that was based on communicative intent. This focus on logical form had been such a dominant cultural imposition in Western intellectual history that it was very difficult to differentiate what philosophers wanted language to be from what it really was. The classical view of categorization can be traced back to Aristotle who felt that natural objects in the world could be categorized into groups and defined by unique attributes.

Major Premise: Socrates is a man
Minor Premise: All men are mortal
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal

This view of categorization has certain interesting assumptions. It is predicated on the belief that categorization is, in essence, a theory of reference. It is a way of discussing the real world of physical objects. It is based on the assumption that the attributes that define classes of objects are shared by all of its members. Furthermore, it was believed that the intension (the set of attributes) determines the extension of a category to which items are members. In other words, categories within classical philosophy did not have internal structure .
Why was classical categorization theory replace? What changed this reliance on traditional models of philosophical categorization came from the work of Eleanor Rosch (1978). In her visit to study the Dani in New Guinea, she found that the speakers of this language had only two color terms: mola for bright, warm hues and mili for dark, cold ones. After exposing the Dani to forty color chips in order to study their perceptual abilities, she confirmed that they indeed had a very different culture, a confirmation of her belief in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis . However, upon continuing her investigation, she discovered some rather surprising information. She noted that the Dani did physiologically recognize colors in a manner very similar to those of Americans. The differences in naming colors were perceptually structured in the same way others outside of this cultural milieu. They used similar strategies in the storage, remembrance, and recollection of colors. They differed in how they were categorized in their own language. Humans do not differ in how their nervous systems organize colors, but how they name them, place them into categories. Recent research on color categories argue that cultures differ as to the location of the focal points of ideal colors, i.e., the prototype colors for color categories differ across cultures because they have different focal points. In some cultures, for example, the colors of blue and green have focal points that are closer to each other and for this reason many shades of blue and green overlap and are seen as color confusion by those outside of the cultural matrix.
Rosch continued her research into other aspects of linguistic categorization. She was intrigued by the fact that in many cultures there are thousands of words for birds, but no one overall category for birds (Palmer, 1996). In the United States, for example, one can readily find a general categorization of all birds into a common class.

Superordinate Level: Birds
Basic Level: Prototype with the exemplar of a robin
Subordinate Level: blue bird, black bird, jay bird, cardinal ….

What does it mean to say that a superordinate level or a general class for birds does not exist? What Rosch found was that in these cultures exemplars or prototypes can be used for designate a whole class or category. It is as if native speaks of English referred to the class of all birds as robins.
Her findings no longer directly challenged the traditional concept of categorization. Others were soon to follow with other cultural examples of the new categorization system (Dirven and Verspoor, 1998).

Category: chair
Prototype: chair
Exemplar Kitchen chair
Non-Prototypes: swivel chair, office chair, high chair, arm chair,
wheel chair, desk chair, electric chair, etc.

What is interesting about categorization is that some of the senses of a category are closer to the prototype and therefore more naturally belong to the same class of objects. Others, such as electric chair, are marginal as a member of the class of objects categories as chairs.

Prototype Structures
The Category The category is really a container. The classical theory of a category is that is its defined by unique elements within each and every substance. In prototype theory, however, a category is defined in terms of its prototype.
Primary Substance This is the ideal example that constitutes the category. The prototype or ideal example is highly concrete in shape, form, color, and function. The ideal category for a bird in North America, for example, is the robin.
Sense or non-primary substances The senses are other members of a category. Some are closer to the prototype or exemplar and others are not. Those senses that are closer to the exemplar of the robin are bluebirds, cardinals, etc. Those that are farthest away from an exemplar differ in substantial ways. The penguin and the albatross fall into these non-typical senses of a category.

Cognitive psychologists (Howard, 1987) learned is that people do not categorize their experiences of the world in accordance with traditional logic as evidenced in creation of logical forms espoused by advocates of transformational grammar (Senft, 2000; Taylor, 1995). Humans create categories for things, places, events, and experiences. Their representations are ideal. For example, the category of bird is represented by an ideal bird, which in North America, is the robin. In Australia, the ideal category for a bird may be the canary and in Brazil, it may be the parrot. These ideal examples are called exemplars. What is important about exemplars is that they provide a richness of details associated with the human experience. So, if one mentions a bird, the category invokes an exemplar that connotes wings, a certain wing shape, a certain color, a certain kind of beak, flight patterns, food preferences, etc. Although one would like to believe that these categories refer to the real world (Kant's noumena) , it does not. Categories are phenomenological. They reflect the perceptual structure of the perceiver. Even though categories harbor prototypes, what constitutes a prototype is usually culturally defined.
In addition to categorizing experiences, events, and percepts in terms of a basic member or prototypes, they are further organized them with regard to superordinate, subordinate levels. A chair, for example, is a category by itself. However, it belongs to a larger category of furniture. The prototype represents the basic level for a category. It is the one that is most easily learned by children and most readily recalled by them.

What is interesting about this theory of categorical levels is that it accounts for lexical networks. Words, it has been argued, do not exist alone. They are part of semantic domains. They relate to each other within lexical networks. Hence, when one thinks of a door, other elements are invoked that are part of a door. This study of the relationship of the parts to the whole is called mereology. Hence, the lexical item "door" invokes such related concepts as "door knob, key, key hole, door jamb, front of the door, back of the door," etc. Lexical networks that have been investigated by linguists in the past were based on genetic relationships, diachronic relationships over time, e.g., the relationship that exists among words such as father, paternal, patronymic, etc. . The new approach to networking is functional and cultural. There are cultural reasons for creating lexical networks and these differ over time and place.
Diachronic linguistics is replete with how lexical networks change through time. One can find interesting examples of these changes within the history of the English language. For example, in Old English, creatures were defined in a category that was based on movement in space. This network structure is evidenced in the following Old English words:

vogel (bird) = movement in space
fisch (fish) = movement in water
wyrm (worm) = movement under ground
tier (animal ) = movement on land.

This spatial classification is interesting because the metaphor of space was a significant part of medieval thought. This metaphor even included the Great Chain of Being whereby humans where visualized as belonging to a vertical space in which the Pope was closer to God and the masses were closer to animals.
How does prototype theory work in linguistics? It is interesting to study the change of these lexical networks through time. In modern English, meat refers to the flesh of animals used for food. In Old English, mete simply meant food.

The mete shall be mylk, honey and wyne. (mete = food)
After mete, before mete, at mete (mete = meal)
boef vs kuh (beef versus cow; beef is mete or edible flesh)
lambe vs mutton (lamb vs mutton, mutton is mete or edible flesh)
It is mete and drinke (mete = food)

What changes over time is the exemplar. At one time the exemplar of mete was food. There were other senses of this word such as a meal, a kind of food (not a drink) and the fleshy parts of animals (boef, mutton). Over time, one of the senses of the category of mete emerged as the prototype of a new category, meat.

Old English Modern English Commentary
Category meat meat Meat [mete] meant food in Old English. In modern English it meant animal flesh. Hence, there was a shift in the ideal category or exemplar
Prototype mete meat The class is called mete in Old English and meat in Modern English
Exemplar Food Animal flesh In Old English, the ideal example of mete was food; in Modern English, the ideal example of meat is food from animal flesh
Sense Animal flesh,
Food, Drink, etc. The was a shift from a non-typical example to an ideal example over the centuries

What was a secondary sense of food in Old English becomes the primary meaning behind the modern English word meat. This change of meanings over time raises even more significant questions about the social history of the world of Old English as compared to Modern English. There more interesting questions behind these prototypical shifts remain to be resolved within the context of social history. What culinary customs transformed this re-categorization from Old English to Modern English? Was this development based on a practice within one subcultural before it spread to others or was it an intrinsic part of the culture as a whole? The new cognitive model brings linguistic theory back into the center of research in the humanities.
Another interesting shift in lexical networks over time can be found in the two senses of the word dog between the 14th and the 16th centuries. During the earlier period, the general category was that of hounds. There were many kinds of hounds: poodles, spaniels, greyhounds, and dogs. The prototype of this category was the dog and the exemplar of the dog was the mastiff, a large strong kind of dog that was used to guard houses. Later during the 16th century, the major category was the dog. Under the new categorization, dogs included the mastiff, poodles, spaniels, and greyhounds.

14th Century 16th Century Commentary
Prototype Hound Dog In the 14th century, a hound was the name of a category that was best exemplified by the mastiff. In the 16th century, the category shifted from hound to dog and the new exemplar was the dog.
Exemplar Mastiff dog Shift in ideal representative of the class
Senses Poodles, greyhounds, spaniels, and dogs Mastiff, greyhounds, spaniels, and poodles Non-ideal examples of the class

Once again, one wonders what may what has transpired in this time frame to cause this shift in how the category of hounds was re-categorized as a category of dogs. The answer can be seen in the exemplars themselves. When the exemplar for hound (mastiff) was replaced by the dog (another kind of hound), this shift caused the category to be restructured and renamed.

COGNITIVE BLENDING THEORY
When Gilles Fauconnier (1994) began to work on the syntax of counterfactuals, he came to the realization that the use of models of formal logic failed to account for natural language semantics. He argued that what was needed in linguistic theory was not a model that was based on the capacities of the mathematical systems used by logicians, but a different model, one based instead on the capacities of the human mind. His cognitive model of language became known as mental space theory. In his model, referential structure is indicated by mental spaces. In his theory, certain expressions set up conditional mental spaces that are separated from reality spaces. Consider the following sentence:

If John has children, John's children are blond.

The marker "if" sets up a conditional mental space C that is separate from the reality space, R.

If R then C

What this sentence states is that if John has children then in the conditional mental space C, those children are blond. The presupposition holds for the mental space C, but not necessarily for the mental space R. What links domain R with domain C is a cross-mapping system of conceptual connectors. With this model, the domains are set up, structured, and connected. These connections are cross-domain functions that specify counterparts and projected structure from one mental space to another. R is called a reference trigger; C is the reference target and the arrow is the connector that performs an identity function. With the concept of mental spaces, Fauconnier (1994: 12) is able to account the following sentences:

In Len's painting, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
In Len's mind, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
Len wants the girl with blue eyes to have green eyes.

In his earlier writings, Fauconnier (1994; 1997) is concerned with the mapping of multiple realities, multiple roles, multiple connectors, and double space builders. Later, Fauconnier (1997) expands his model to account for mood (indicative, imperative, and subjunctive) in language. He also introduces the concept of blending (1997: chapter six). A blend is a third mental space that inherits structures from its input mental spaces. These input spaces are connected to a generic mental space. This generic space reflects some common abstract structures and organization shared by the inputs. One of the ways of understanding this connection can be found in earlier discussions of the metaphor: The surgeon is a butcher.

Input 1: the butcher
Input 2: the surgeon
Generic Space: what the inputs have in common
The blend: contains emergent structures not contained in the inputs
The metaphor resulting from the blend: The surgeon is a butcher.

There is much to be said about the roles associated with these input mental spaces. One works in a butcher shop full of the carcasses of animals and the other is surrounded by an expert team of assistants in a sterilized environment. The butcher hacks away at body parts with a meat cleaver while the surgeon uses a scalpel to operate on his patient. What Fauconnier wants to highlight is that information about the roles of the surgeon and the butcher can be found in the generic space. The input spaces are projected into the mental space of the blend where several processes take place. One of these new processes is Composition. The projections from the input spaces make new relationships available in the blend that did not occur before. There is also a process of completion which allows knowledge of background frames, cognitive and cultural models to be views as a part of a larger self-contained structure in the blend. The patterns triggered by the inherited structures are completed into the larger emergent structure. Finally, there is a process of elaboration in which the structures are elaborated or simulated (running the blend) in accordance with the new logic of that mental space.
In a later work, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) expanded their concept of conceptual blends. They addressed the phenomenon of imagination, not to celebrate it, but to make a science of it. They argued that conceptual integration is at the heart of the process of imagination. In the process of conceptual integration, for example, input mental spaces are projected into a blended space and develop emergent structures through composition, completion and elaboration. This fundamental cognitive operation, they argue, has not been studied and merits further investigation. What one finds in this latest book is a detailed discussion of the processes of conceptual integration, identity, and imagination. . Numerous examples are provided to illustrate the nature of this process.

THE BUDDHIST MONK: Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40-50) provide an example of the Buddhist Monk. In this scenario one visualizes a monk walking up to the top of a mountain. One also imagines this same monk waking back down from the top of the mountain. The question is asked about where along this path he will meet himself. In order to resolve this imaginary scenario one needs to establish one input in which the monk makes his journey up the mountain. One also needs to establish another input in which the monk descends the mountain. These input spaces undergo a partial cross-space mapping (the monk, journey up the mountain, the journey down from the top, the top of the mountain, the bottom of the mountain, the motion from source to goal and the links between these. A generic mental spaces maps onto each of these inputs and contains what they have in common, a moving individual, his position, a path, motion, and direction. In the fourth mental space, there is a blend between the two inputs. Each of the mountain slopes in the two inputs (the journey up and the return) is projected to the same mountain slope in the blend space. The two days of travel, one going up and the other returning down, is blended into a single day. From this blend there develops emergent structures that cannot be found in either input.

Composition: In the inputs there are two individuals, one going up the mountain and another returning back to the bottom of the mountain. However, in the blend, there are not two moving individuals but one.

Completion: New relations exist in the blend. Instead of having two individuals making a journey on separate days, what one finds is two individuals making the journey on the same mountain at the same time and on the same day. They share the same background frame.

Elaboration: This involves running the blend. In this simulation one finds two people waling on a path in opposite directions, one begins the journey from the bottom of the mountain and the other begins the journey from the top. The running of this blend is an elaboration. It is a new structure, an act of creation.

The Network: The geometric correlations of time, position, location, and different mental spaces form a network. They form a conceptual integration network of four mental spaces and their correlations. The generic and the blended spaces are related. The blends contain generic structures captured in the generic space. Emergent structures in the blend are generated through the composition of projections from the input to create something new that did not exist in the inputs. In the inputs one finds two Buddhist monks traveling on different days, one is going up the mountain and the other is coming down from the mountain. In the blend, they are the person traveling at the same time. Emergent structures in the blend are also created through completion in which the blend recruits a great range of background meaning, recruited frames and scenarios. Finally, emergent structures can also be found to occur in elaborations, the simulation in which one runs the blend. It is in the running of the blend that one resolves the problem of the Buddhist Monk meeting himself along a path. Hence, composition, completion, and elaboration account for the creation of emergent structures in the blend.

DEBATE WITH KANT: Another interesting example of cognitive blending occurs in the debate with Immanuel Kant, the note German philosopher who lived in the 1800s. He posits a situation in which a university professor claims that Kant disagrees with him. The cognitive frame in this case is a debate that takes place with a professor of philosopher who is not living. In order for this scenario to work, one must posit two input mental spaces, one for Kant and one for the contemporary university professor. In the generic space, one encounters the fact that they are both philosophers, both have established modes of expression, both deal with issues, etc. However, in one of the input spaces, Kant speaks German whereas his debate, the American philosopher, speaks English. Kant is no longer living and his American counterpart is. In the blended space, there are retorts, challenges, and rhetorical claims by both philosophers. In this blended space, they both speak the same language and the both exist in the present. The blend has a rich emergent structure. Once again, one has created a mental space in which new scenarios can be envisaged.
There are certain types and subtypes of vital relations that exist with the mental space of the blend. Among these are change, identity, compressions of space and time, cause and effect relations, entering the world of representation, role functions, analogy, disanalogy, similarity, category, and uniqueness (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 93-101). These categories provide a cognitive scientists with a research agenda, areas of investigation that merit further study. One should add to this list the function of generic space. This is a mental space that enables one to abstract relationships from inputs that can assist the network to develop a working blend. There are certain problems associated with this assumption. The first has to do with the role of memory within this cognitive network. In earlier writings, Fauconnier (1994) referred to this network of mental spaces as a model of short term memory. It is equivalent to the virtual memory that one encounters when turning on a computer. No matter what was created while the computer was in operation, the information will be lost if it is not saved before turning off the machine. The second problem has to do with long term memory. When one turns on a computer, the information that is uploaded functions as the equivalent of long term memory. This model does not adequately account for long term memory. It hints that it comes from generic space, but there are no strong claims on how such memory functions within the network. If this integrated cognitive network is to adequately account for blends, it must include long term information in the form of social scripts. This concept will be introduced shortly.
Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 120-137) argues that there are four kinds of cognitive networks that operating among mental spaces.

Types of Cognitive Networks

Simplex Networks This is a simple kind of integration network. It can be found as a frame that is used in the explication of family roles. Hence, this frame prototypically applies to human beings. Consider an integration network contains this frame of the family and in the other space there are two human beings, Paul and Sally. In the blend, one would arrive at the claim: Paul is the father of Sally. The mapping across these two input spaces has a Frame-to-Values connection. The role of the father connects to Paul and the role of the mother connects to Sally. What makes simplex networks function comes from the fact that the relevant part of the frame in one input (X is the Y of Z) is projected onto the values in the other space.
Mirror Networks The Mirror Network occurred in the Buddhist Monk and the Debate with Kant. It is an integration network in which all spaces (inputs, generic, and blend) share an organizing frame. The organizing frame in the Buddhist Monk was the journey; and the organizing frame the debate with Kant was the rhetorical argument. The organizing frame in the mirror network provides a typology for the space that it organizes. This is evident in the Buddhist Monk example. Mirror networks can integrate many different spaces provided that they share the same organizing frame. Mirror networks can perform compressions of time, space, identity, roles, cause-effects, change, intentionality, and representation. This is because all of the elements within the network share the same frame. For example, time and space are compressed in the Debate with Kant.
Single-Scope Networks In a single scope network, there are two inputs but each has different organizing frames, but only one of them is projected to organize the frame. What this means is that both frames must compete for integration into the blend. The example provided for this is a scenario in which two men are boxing in one input space and two business executives are competing in the other input. In the blend, the boxing frame dominates. In the cross-mapping, however, there is a mapping between each boxer and the executives. In the blend, one executive knocks out the other in a business venture. Headliens: Murdoch knocks out Iacocca..
Double-Scope Networks Each of the inputs in a double scope network has a different organizing frame. Often these frames clash with each other. In the blend, an only part of each frame is included. The computer desktop provides an example for this type of network. The computer screen is treated as a desktop, a piece of furniture. On it one finds a waste basket, a filing cabinet, and computer commands (save, open, close, print, etc.).

MEANING AND LANGUAGE: As Lakoff noted earlier, metaphor is not about language. It is about thought. Meaning is not to be found in language, but in thought. What language does is to prompt the construction of meaning. Language is used to select structures and elements that go into a cognitive blend. If the blend can be elaborated, then it has meaning. Meaning comes from running a blend. We humans social construct reality, they are constructing cognitive blends. They enter into those blends and live in them. When they live in these blends, they function as social and cultural constructs. Meaning is the imaginative product of blending. Two people may experience similar inputs and derive separate blends from those experiences. For example, a professor should have a richer blend than his student because he has access to a greater depth of inputs and long term memory. Two individuals who interact with each other across cultures, will arrive at different blends even though they share the same inputs. In the next chapter, the implications blending theory for cognitive scaffolding will be discussed.

SIMILE: Given the concept of elaboration (the running of a blend), the difference between simile and metaphor becomes very clear. A metaphor has meaning because it has been elaborated. It has been subjected to cognitive simulation. Simile, on the other hand, is nothing more than a proposal for a blend. It has not been elaborated.

John is like an animal (Simile, not elaborated)
John is an animal (Metaphor, blend has been elaborated.

Cognitive blending theory is concomitant with current work in cognitive linguistics. It makes use of cognitive schemas and assumes that communication occurs through cognitive blends. Language is about the organization of thought; it is about cognitive blending; it is about invoking scenarios and negotiating them with others is a highly contextualized situation.
There are several problem areas with the current theory. One is that is meant to account for psychological constructs and as a consequence it does not account for social interaction among individuals. The following comments address these limitations.

SCRIPT THEORY
For decades linguists have focused on abstractions and universals in language. As a consequence of this concern for universal laws, they have overlooked the crucial role that contextualization plays in language. The richness of language can be found in its contexts. This awareness for context grew out of the work of Rosch (1978) who was the first to document how prototypes that are based on detailed exemplars form the the basis for the process of categorization. This realization also emerged from attempts by computer scientists to represent human thinking (Minsky, 1975; 1985). In order to have a robot perform human tasks, it needed to envision the world as humans do. Minsky (1985) used the metaphor of the society in the mind to illustrate how social concepts play an important role in how human beings think and act together under normal circumstances. They work from an image of society that is represented in the human mind. For Minsky, that image existed in the form of a computer program that knew and understood the world of human being, a social world. In order to create such a program in the computer, Minsky needed to provide a plethora of rich details about how human beings live, act, and think. It was this contextualization that enabled him to successfully accomplish his robotic research.

STRUCTURAL EPISTEMOLOGY: Another problem with most models of language is that they fail to incorporate non-verbal modes of processing and expressing information (K?vecses, 2002: 57-66). There are several reasons for this lack of theoretical concern with other modes of cognition. European culture is logocentric. It is a rhetorically based culture that assumes that knowledge primarily exists in verbal form. As a consequence, one find that the equation of language with thought underlies most linguistic thinking until recently (Fodor, 1982; 1983). One has to visit other cultures, especially those in Asia, in order to see how little verbal expressions matter while interacting with others. In many of these cultures, there are expressions about not trusting language. In Japanese, for example, one says that "speech is trash." They judge one's character by what a person does and not what he says. Many indigenous cultures also place more of an emphasis on nonverbal communication. In these cultures, silence is communication (Basso, 1970; 1990).
Structural epistemology is a cover term that emphasizes the fact all knowledge cannot be communicated unless it has some form of expression. If a concept does not have a corresponding form, it is ineffable. Behind the concept of structural epistemology is the recognition that there are many different ways available to human beings for self expression. One is not limited to verbal expression. Hence, the relationships between the contents of a sign system and its forms of expression are complex. In the field of Linguistics and its sister discipline of semiotics, it is assumed that the sign system consists of meanings that are embedded into forms, the conduit metaphor. Structural Epistemology expands that concept to include other metaphors of expression within the contexts of cognitive sociology. It not only incorporates the standard verbal metaphor of content being embedded into form, but it also includes the metaphors of resonance and visual space. These may differ significantly from the language metaphor (the conduit metaphor). For example, the metaphor of resonance comes from music. Many cultures express themselves in terms of musical metaphors (being in harmony, moving with the flow or the force of nature, etc.). Hence, meaning is transferred through resonance and empathy. Many cultures also organize themselves around metaphors of visual space and embed themselves into movements within that space (non-verbal communication, ideography, metaphysics of the quaternity, symbolic dance, and sacred art). As noted earlier, the study of Structural Epistemology is an attempt to understand the various ways in which human information systems are organized knowledge across cultures. It does not claim that only one metaphor of communication exists, such as advocates of semiotics and formal linguistics do. It allows several systems to co-exist and understands that within a given culture only one of these systems may be legitimated and advocated as the official metaphor of communication even though all three communicative metaphors may co-exist within a society. In addition to the cardinal metaphors of communication, the model of structural epistemology is also concerned with how transducers constrain and modify information. These transducers may be biological and social. Just as biological transducers operate within a limited frame within the electromagnetic spectrum, social transducers also operate within frames of knowledge and belief. All of these directly impact on how knowledge is processed, understood, and conveyed within social systems. Knowledge is mediated through cognitive categories and represented as language, resonance, and visual space.
The rationale for this different approach to communication systems comes from the distinction between the study of substance or structure and the study of form or pattern. In studying substance, one asks what it is made of. In the study of form, one asks what its pattern is. The former has to do with quantitative research while the latter is qualitative in nature. The study of patterns is important for human systems research because it reveals the emergent properties of a system. These are the properties of organization. Without organization, one does not have a system, merely aggregates. Vision, speech, and hearing all have their own theories of substance. What is being investigated here is their theories of self-organization, their emergent properties, and their non-linear networks. Hence, structural epistemology is about the emergent properties (the systemic properties) of linguistic, visual, and auditory networks within the context of human information systems.

LANGUAGE AND THE TRIUNE BRAIN: Earlier models of the cognitive sciences focused on a theory of the brain. With the advent of the second generation of the cognitive sciences, the focus shifted to a theory of the mind. Currently, there is an overlap between the two traditions. Lakoff and Johnson (1991) are more concerned with a theory that embodies the mind. Their theories do not fully reside there, but their quest is to account for how the mind is embodied. Fauconnier and Turner (2002), on the other hand, are more concerned with mapping networks and integrative functions within the mind. Before resolving this issue, one must ask just what the brain is. Which part of the brain do these theories address?
The human brain is not one, but three: the reptilian, the limbic, and the neocortex. Each of these areas of the brain performs different functions and emerges phylogenetically and developmentally from different paths.

THE TRIUNE BRAIN AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The Triune Brain Function Commentary
The Reptilian Brain
The reptilian brain is preverbal and controls autonomic life functions such as the heart and the lungs. It is concerned with fundamental needs such as survival, physical maintenance, preening, and mating. It is similar to the brain possessed by reptiles that preceded mammals about 200 million years ago. Its impulses are instinctual and ritualistic. It lacks language.
The Limbic or Mammalian Brain
The limbic brain is involved in bonding needs, including emotions and attachment. It acts as the brain's emotion factory and creates chemical messages that connect information into memory. Retention of information can be significantly increased when it is presented in an emotionally charged context. The limbic brain is common to all mammals and evolved about 60 million years ago, after the dinosaurs perished.
The Neocortex
The neocortex controls such high-level processes as logic, creative thought, language, and the integration of sensory information. It is divided into two hemispheres. This brain is found in all mammals and is most developed in Homo sapiens. It constitutes five-sixths of the toal brain mass and has evolved over the last million years to produce the human brain.
Where does the embodied mind fit into this system of the triune brain? When Lakoff and his colleagues refer to body schemas, which parts of the brain are they addressing? It appears that the concept of the embodied mind has to include both the limbic and the neocortex. It has to include the limbic system because of Lakoff's metaphor of emotion within the context of the container schema. The problem that one encounters in this model of the embodied mind is that emotions belong to the limbic mind whereas the model for the container schema is accounted for in the visual cortex, part of the neocortex system. How does this schema connect the limbic system with the neocortex? Philip Lieberman (2000) contends that linguists working within the first generation of the cognitive sciences have predicated their belief in language being a universal or innate function. He argues contrary to Pinker (1994; 1997 ) and Chomsky (1972; 1975) and their assumption that language reside solely in Broca's and Wernicke's areas of the brain and argues that it is dominated by the primitive subcortial basal ganglia, structures associated with the reptilian-amphibian brain. Damage in these areas of the brain, he adds, can cause more harm to linguistic cognition than damage to such areas as Broca's area. Various aspects of "high" cognition are regulated by parallel circuits that involve the basal ganglia and other subcortical structures. Hence, the functional language system is a distributed network that involves parallel processing traditionally associated with motor control. He adds that the modular theories of the brain proposed by Chomsky have more in common with computers than to the constraints of evolutionary biology that structure the anatomy and the physiology of the human brain . Hence, human language is not a separate functional module, but a functional neurological system made up of many separate abilities. Within this context, language is a device for coping with the world. It is a remarkable by-product of remote reptilian ancestors that were coping to survive, practiced their abilities to avoid hazards, seize opportunities, and survive for another day. Lieberman claims that language is not biologically special and it is not based on recent developments within the human species. It is predominantly a learned function. He notes that even the ability to walk upright, which first generation cognitive linguists often cite as evidence of an innate ability among humans, is a learned skill.

Functions of the Reptilian Brain
Cerebellum The primary role of the cerebellum is to maintain balance and coordination of voluntary movement. The cerebellum initiates movements and is required to make these complex motions work correctly. It also plays a role in learning movement skills.
Medulla The medulla helps control bodily functions such as respiration, digestion, and heart rate.
Midbrain The midbrain aids in many sensory and motor functions
Pons The Pons passes and receives information about movement
Brain Stem The brain stem includes a bundle of nerves connected to the spinal cord which allows the body and the brain to communicate.

Given these functions within the reptilian brain, cognitive scientists need to explain how these functions emerge as cognitive schemas. How, for example, does the amygdala transfer fear, anger, social attraction, and sexual response into motor schemas that emerge as cognitive constructs associated with the language of fear, anger, and social attraction? What role does the thalamus play in the construction of body schemas that emerge as orientational metaphors in language? What role does the hypothalamus with its the four F's of feeding, fighting, flight, and fornicating play in the emergence of cognitive schemas associated with war metaphors? What role does emotion play in the rational thought? There is much more to do within the embodied mind model than linguists have even addressed. There is not just one brain but three. One is used for instinct, another for emotion, and still another used for intellect.

THE THEATER OF THE MIND: Evidently, most of what Lakoff and his colleagues have considered in their theory of the human brain is the neocortex region. Linguists are aware that the mind is embodied, but they have not even begun to address seriously how these links with the tribunal brain account for motor schemas, cognitive schemas, integration and cognitive blending. The reason why linguists have failed in this attempt is obvious. They have not even begun to consider how the brain and its functions relate to human language. Much has been predicated on inferences based on the modular theory of first generation cognitive scientists. Even those who are operating within the second generation of the cognitive sciences have addressed this problem from the perspective of the neocortex rather than from the other parts of the triune brain. There is nothing wrong with this approach except that what linguists are engaged in is not a theory of the brain, but a theory of the mind, the neocortex. In particular, they are operating within a dramaturgical metaphor called the theater of the mind, a theory about language and its function within the neocortex (St. Clair, 2004). The theater of the mind is a dramaturgical metaphor that continues to resurface in the history of ideas (St. Clair, 2002, Chapter Four). One of the clearer statements of this concept can be found in the work of Erving Goffman (1959; 1974). He argues that human beings present themselves to others in the stage of life. They are playwrights in that they construct their own personal and social scripts, life goals. They are actors in that they perform the roles that they have created for themselves. They are critics in that they evaluate their own performance while in the presence of others. They are set designers in that they dress themselves and their environments to fit the roles that they have selected for themselves in life. In the cognitive blend model, it is assumed that several inputs are somehow selected and placed in a mental space where they under simulations. If the running of the blend works, understanding is said to result. What is missing is the fact that inputs into the cognitive blend do not only come from the context of the social situation, but is also orchestrated by a playwright, the individual who has his own script, stage directions, and audience. However, this playwright has to be able to rewrite his plays while interacting with others. This is because the others in his life, especially the significant others, are also sharing his stage and running their own theatrical productions. This social aspect of human interaction needs to be incorporated into cognitive blending theory. One does not stand alone on stage without an audience, stage hands, and fans. Life is predicated on a series of mini-dramas and it is argued within this framework that these mini-dramas constitute the scenarios or social schemas that motivate human interaction. Life is dominated by the metaphor of play, a dramaturgical metaphor.
It is important because the blend is where the theater of the mind occurs. After one has constructed a imaginative context, then one is able to refer to events, actions, and social scripts within that context. This is because the cognitive blend constitutes the theater of life. In his discussion on metaphor and metonymy, K?vecses (2002: 145) struggled with certain tropes. For example, he asks how one can distinguish between metaphor and metonymy since so many tropes suggest metaphorical origins.

Metaphoric Expression: The creampuff was knocked out.
Metonymic Expression: We need a new glove.

He claims that the metaphoric expression can be rephrased as simile; the metonymic expression cannot.
The boxer is like is like a creampuff.
*the third baseman is a new glove.

He concludes that this test clarification between metaphor and metonymy provide further evidence that these are two different kinds of figurative language and they have different kinds of functions. Metonymies operate within the same domain and have to do with the relationship of the whole to its parts.

They stood at the altar (part of the scenario for the whole)
She took the pill (the category for one of its members)
The crown addressed the people (synecdoche, a special case of metonymy )

He notes that metonymy is often used for participants who are involved in some kind of prototypical action. Instrument for action: to shampoo

Agent for action: to butcher, to author
Object involved in the action for the action: blanket the bed
Result for action: a screw-up
Manner for action: he tiptoed

What is interesting about metonymy is that it requires contextualization. This suggests that the process is closely related to visual thinking. One has to visualize a scene before articulating how its parts are closely connected to each other. Therefore, in metonymy one has to visualize the contexts of the situation. What one is trying to create in the blend is a stage scene or a play. Elements are chosen to be inputs into a possible dramaturgical blend. If the blend works, it becomes the context for numerous linguistic expressions involving metaphor, and metonymy. If the blend is a potential metaphor, it appears as simile, a possible blend . Consequently, the theater of the mind provides the context for the generation of other metaphorical and metonymical expressions after a blend has been successfully run.

THE VISUALIZATION OF CONTEXTS: Metonyms are highly contextualized. They require detailed visual scenes in which its various parts are related and integrated into a whole scene. The restaurant scene discussed in an earlier chapter provides such a situation. In a restaurant, there are people who perform certain roles and each of these roles comes with its own social script.

Explicandum Dramaturgical Blends
Bakhtin noted that when two people are conversing face-to-face, each sees what is behind the other. Each speaker, however, is not aware of what is behind him. In the theater of the mind, both place this background on the stage located between them. They use this shared stage in order to interact with each other and better understand the context of the situation. Each person acts as a playwright and creates his own theater of the mind. Each creates his own blend of what is happening. If these individuals create different scripts of the same situation, they will create separate blends. They will also play different social roles, and stage the events in disparate ways. Each has constructed a different social reality of the shared event. Each has a different script theory.

The Restaurant Schema under Social Script Theory
Event Frame Dinning at a restaurant
Social Roles Waiter, customer, cashier, busboy, manager, cook etc.
Episodic Functions Enter a restaurant. Approach the host. Have someone direct the customer to a table. Have someone bring a menu to the customer. The customer peruses the menu. Have the waiter approach the customer and ask for an order. The customer puts in his order. The water leave and eventually returns with the food. The waiter signals the end of the main meal by asking about deserts. The waiter customer signals the end of the meal by asking for the bill. The waiter brings the bill or the check. The customer either pays the waiter or pays the cashier. The customer pays the cashier. The customer may leave a tip. The customer leaves the restaurant.
Lexicon Waiter, customer, table, main meal, deserts, tip, cashier, restaurant, the bill, the check, the menu, etc.
Script Enter a restaurant, approach the cashier, get assigned to a waiter, go to your assigned table, accept the menus, read them, make an order, wait for the meal, eat your meal, discuss the topic of conversation during the meal, wait for the waiter to ask if you want to have a dessert, order the dessert (0ptional), receive the bill, leave a tip, pay the cashier, leave the establishment.

Each person in the restaurant has his own social script. The waiter, for example, knows his duties and how to perform them. He knows his customers by what they order, what table they are sitting in and what section of the restaurant they are located at. Hence, he may refer to a person in these contexts by means of metonymy.

The ham sandwich wants more coffee.
Table five is leaving.
I am working the back today.

SCENARIOS, SCRIPTS, AND EPISODES: One of the problems in metaphor theory has to do with the explication of the domain in which events occur. Much of this information is suggested as tacit knowledge. What is needed is a better definition of the situation and its structure. These can be found in more complex structures such as scenarios, scripts, and episodes.

Module Description
Scenario A scenario is a complex scene in which various actions are concatenated and orchestrated. A play is one kind of scenario. It consists of a whole story that is articulated in various parts known as acts. Scenarios involve a large number of roles working together. The restaurant schema is a scenario. It has its roles, its functions, its own social drama. It is a recurring play that has its own stage (front and back). The play begins when customers enters the premises and closes when they leave.
Episodes Episodes are personal ventures that occur with a scenario. These will be discussed under plot structure. Many individuals personalize aspects of a scenario and perform their own mini-dramas. They have episodic lives.
Scripts These are the stage directions. They are social scripts that tell individuals how to act out their own parts in a social drama. The one who orchestrates a scenario has his own script; those that are involved in articulating the various aspects of this social drama have their own individual scripts. These scripts constitute a part of the roles that people play in life. They may include what kind of uniform to wear, what kind of things to say, and so on.

The restaurant scenario has been discussed in some detail throughout this chapter. The same is true for social scripts. It is now time to look at episodes (St. Clair, 2002) and episodic memory (Tulving, 1983).

A literary study of episodes can be found in the study of plot structures (St. Clair, 2003). There are certain plots that occur over and over again in life. These plots have to do with the human condition, people and their fears, hopes, desires, etc. There are some 20-24 master plots that can be found in all forms of social drama (Tobias, 1993). Hence, the plots themselves are scenarios because they are concatenated scenes. However, these scenarios have subsections, subplots, and mini-dramas. These are the episodes. They are personalized accounts of individuals in a larger social drama. An interesting example of a scenario and its episodic functions can be found in the quest plot (St. Clair, 2003).

THE QUEST PLOT: The metaphor of the journey underlies the quest plot. It represents a scenario that frames literary events along a trajectory. The protagonist is the hero who begins his journey in search for something that will dramatically change his life. This action-driven plot dominates Western literature. These are many tales about a hero who is on a journey. Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, for example, is quest plot. So is the story about the wanderings of Don Quixote, the Man from La Mancha. Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz was also on a journey. The hero is obsessed by this search. He is changed by the process. If his quest is for a material object, he is enriched by the search. If his quest is for psychological development, he grows cognitively during the process. And, if the hero is on a spiritual journey, he is raised to a new level of consciousness and the end of his journey and acquires hard earned wisdom. He learns something about the world and about himself. When the journey is completed, the hero is usually wiser. He has earned his wisdom. There is always an incident which motivates the hero to commence this journey.
" For Don Quixote it was his desire to become a knight. Even though this first modernistic novel was meant to be a satire on the chivalric novel, it does use the same plot structure of the quest. Many heroes, however, have the assistance of a friend who accompanies him. Don Quixote had Sancho Panza.
" Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz involves a quest plot. She is unhappy and wants to change the circumstances of her life. She is also on a quest. What is fascinating about the Wizard of Oz is that there is not one quest, but four. In addition to Dorothy's quest, one finds that the Tin Woodman is searching for a heart; the Lion is seeking courage; and the Scarecrow searches for a mind. However, each episode along the journey provides a challenge for the protagonist. He may travel this path alone. Many heroes, however, have the assistance of a friend who accompanies him. Dorothy had the company of the Tin Woodman, the Lion, and the Scarecrow.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE QUEST PLOT
The Scenario and its Episodes
Act One Act Two Act Three
The Question The Journey The Answer
One asks the question
The journey begins.
The hero leaves home.
He encounters obstacles
He has a helper The quest is fulfilled.
The moment of realization
The hero gains insight.
The hero is rewarded.

The quest plot has much in common with the morphology of the Russian folktale. The hero begins a journey. He leaves home to commence the search for an object. The villain enters the story. Along the way, the hero encounters many obstacles. He may have helpers. He may be falsely accused. Finally, his quest is fulfilled; he is rewarded. The story ends. In action plot stories of the quest, the complication of events may consist largely of chase scenes. There is a crisis, and a resolution. In the Western, there is a big showdown, a major gunfight, a major stand off. In adventure stories, the hero encounters a major task, the taking of a well-defended hill, the blowing up of bridges, breaking the enemy's code, etc. In the tales of the errant knight, he hero leaves home to fulfill his quest of saving a castle, obtaining the Holy Grail, or some other major quest. His rewards consist of ascending to the throne and winning the hand of the princess in marriage.

THE MALE QUEST: An interesting interpretation of the quest plot in terms of a Jungian spiritual journey can be found in the writings of Robert A. Johnson (1977a). He argues that the journey taken by the knight errant is a spiritual one. He is not searching for the real princess, but for the ideal women who is within himself. In Jungian Depth Psychology, terms that men and women are androgynous (1980). In each male (andros) there is a woman (gynos); and, in each woman there is a man. These, as have been noted, are psychological ideals. Karl Jung (1968) designates the female within each male is known as the anima (Lat. feminine spirit). He argues that a man is not whole or individualized until he comes to grasp and understand this part of his own psychological being. The male projects this ideal anima onto other woman. Projection is an unconscious psychic mechanism. One does not decide on what to project onto others. It just happens. Hence, he does not fall in love with a person, but with a projected ideal. The anima is a personification of an ideal woman that exists within the psyche of the male. A woman also has a male ideal within her. This spiritual force is called the animus (Lat. masculine spirit). It is an unconscious force within her. It is a personification of the masculine ideal within her. Hence, when a woman falls in love, she projects this ideal male onto the other man. When a person falls in love, he feels perfectly whole. Jung refers to this process as individualization. This state of ecstasy, Jung notes (1980) is reminiscence of the myth of Anthropos, the original man. Plato recounts the story of the original man in the Symposium. The original human beings were perfectly round. They had four legs, four arms, and two faces which looked in opposite ways. These human prototypes were exceptional beings. They possessed astounding qualities. They rivaled the gods in their great intelligence. The gods feared the Anthropos and envied their qualities. They wanted to reduce their power and decided to cut the spherical beings into two parts; one was male and the other was female. When one falls in love, he meets his other half. In the reunion of these severed halves the anima and the animus become individualized. What Jung finds important about this myth of Anthropos is that they represent Archetypes (the original types). The anima and the animus are the building blocks in the psychic structure of every man and woman (Jung, 1980). The reunion of these archetypes is charged with psychic energy. Their projections produce a state of numinosity. They constitute a return to the original state of the original human being; half male and half female.
Myths and fairy tales provide interesting examples of anima projection. Robert Johnson has selected the myth of Parsifal's search for the Holy Grail as an example of plot of the male quest. The Grail myth arose in the twelfth century and spread throughout Europe. The French have their version of this myth as told by Chrétien de Troyes, and so do the Germans in the tale by Wolfram von Eschenbach. The English version can be found in the stories of King Arthur and his court (Le Morte D'Arthur). The version used by Sanford (1974) is based on the French tale. The Grail myth is a story about the male psyche. It is a story about mythological man. The psychological adventure begins with the Grail castle. The Fisher King is in misery. He has been severely wounded. He groans; he cries and he suffers constantly. His wounds are fatal and yet he cannot die. The misery extends throughout his kingdom: the land is in desolation; the crops will not grow; the cattle will not reproduce. Even among the privileged, the knights are killed and maidens weep. All over the land, many parents die and their children become orphans. All of this happens because the King is wounded. This state of affairs came about years before when the King was an adolescent. The story is told about him wandering about the woods when he came onto a camp. It was a strange event: all of the people where gone. He noticed a salmon on a spit roasting over the fire. Because he was hungry and wanted to partake of a piece of the salmon, he reached out to grab it. It was very hot and as a consequence he burned his fingers. He was badly wounded and put his fingers into his mouth to relieve himself of the pain. He was wounded by a fish and from that time onward he was called the Fisher King. The salmon, Sanford (1974: 9) notes, is a symbol for Christ and he interprets this tale as a spiritual quest. The hunger that the King felt was a spiritual one. The King has had the taste of spirituality and will never be the same. The experience has changed him. The Holy Grail is kept at the castle of the Fisher King. He could be nourished by this chalice of the Last Supper, but is unable to touch it because of his wounds.
At this point, the story turns from the Fisher King to a rustic lad from Wales who is raised alone by his mother, Heart Sorrow. He is untutored, naive and wears homemade clothes. One day the youth was playing when he saw five knights riding by on horseback. He was dazzled by the sight of scarlet and gold trappings, shiny armor, shields, lances, and other paraphernalia of knighthood. He rushes in to tell his mother that he saw five magnificent kings and that he wants to leave home to join them. She tells Parsifal that his father was a knight and was killed while rescuing a fair maiden. His two brothers were also knights and were killed in battle. She tries to detain him and fails. Johnson (1974: 5) notes that the lad thinks that he is on a journey of perfection, but in actuality he is beginning his journey of completion. He has begun his question of individuation. Before leaving, she tells him to respect all fair damsels, to go to church daily where he can find food, and she instructs him not to ask any questions. He leaves home to begin his journey to find the five knights. Eventually, he comes upon a tent where he finds a fair damsel. He cherishes her and takes a ring from her finger as a talisman. She is waiting for her beloved knight and warns Parsifal to leave lest he will be killed. He leaves and on his way he encounters a powerful Red Knight. He wars a scarlet tunic and has red armor. He stops the knight and asks him how he could become a knight. The Red Knight is perplexed by the naive youth. He sends him to King Arthur's Court. The Red Knight was at this court earlier and overwhelmed them with his power. He left there with many gifts.
Parsifal's journey leads him to King Arthur's Court. He is brought before King Arthur and asks him to enable him to undergo training for the knightly arts. The kindly King agrees. A damsel at the court sees Parsifal and bursts into laughter. He spends six years at the Court and becomes a man. The damsel who laughed at him now finds joy in his presence. An incident occurs at the Court in which the damsel is insulted and Parsifal vows to revenge this insult. He asks King Arthur for permission to have the horse and the armor of the Red Knight who had threatened the Court six years earlier. Parsifal sets out with his page to find the Red Knight. They meet and have a duel. Parsifal kills the Red Knight. He pierces him through the eye.
He mounts the horse of the red Knight and goes on to Gournamond castle where he learns the ways of chivalry. He learns two lessons from Gournamond. First, the only proper pursuit for a knight is to search for the Holy Grail. This means that he must be no physical intimacy with a woman or there is no hope for the Grail. The second lesson that he learns is that when he enters the Grail Castle, he must ask the question "Whom does the Grail serve?" Parsifal begins his journey and soon comes upon the castle of Blanche Fleur (White Flower) and finds a fair maiden in distress. Sanford (1974: Chapter Four) argues in Jungian terms that she represents the distress within himself. He saves her and continues his journey to the Grail Castle.
Parsifal finally comes upon the great castle. He goes to the courtyard and four youths come out to meet him. They prepare him to meet the Fisher King. He is finally brought before the King. The whole court of 400 knights and their ladies are in attendance. A great banquet is served. The Holy Grail is passed about and each guest makes a silent wish. Parsifal knows that he must ask the question: "Whom does the Grail serve?" But, he also remembers that his mother told him to ask no questions. Parsifal remains silent. The King makes him the gift of a sword and after the banquet Parsifal is led to his quarters and put to bed. In the morning, he wakes to find that not a soul is to be seen. He knocks on doors and even checks the courtyard, but all is empty. He mounts his horse and goes over the drawbridge. It closes immediately upon his departure. Miraculously, the Grail Castle disappears. Nothing is left but the forest. Sanford (1974: 49) notes the Grail Castle represents a place of precious feminine quality and that the Grail is the epitome of all that is feminine. It is not a physical place, but an inner reality or ideal. It is the experience of the soul and a projection of his anima. Parsifal lost his opportunity for his own spiritual and psychological growth when he did not dare to ask the question that Gournamond advised him to ask. Instead, he listed to his mother complex and it lost him his ability to stay within the Grail Castle. Such is the nature of the Grail Quest. It is a tragic journey. It represents what Parsifal cannot have within his present state of consciousness. Parsifal is torn between his masculine and his feminine sides. He is listening to his sword-wielding mentality. He is out of balance. He must continue the journey of the knight. He has not suffered enough. The real battle that he is fighting is not outside of him. His real enemies are not the other knights and their glorious deeds. The real battle is within himself. He must confront his anima. He must become whole. His journey is one of individuation. He needs to recognize and develop the feminine side of himself.

THE FEMALE QUEST: Another description of the spiritual quest can be found in the writings of Robert Johnson (1977b). He argues that all psychological journeys begin with the mother. The male leaves the mother and quickly learns to establish his ego boundaries. He is prevented from being a "mother's boy" by his father who wants him to exhibit his masculine side (the animus). One of the consequences of this detachment is that the male will grow up lacking a development of his feminine side (the anima). The female also goes through a journey, but hers differs from that of the male. She also finds her natal and psychological connections with her mother and comes to identify with her at the most deep and intimate levels. She does not learn to develop her own ego boundaries. She becomes her mother. She identifies with nurturing, caring, and loving. The major crises in her life will come about with the occurrence of two tragic events. One is when her mother dies and breaks the psychological bonding she depends on and the other occurs when her children grow and she is left an empty nest and with no one to nurture or care for.
Just as the tales of knighthood portray the male journey towards individuation, there are also many significant stories which present the trials and tribulations of the female journey. The Greek myth of Amor and Psyche best represents the nature of feminine individuation for Robert Johnson (1977b). The story begins in an ancient kingdom in which a king and a queen have three daughters and one of them is Psyche (Greek "soul"). She is beautiful and charming. She is reminiscent of Aphrodite who was the goddess of femininity. However, Psyche is the new Aphrodite. At this point the differences between these two figures should be elucidated. Aphrodite represents the unconscious. She was born in the water when the genitals of the god Uranus were severed and she fell into the sea. Water is symbolic of the unconscious. Psyche, on the other hand, represents consciousness. She was born on land when a dewdrop fell on the land and created her. Since she was not born in the sea, she was born of the earth and she is symbolic of the consciousness. What motivates the story of Psyche is her loneliness. She is worshipped by many, but she is not courted. She is not close to anyone. She is untouched, unrelated, and unmarried. Her father, the king, is concerned for his daughter. He goes to an oracle for guidance. The oracle is under the control of Aphrodite who is jealous of Psyche. As a consequence, the oracle pronounces a terrible judgment upon Psyche. She is to be married to Death. She is to be taken to the top of a mountain where she will be chained to a rock and left to be ravished by this awful and dreadful creature. Once again the symbolism of this event merits comment. Her wedding procession will be a funeral cortege. The flood of her tears will extinguish the torches and leave her alone in the darkness. What this means, in essence, is that a maiden dies on her wedding day. She is to die at the hands of a man. It is not in her nature to be subject to a man. Furthermore, marriage is a form of death for any women. For her it is a total commitment. She is required to change her name, to leave her home and friends, and to leave her youth in order to enter into motherhood. For her, marriage is a form of a sacrifice. What makes this so tragic is that she is the one who is being sacrificed. The myth of Psyche is about the psychological and spiritual evolution of the feminine soul. She represents the end of feminine naiveté.
The other person in the myth of Psyche is the Greek figure, Eros. He is the son of love and is known by several other Latin names, i.e., Amor, and Cupid. His mother is Aphrodite. She wants things to return to the way they were when she was in power. Hence, she represents tradition and Psyche represents change. She instructs him to enflame Psyche with love for her new husband, Death. Hence, he plays the role of the animus within Psyche. When Eros goes to entrust the arrow of love into Psyche, he falls in love with her. He takes Psyche away from the mountain of death and brought her down into the valley of Paradise. It would seem that the myth would end here in paradise. However, it seems that all paradises fail. The Garden of Eden had its serpent, and Psyche has her two sisters. They are jealous of her. She is married to a good man and she is living in paradise and they are envious of her situation. They try to lure Psyche away from the garden paradise. When this fails, they ask to visit her. She tells Eros of these events. He senses danger and warns her about their intent. He makes a covenant with her. If she disobeys him and breaks the covenant, she will become a mortal. Furthermore, he tells her that under these conditions of the covenant, he will leave her and punish her with his absence.
Psyche is aware of the covenant and is torn by the demands of her sisters. She allows them to visit her several times. It was on their third visit that her sisters devised a devious plan. They convince Psyche that her husband a serpent who wants to devour her and her unborn baby. They tell her that they have a plan to save her and her unborn child. In the middle of the night, when he is in deep sleep, she must hold a lamp onto his face and sever his head with a knife. Psyche agrees to their plans and makes preparations to kill her husband whom she perceives as a serpent. At night, Eros comes to bed with Psyche and he falls into a deep sleep. Psyche takes the lamp and holds it up to his face. She is bewildered by him. He has the face of the god of love, the most beautiful creature on Mount Olympus. She is terrified by her intent to kill him. She thinks of killing herself instead. She drops the knife and in her movement she accidentally pricks herself on one of his arrows. The result is predicable. She immediately falls deeply in love with him. She is still holding the lamp (of consciousness) before him and drops of oil fall on his right shoulder. He wakes in pain and being a winged creature, he takes flight. Psyche clings to him and is carried away out of paradise. She cannot hold on any longer and falls to the earth. She is exhausted and feels desolated. Eros tells Psyche that she has disobeyed the covenant. She and her child to be are to now to become mortals. Eros flies away and leaves her forever. He flies back to his mother, Aphrodite. He takes refuge in her.
This myth of Psyche is part of the quest plot. The sisters of Psyche represent her shadow. They are the forces around her that will cause her to become conscious of her animus. In this new state of consciousness, she will come to know Eros as he really is. However, this lesson of life has been earned at great expense. He has been death to her. The maiden and the innocence in her had died. The lessons of life that she were destined to learn from her first marriage were avoided only to return in a different form in her marriage to Psyche. Psyche can no longer depend on Eros. She must now learn to develop and to express her own inner Eros, her animus. It is interesting to note that Psyche did not use the knife on her husband. The knife and the sword are things that men use. What she did was concomitant with her feminine side. She used the lamp of consciousness, a feminine symbol. The oil that burnt Eros is also a feminine symbol for oil supplies the lamp with light. Consciousness plays an important part in this myth because it enable Psyche to go from "falling in love" with Eros to "loving" him. To fall in love is a divine illusion. It does not last. Loving someone is not an illusion. It is durable and realistic. When Psyche becomes a mortal, she no longer sees Eros as a god. She sees him as he really is and she has survived the experience. In Greek mythology, a mortal who touches something super mortal or godly never lives to tell the tale (Johnson, 1977b: 32). Psyche has encountered the god of love and has lived to tell the tale. She has lighted the lamp of consciousness and expected to see a beast, but she saw the god of love. She came to understand her animus and has demystified it. In Jungian terms, she has become individuated.
The Jungian models of the male and the female quest is concomitant with Western literary models of the hero and the heroine. They also reflect much on psychoanalytic thinking (Whitmont, 1969) in which argues that all psychological development begins with the mother archetype and the path away from the mother is different for males and females. The male comes to associate emotions with his mother and is taught at an early age to deny his emotions so as to distance himself from other women and to consolidate his commitment to male bonding. He takes on activities which prove his maleness and he castigates males whom he considers to be emotional. This act of machismo occurs across a wide variety of cultures. The challenge that the male must go through before becoming psychologically mature is a simple one. He must recognize his own emotionality. He must accept the anima within himself. The journey of the female away from the mother differs from that of the male. She is closely aligned with her mother. She has defined herself in terms of her mother and has identified with her ego boundaries. Her world falls apart when her mother dies or when her children leave home (the empty nest syndrome). Her challenge is life is also a simple one. To attain psychological maturity, she must define her ego boundaries. She must recognize that she is an individual who is separate from her mother. The part of her that is male, her animus, must be recognized. She has to become more assertive about her own goals and values in life.
The plot quest represents a scenario in which various parts of the whole are concatenated in the form of a journey, a quest. This journey is not the same for all. Men and women have their own psychological journeys. These journeys constitute the episodes in their lives. These are also structured and can be defined in terms of their parts. People who imitate these personal quests are, in essence, leading episodic lives. Other kinds of episodic ventures can be found in the social games that people play.

SOCIAL GAMES AS EPISODES: Johan Huizinga (1955) advanced the hypothesis that play is a significant part in culture. This is because it transcends the immediate needs of life and enables one to pretend. Furthermore, it allows one to impart a special meaning to the daily patterns of life, and transforms the ordinary into the divine. He sees in the Greek drama the embodiment of this situation whereby the enactment allows one to recapitulate and identify the act with its mystical origin. Some acts or dramas are represented as imitative acts of life [mimesis] and others involve actual participation, a methectic event. He notes that the rite is a unit of action, something acted (dromenon). When one performs a rite, it represents a cosmic happening. Hence, what one tries to do in representing a ritual act is to identify with the original event (Huizinga, 1955: 14-15). This is why Huizinga attributed cultural significance to plays. They provide the opportunity to crate new images and to manipulate old established ones. Social dramas actualize anew and recreate events that have been already established. Social dramas have the unique function of maintaining symbolic order. Huizinga was a social historian, but his concept of the cultural significance of play can also be found among phenomenological sociologists. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). The re-enactment of the symbolic event reifies the experience and convinces the participants in the drama that they are indeed dealing with the appropriate social reality.
The concept of play, as Huizinga has noted, has many similarities with that of an illusion. As noted earlier, this should not be surprising since the word "illusion" comes from the Latin word in ludo, which means "in play." But there are differences. Play has its rules and regulations and these determine how the outcome will enfold. In play, Huizinga adds, people wear masks and become another person (cf. Greek, persona "mask"). But the actor does much more than wear a mask; he re-presents a special happening, a symbolic act. His representation is a mystical event, a cosmic happening. This comportment, however, differs significantly from an ordinary stage performance. The drama, in this case, is memethic. It is acted out. Whereas in the case of the stage production it is mimetic, it imitates life. Hence, for Huizinga, play takes on ritualistic dimensions; they correspond to the re-creation of a cosmic event. It becomes an enrapturement. Its raison d'être is mythical. Obviously, he has a reason for creating this dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. For him, play is sacred and work is profane. They belong to separate domains. There is another explanation within the contexts of structural epistemology for the differentiation between work and play in European cultures which Huizinga has overlooked - play is dialectal and involves the exploration of new mentalities, whereas work is rhetorical and is involved in the predefined constructs of a given system in which options are either severely limited or controlled. This shift in the rationale for the distinction between work and play also enables one to explain why, for some people at least, their work is a form of play -- they have the freedom to explore and redefine their work place whereas others do not.
Huizinga's theory of play went unchallenged until the work of Roger Caillois on Les jeux hommes appeared in 1938. What followed in this treatise was a brilliant critique in which Caillois demonstrated how Huizinga seemed to ignore some forms of play and even minimize others. Callois expanded on the range and the diversity of the forms of play. He noted how Huizing failed to elaborate on the various needs served by the phenomena of play within the larger context of culture theory. Caillois argued that there are four basic types of play:

Ludus Games that require skill and patience
Agon Games of competition, contests
Alea Games of chance, dice
Mimicry Games of simulation, mimesis
Ilinx Games of vertigo, whirpool
Paidia Games of uncontrolled fantasy

These four types of play are linked in a continuum ranging from LUDUS or skilled games at one end to PAIDIA or games of fantasy on the other. The reason why these types of games are of interest culturally is that they are not equally dominant in all societies. For example, some cultures are agonistic and others are not. They may have a propensity for a fatalistic (aleatoric) view of life. Most of Huizinga's discussion of games, it should be noted, tended to deal only with memetic cultures. Hence, these groups differ culturally.

THE MAJOR CATEGORIES OF GAMES
ROGER CALLOIS
AGON ALEA MIMESIS ILINX
Demonstrated by Competitive Sports Manifested by Gambling The Life of the Theater Evidenced by the Frenzy of the Roller Coaster
The Contest, Confrontation Cultures Fatalistic Culture Escapist Culture Panic Culture
Individuals want to compete, winning is everything. People take chances with their lives and their possessions Individuals want to escape into another world, they want to hide in the illusions of others The ultimate escape through self destruction, flirting with death, and with various states of mental frenzy

AGON: There are many examples of agonistic games. Boxing is agonistic. It requires two competitors who fight with each other in the ring in accordance to certain rules. The winner is the superior fighter, the one with the greatest physical skills of toughness, stamina, speed, and boxing talent. Football is another example of an agonistic game. In this case the battle takes place on a field which is marked off into competing territories. A quarterback heads the team. He organizes the plays and leads his team to victory. The team that has reached the goal line the most after a stipulated period of time wins the game. The skill in this case is a team effort; it involves the physical strength and agility of the players and the mental alertness and perspicacity of the team captain. Chess is another type of agonistic game. The players compete on a board with opposing rows of chess pieces. The object of the game is to attack and conquer the king. The moves are regulated. Each piece has certain constraints on how it can move, when it can move, and where it can move. The winner of the game conquers his opponent through the use of his mental skills, experience at chess, and employment of strategic moves.

ALEA: There are many examples of games of chance. The lottery is a well-known aleatoric game. It involves the buying of tickets from some commercially recognized establishment. The tickets have been officially coded and given a lucky number. Once a month, the winner of that lucky number is revealed to the public. Those who favor the lottery, sweepstakes, or similar aleatoric enterprises do so on fate. They have no guarantees that they will win. They have no skills that they can employ to enhance their chances. All that they can do is wait for the die to be cast. It is all a matter of chance.

MIMESIS: The most obvious example of the game of mimesis is the stage. Theaters are houses of illusion. They are chambers of escape. They are places where the audience escapes from the profane world of everyday interaction to enter into a sacred space where heroes are bigger than life and the villains are more evil than iniquity itself. The earliest stages were allegorical. The messages of these passion plays dealt with matters of apocalyptic proportions (Burns, 1972). Its characters were the traits of the good, the bad, love, hope, and charity.

ILINX: Ilinx destroys reality. It is an attempt to escape into another reality, a different form of the senses. Whereas the games of alea and agon are attempts to replace reality with an idealized version either by effort or by change, ilinx is an attempt to escape the status quo completely. Caillois (1979) argues that ilinx is the desire for disorder, a desire for destruction. This is the game of the drug culture, the game of destruction. For those who are involved in the sport, it is a form of escape into another reality; but, for those who witness the event from the outside, it is a game of death. Such is the game of vertigo.
The underlying tenet of Huizinga's fascination with play can be found in the third chapter of his book Homo Ludens. He argued that cultures use play to express its interpretation of life. He is not saying that play turns into culture, but that the play metaphor pervades culture. One wonders if such a claim can still be maintained. With the advent of television, children are exposed to many kinds of episodes involving competition, social drama, fortune, and dismay. They model their lives on these social games and the result is that they incorporate these episodic events into their own lives. Hence, social games are about episodes (Berne, 1964; 1974; Steiner, 1971).
Script theory (St. Clair Thomé-Williams and Su, 2004) is an attempt to structure the context of the situation. Although it is called script theory, the model really addresses other kinds of social organization through language. It includes scenarios (plays and other social dramas), episodes (social games and dramas), and social scripts (stage directions, social recipes, and structured definitions of roles). These social events are seen as prototypes. One has a prototypical role, for example, on how to function as a waiter. Many individuals may decide to modify those roles, revise them, or interpret them in a different manner. These changes make them non-prototypical roles, but they are still referenced with regard to their ideal types, prototypes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, the paradigm that constitutes the second generation of the cognitive sciences has been explicated. The changes that have taken place in cognitive linguistics are revolutionary. Linguistics is no longer the study of form. Communication is not about language, but about thought. Meaning is not to be found in words and sentences, but in the successful simulation of a blend. The implications of this new model for cross-cultural studies are numerous. In the next chapter, some of these will be discussed under the anatomy of social metaphor.
For more than two millennia, philosophers have down played the significance of metaphor as an instrument of cognition. With the advent of cognitive linguistics, however, there has been a renaissance in metaphorical thinking. In other words, analogical thinking plays a major role in human cognition. It is by means of analogical thinking that verbal metaphors are constructed and sometimes blended. It is by means of analogical thinking that tonal metaphors are generated. The circle of fifths in music theory, for example, involves the codification from one key into another. The first forms the source for the second. Finally, it is by means of analogical thinking that visual information is placed on a cognitive space to convey information.