Introduction
There are two ways of doing cognitive linguistics. They are referred to as the first and second generation of the cognitive sciences. The first emerged from the Hixon Symposium after the Second World War. Scholars from different disciplines met at the California Institute of Technology to discuss the implications of a new theory that the human mind functions as a computer. Some of the noted scientists from psychology, neurology, linguistics, and mathematics discussed their perspectives on this new paradigm. What marked all of these scientists as a group was their belief that the brain is comparable to the computer and what they wanted to discover was the software of the mind, the programs that make humans perform as they do. This paradigm dominated the cognitive sciences for decades. It led to several new disciplines such as computational linguistics, mathematical models of language, mathematical models of the mind, and formal linguistics. These scholars are referred to as the first generation of the cognitive sciences. Their philosophical theories were based on the belief that the mind and the body function independently of each other (the Cartesian Paradigm) and that language is essentially a symbolic code that is refers to state of affairs in the world.. Noam Chomsky even referred to his formal model of language as Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky, 1966).
Thirty years after the creation of the cognitive sciences, a model of language began to emerge. This new model came from the realization that language is largely metaphorical and that metaphor plays a major role in how human beings think (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This new approach was called cognitive linguistics, but it was not the same kind of approach to language used by Noam Chomsky and his students at MIT. This new kind of cognitive linguistics was based on the second generation of the cognitive sciences. Its new leaders were interested in how human beings think and the role that language plays in cognition. Fauconnier (1994, 1997) and his colleagues (Fauconnier and Sweetser, 1996; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) demonstrated that the concept of mental spaces was needed to account for linguistic mappings of counterfactuals. He referred to these as source and target mental spaces. This same model accounted for metaphorical blends in which inputs from two semantic domains (the surgeon and the butcher) were placed in a third mental space where they were blended. The result was a metaphorical expression (The surgeon is a butcher). New structures emerged from these blends that were not present in the original inputs which led Fauconnier and Turner (2002) to investigate the creative nature of these cognitive blends. Language in this new framework is not a formal linguistic code, but a way of organizing concepts. What followed from this new insight was an interdisciplinary conference on metaphor (Ortony, 1996), and new linguistic models by Langacker (1991, 1996) on cognitive grammar. The framework used in this book is based on the paradigm of the second generation of cognitive linguistics, the concept of the embodied mind. Actually, there are two different trends within this new approach to the cognitive sciences. One of them is more concerned with how thought is embodied (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and N??ez, 2000) whereas the other is concerned with cognitive mappings and blending in the theater of the mind (Fauconnier, 1985, 1997ç Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Overlapping these two trends is the work of Ronald Langacker (1991; 1997) with his model of cognitive grammar. Before discussing the second generation of cognitive linguistics, it is important to review some of the features that characterize the first generation of the cognitive sciences.
THE BRAIN IS THE HARDWARE; LANGUAGE IS THE SOFTWARE
In 1948, a very important series of meetings took place at the California Institute of Technology. These meetings mark the first generation of the cognitive sciences. This gathering was known as the Hixon Symposium (Jeffress, 1951) and it brought together researchers from a wide range of disciplines under the auspices of the Hixon Fund to discuss the cerebral functions of behavior. What these researchers had in common was an attempt to provide a new understanding of how human beings perceive the world in the way that they do. John von Neumann provided the metaphor of the brain as a computer. Warren McCulloch added to this analogy by discussing several parallels between the human brain and other logical devices. Karl Lashley challenged the dogma of classical behavioralism with commentary on the problems associated with ordering behavior serially. The problem was that the classical model of behavior could not explain how human beings accomplish tasks that are organized serially. What emerged from this symposium was the belief that higher levels of organization do take place in the mind and that the organization of language plays a significant role in all cerebral activity. As Lashely noted, behavioral sequences have to be planned and organized in advance of the executions. The organization of these sequences includes higher level functions that are responsible for prompting utterances. Hence, it became obvious from those attending this symposium that the human brain contains an overall plan or structure that enables its components to process information independent of specific feedback from the environment. Furthermore, these central brain processes precede and regulate the ways in which an organism orchestrates complex human behavior. Contrary to the tenets of behaviorism, this organization emanates from within the brain. It comes from a central component, the brain, rather than from its peripheral inputs. This new view of the mind was one in which the brain consisted of a composite of interacting systems (Jeffress, 1951: 135). After Lashely gave his presentation on how the mind is organized, the paper by von Neurmann took on added significance. The human brain demonstrated many parallels with computer systems. Both had central processing units; both had interacting subcomponents, both used a special language to organize and orchestrate behavior, and both were logical systems. The latter point was introduced by Warren McCulloch at the symposium and enhanced in later research in conjunction with Walter Pitts, a logician. They demonstrated that the human cell functions in conjunction with other nerve cells in neural networks that can be modeled in terms of logic. These neural systems, they argued, can be seen as logical statements that function within a propositional calculus. This was the same kind of binary logical network that was used in computer machine language. The machine that now dominates the machine metaphor is the computer. This event began at the Hixon Symposium
In 1945, the mathematician John von Neumann demonstrated that although a computer may have a simple, fixed structure, it was able to execute any kind of computation if properly programmed. Why is this important? Why did it matter that a machine was built as a general purpose solver, the same machine controlled for different purposes by different software? It turns out that this phenomenon was unique to the history of mankind. For the first time in human history, machines were not built for a specific purpose. Up until that time, machines were built to perform only one function. However, with the advent of the computer, the machine remained the same and its software converted it into a special purpose devise. Now, why is this event important? Why are cognitive scientists by this? What implications do they so intriguing in being able to use software to program the same hardware and make it function as different machines? The answer is quite simple. Human beings want to understand who they are and how they think. They want to be able to test their ideas on how the mind functions. The computer provides them with that opportunity. It enables them to create theories in the form of computer programs and to simulate them by running them through the computer. The scientists who attended the Hixon Symposium shared this ideal (Jeffress, 1951).
| Generations, Computer Languages | Computer Functions | Commentary and Explanations |
| First Generation | (1GL) Machine Languages These are computer programs that consist of binary instruction string (1, 0). | These programs were geared to specific computers and were dependent on the hardware on which they were used. Introduced in the 1940s. |
| Second Generation | (2GL) Assembly Language | Assembler Instead of programming a computer by means of ones and zeros, programmers substituted mnemonics for machine language. It is easier for humans to program with letter combinations than with binary numbers. Assembly language was introduced in the early 1950s. |
| Third Generation | (3GL) Special Procedural Higher Level Computer Languages - Fortran, Cobol, Basic, Pascal, C, Ada, Visual Basic, C++ |
These higher computer languages were procedural languages designed to function efficiently on certain kinds of tasks. Fortran worked well with mathematical concepts, and Cobol was oriented to business applications. In procedural languages, the software determines what can be done and not the user. Procedural languages consist of a series of procedurals (subprograms or functions or subroutines) that execute when called. Data may be executed locally within a procedure or globally by means of calling procedures used in Fortran and C language. Pascal is a block-structured procedural language that employs scope rules and nested block structures for storing and accessing data. C and C++ are object based languages that implement data abstractions and permit object oriented programming. |
| Fourth Generation | (4GL) Non-Procedural Higher Level Computer languages known as 4GL - spreadsheet languages, database languages, decision support systems, statistics, simulation, Mathcad, and presentation graphics. In non-procedural languages, it was the user who determined what is to be done. | The first and most successful of these fourth generation languages was the spreadsheet language. It met with great success in the business community. Database languages were used to program the Viking spacecraft to Mars. Later, it appeared as DB II and was eventually improved into a multi-relational database language. |
| Fifth Generation | (5GL) Natural Language - Visual Basic, knowledge base systems, and AI. | These languages encapsulate many of the functions of natural language and hence play a significant role in artificial intelligence, and knowledge based software. |
The lower the generational language (GL), the more instructions that the programmer has to write, As one moves to higher GLs, more structure is built into the computer language, the easier it is to implement the program and the quicker it is to learn. This hierarchy from lower to higher generational languages is based on how user friendly such systems are. Fourth generational languages are meant to improve productivity, make computer programming power available to non-programmers and typically feature integrated database management system, report generations, and report generators. Fifth generational languages attempt to mirror natural language abilities (Wexeblat, 1981).
WHY METAPHORS ARE IMPORTANT TO COGNTIVE LINGUISTICS
Since the time of Aristotle, metaphor was referred to as novel instances of poetic language. This way of looking at language persisted for over two millennia. Metaphor was seen to be a matter of language, not thought. It was argued that everyday language had no metaphor. That was the domain of literal language. This traditional view is wrong. Metaphor is not about language, it is about thought. Metaphors are about how human beings conceptualize their worlds and function within them. Metaphors are about concept and concepts are important because they structure what human beings perceive, how they get around in the world, and how they relate to other people. The generalizations that are captured by metaphor are not in language, but in thought. They have to do with conceptualizing one mental domain with another. They have to do with cross-mappings from one domain to another. Everyday abstract concepts such qas time, states, change, causation, and purpose are metaphorical. Hence, this is why Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued that the human conceptual system is largely metaphorical. This is because the way in which human beings think and the way that they act are largely metaphorical. Not surprisingly, human beings communicate through language by means of conceptual systems that are essentially metaphorical. Consider, for example, the conceptual metaphor of the ARGUMENT IS WAR:
Your claims are indefensible
He attacked the weak point in my argument
I demolished his argument
His criticism was right on target
I have never warn an argument against him
He shot down all of my arguments
The ARGUMENT IS WAR METAPHOR is one that plays a central role in Europeans cultures and it structures the actions that we perform in arguing. The essence of a metaphor is to understand and to experience one kind of conceptual domain in terms of another and these concepts are metaphorically structured.
The experiences of war are structured into Arguments
Since the concept of war is metaphorically structured, then the activity of arguing shares this metaphorical structure.
Lakoff and Johnson want to make a distinction between conceptual metaphors and related metaphors based on that concept. In order to characterize these differences, they state conceptual metaphors in the form of capitalized letters. ARGUMENT IS WAR. They also want to point out that these metaphorical concepts belong to a semantic domain that is structured within a system of thought.
From Conceptual Metaphor to Metaphorical Linguistic Expressions
The Experience War
The Conceptual Metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR
Metaphorical Expressions Your claims are indefensible
He attacked the weak point in my argument
I demolished his argument
His criticism was right on target
I have never warn an argument against him
He shot down all of my arguments
Metaphorical Correspondence. The structure of an argument corresponds to the structure of war.
Metaphorical Entailment The experience or the concept of war is used to structure the concept of war as an argument. The linguistic expressions about arguments correspond to the conceptual metaphor of war. Similarly, one's way of acting and interacting with others during an argument correspond to the concept of war.
Another conceptual metaphor is TIME IS MONEY
You are wasting my time
This procedure will save you hours
We don't have the time to give to the project
How are you spending your time?
This problem cost me an hour.
We invested a lot of time on this.
We don't have the time to spare
We are running out of time
You need to budget your time
Put aside some time to relax
Was that worth your while?
Do you have much time left?
You need to use your time more profitably.
I lost a lot of time when the system broke down
Thank you for your time.
What one finds in these analogical expressions is that there are three conceptual metaphors:
TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE
TIME IS MONEY
TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY
Another conceptual metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) focus on is the Conduit Metaphor. They cite an article by Michael Reddy (1979) in which Reddy argues that linguistic expressions are containers for meanings. This is not a new metaphor. It can be found in numerous textbooks on language by European scholars and many of them cite the introduction of the railroad as the basis for this way of looking at language. Railways systems are marked by strategic railway stations where passengers and goods are either allowed to enter into the system of travel or depart from it. One of the most important aspects of the railway system was the delivery of the mail and merchandised goods. These items were put into containers, taken to railway stations, put onto the trains, and delivered to their various destinations. Those at the receiving end would go to the railway station, collect the shipped goods, and open the containers to retrieve the items. It is believed that this is the genesis of the conduit metaphor. What is new about the metaphor, however, is the realization that the conduit metaphor is a conceptual metaphor, one that organizes and directs the way in which people think about communication. Lakoff notes that it was the paper by Reddy (1979) that projected him into a serious investigation of conceptual metaphors.
The Conduit Metaphor: WORDS ARE CONTAINERS OF MEANINGS.
Can you get your idea across to him?
I gave you that idea
Your reasons came through to us.
He has difficulty in putting his ideas into words.
He has a good idea
He captured it into words
Try to pack more thought into fewer words
The meaning is right there in the word
His words carry little meaning
He forced his meaning into that word
His words seem empty
This sentence is without meaning
His ideas are buried here somewhere in this paragraph
The conduit metaphor of WORDS ARE CONTAINERS OF MEANINGS is one of the ruling metaphors behind the first generation of cognitive linguistics (Gardner, 1987). They strongly believed in language as a symbolic system in which words contained meanings. These symbolic systems existed independently of people or the contexts of a situation. Advocates of cognitive linguistics, the second generation of the cognitive sciences, has replaced this metaphor with one known as cognitive blending (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). More will be said on this new framework later on.
ORIENTATIONAL METAPHORS
Metaphors of space play an important part in language. These orientational metaphors account for how human beings position themselves in the world. They are metaphors that mark verticality (up and down), symmetry (left and right), horizontalness (front and back), and proximity (near and far). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have provided some interesting examples of how these orientational metaphors structure emotions, feelings of control, and quantity.
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN
That boosted my spirits
My spirits rose
You are in high spirits today.
That gave me a lift
He is feeling depressed
My spirits sank
I am feeling rather low today
She fell into a depression
CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN
Get up
Wake up
I am already up
He rises early in the morning
He fell asleep
He dropped off to sleep
He is under hypnosis
He sank into a coma
He is under anesthesia
HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN
He is at the peak of his health
He is in top shape
He fell ill
He is sinking fast
He came down with the flu
His health is declining
He dropped dead
Lazarus rose from the dead
HAVING CONTROL IS UP; BEING CONTROLLED IS DOWN
He is in control over them
He is on top of the situation
He is our superior
He is in a superior position
He is at the height of his power
He is in the upper echelon
He ranks above me
He is under my control
He fell from power
His power is on the decline
He is my inferior
MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN
The prices are going up
The sales are going up
His income rose again
The prices are going down
His income fell
He is underage
Turn the heat down
HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN
He has a lofty position
He is going to rise to the top
He is at the peak of his career
He is climbing the corporate ladder
This promotion marks your upward mobility
He is at the bottom of the social hierarchy
She fell in status
GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN
Things are looking up
It was a peak year
He does high quality work
Things are bad; they are going down
VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN
He is high-minded
He has high standards
He is upright and honorable
He was underhanded
He stooped to doing that
What he did was beneath him
That was low-down behavior
FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP AND AHEAD
What are the upcoming events?
What is coming up next week?
What's up? (= What is happening?)
All of these metaphors are based on what has been called "the embodied mind." It is based on the assumption that human beings organize and structure thought in terms of their bodily experiences. What this philosophy does is challenge the old Cartesian adage that separates the body from the mind. In embodiment theory, the human mind is in the body and processes information through bodily behavior. This model is enactive; it does not separate the mind from the body. They both participate in the acts of knowledge. What Lakoff and Johnson (1980) are referring to by means of these orientational metaphors is the fact that human beings are organized spatially and participate in a world that reflects their orientation.
The Biological Orientation of Human Beings and how they Structure their Concepts of Self |
||
| Parameter | Oppositions | Propensity |
| Verticality |
|
Superior is directed towards the head; inferior is directed away from the head. There is a predisposition among humans for superiority. This is the basis for the orientational metaphors of CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN and HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN. |
| Horizontalness | Anterior Posterior |
Anterior marks a position in front of the body; posterior marks a position behind the body. There is predisposition among humans for anteriority. This is the basis for the orientational metaphor of FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP AND AHEAD |
| Symmetry and Centrality | Lateral | Lateral refers to a side away from the midline. This is the basis for the orientational metaphor of RIGHT IS GOOD; LEFT IS BAD |
| Proximity | Proximal | Distal Proximal is associated with movement towards the torso; distal is associated with movement away from the torso. This is the basis of the orientational metaphor of KNOWN IS NEAR; UNKNOWN IS FAR AWAY |
The propensity for the mind over the body is associated with the parameter of verticality in which Europeans praise qualities and actions associated with the mind: CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN and HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN. This predilection for some human qualities over others has been discussed by Robert St. Clair (Giles and St. Clair, 1987). It turns out that orientational metaphors structure the way in which social groups mark others as insiders or outsiders.
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| TRAITS | IN-GROUP (GOOD) | OUT-GROUP (BAD) |
| Intelligence | People in the in-group are seen as being very smart, highly intelligent, and industrious | People in the out-group are considered to be lacking in these qualities of intelligence. They are called by such names dumb, retarded, cretins, and idiots |
| Agility | People in the in-group are praised for their mental agility | People in the out-group appear to be praised for their agility, but they are only complimented on their physical prowess, |
| Humane | Those who belong to the in-group are seen as real and true human beings | Those assigned to the out-group are deemed to be at the edge of humanity and are accused of acting like animals and savages. They may be even lowered to the stage vermin and other low life |
| Religion | Ever since the Reformation, those in the in-side pride themselves in going to church and being good Protestants | Those relegated to the out-group are accused of having no God. They are called pagans, and heathens |
| Adulthood | Those in power are the adults and so they have defined themselves as being the center of the in-group. Adults know how to behave; they can be trusted | Those who are not adults cannot be trusted; They act like children, babies. Hence, they are members of the out-group. They need adult supervision. |
| Gender | In patriarchal societies only males constitute the in-group. Only males can be trusted to lead. Those who are in the out-group are not real leaders | Weak leaders are not real males, they are effeminate, and they have been emasculated. They act like females. |
Every culture has its own way of naturalizing human behavior by means of orientational metaphors. Hence, it is time to turn to the concept of the embodied mind and the role that it plays in the cognitive sciences.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMBODIED MIND
As noted earlier, orientational metaphors can be found in all human languages. These metaphors are used by humans to orient themselves and they have much to do with the concept of space. Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1994, and 1998) has developed a whole phenomenological philosophy on how the human body influences and controls how human beings think about philosophy. He is a phenomenologist who was troubled by the Cartesian duality in which the mind and the body functioned as dual system. He argued that philosophers underestimated the significance of the body and its importance to philosophical thought. They are not aware of the role that embodied inheritance plays in the way that human beings think. Perception by means of the body is how human beings come to know the world. Hence, all perception is intrinsically cognitive. Descartes, he noted, was wrong in prioritizing the mental over the physical. Instead of the Cartesian adage of "I think, therefore I am" Merleau-Ponty suggests a different perspective: "I perceive, therefore I am." He argues that "we are our bodies." What he means by this is that there is no meaning which is not embodied, nor is there any matter that is not meaningful (Crossley, 1994). The mind is inseparable from the body. The perceiving mind is an incarnated body (Merleau-Ponty, 1994). Human beings never know things in their totality; what they know is always from the perspective of the body. Space, for example, is not an abstract concept, but one that is always related to the body that is situated in a world. It is always seen from the perspective of the body.
It is not necessary in this phenomenology for an individual to be aware that he is perceiving (Merleau-Ponty, 1998). Human actions are largely habitual (tasks of skill). They are learned through imitation and responsiveness within an environment and a community. This intelligence is irremediably embodied. The human body understands the acquisition of a habit or skill. A movement, he argues, is learned when the body has understood it. It is learned when it has incorporated that experience into its world and is able to respond to it. Hence, Merleau-Ponty differs substantially from most European philosophers when he deals with dichotomies. They are never polarities. Such polarities lead to solipsism. They are always connected to each other such as the relationship of touching and being touched or looking at others and being looked at. These are reversible processes. They are always connected to each other.
The belief that cognition is a mental representation has been a central tenet of the cognitive sciences. In this framework, the mind is thought to operate by manipulating symbols that represent features of the world (Gardner, 1987). In their work on the Embodied Mind, Francisco Varela and his colleagues (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991) present a different view of the mind. Cognition, they argued, is not the representation of a predetermined world by a prearranged symbolic mind. What actually happens is an enactment of the world and the mind that are predicated on historical events, personal and social actions that are needed to perform in that world. This being is the world requires an embodiment of the mind. This model is enactive because the mind is present in embodied everyday experiences. The human brain encounters about 20% of signals from the outside world and conjoins this with 80% of old templates, filters, memories, and beliefs about the world.
George Lakoff dedicated his book (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000) to Francisco Varela. He and his colleague, Mark Johnson (1987) have worked within the paradigm of the embodied mind and have overcome many of the problems that Merleau-Ponty left unresolved. For example, Lakoff and Nunez (2000) demonstrate that contrary to popular opinion, mathematics has its origins not in symbols, but in ideas that are grounded in cognitive schemas and concepts. Mathematics is structured by the human brain and its mental capacities. For the most part, human beings conceptualize abstract concepts in terms of concrete terms and these ideas and modes of reasoning are grounded in the sensory-motor system. Conceptual metaphors provide the mechanisms by which these abstract concepts are understood in terms of concrete ones. The reason why these conceptual metaphors have gone unnoticed as metaphors is because mathematicians have taken them to be literal mathematical expressions. Consider, for example, the concept of putting things into groups. Children have this ability. They can discriminate things as separate groups by the age of four. This ability is inborn. It is a cognitive ability that human beings possess (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000: 15-22). Later, a child will be able to discriminate larger groups of numbers and perform the operations of addition and subtraction on these estimations of number. The basis for mathematical thought is already present in children . Children understand numbers, which are conceptual categories (Dahaene, 1997). Later, they will learn numerals, symbols for numbers (Arabic numerals, Roman numerals, etc.). The main point that Lakoff and N??ez are trying to make is the fact that the cognitive structure of advanced mathematics uses the same kind of conceptual apparatus that one finds in everyday thought. This conceptual equipment is embodied in human beings in the form of image schemas, aspectual schemas, conceptual metaphors, and conceptual blends.
A common image schema used in mathematics is the container schema. Human beings are familiar with this schema as they have all experienced the human body as a container. A container has three parts: an interior, an exterior, and a boundary. This structure forms a gestalt, a holistic pattern. The image schema of a container has a built in spatial logic. There is an inside, a boundary, and an outside. What is inside a container is a substance. One may foreground or profile either the substance or the container.
One may add an object X and explain its logic by means of the container schema.
Let X = a pebble; X is in Y and Y is in Z.
A pebble is in the water. Therefore, the pebble is in the glass.
A pebble is outside of the water. Therefore, the pebble is outside of the glass.
He put a pebble into the glass. Therefore, he put a pebble into the water.
He took a pebble out of the glass. Therefore, he took a pebble out of the water.
One may have containers situated in other containers and explain the location of objects within this configuration by means of the spatial logic dictated by the container schema. Terry Regier (1996) has built a computational neural model of a number of image schemas that explains the concept of containment that is central in much of mathematics. The container schema can provide the metaphorical foundations for many mathematical concepts such as CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS. A category is a bounded region in space. Objects that are located within a category are its members. Within a category, there may be other bounded regions or subcategories of a larger category. From this Lakoff and N??ez (2000, 44-45) explain some of the basic concepts of logical inference.
|
|
Source Domain Container Schema Inferences |
Target Domain Category Inference |
EXCLUDED MIDDLE Every object X is either in Container Schema A or out of Container Schema A. |
EXCLUDED MIDDLE Every entity X is either in category A or out of category A |
MODUS PONENS Given two Container Schemas A and B and an object X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B. |
MODUS PONENS Given two categories A and B and an entity X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B. |
MODUS PONENS Given two Container Schemas A and B and an object X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B. |
MODUS PONENS Given two categories A and B and an entity X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B. |
HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM Given three Container Schemas A, B, and C, if A is in B and B is in C, then A is in C. |
HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM Given three categories A, B, and C, if A is in B and B is in C, then A is in C. |
MODUS TOLLENS Given two Container Schemas A and B and an object Y, if A is in B and Y is outside B, then Y is outside A. |
MODUS TOLLENS Given two categories A and B and entity Y, if A is in B and Y is outside B, then Y is outside A. |
HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM Given three Container Schemas A, B, and C, if A is in B and B is in C, then A is in C. |
HYPOTHETICAL |
The space-logic of the Container Schema is both perceptual and conceptual in nature. There is a built in logic in the schema that allows mathematicians to create the concept of containment central to mathematics. Metaphor is not a mere embellishment. It is the basic means by which abstract thought is made possible. These abstract thoughts are typically understood in terms of more concrete concepts by means of metaphor. Hence, metaphorical mappings are systematic and not arbitrary.
THE MIND IS A MACHINE
He is still grinding out a solution
His mind isn't operating today
My wheels aren't turning
He is a little rusty today
I can't think; I am running out of steam.
It is interesting to note that Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1961) has often been cited as the strongest proponent of the machine metaphor. His book, L'homme Machine (1748), openly argues that man is a complicated machine . His belief in the machine metaphor is so strong that he admonishes G. W. Leibniz (1954) for advocating a theory of monadology, which has spiritualized matter rather than materialized the soul. This, he notes, is an unintelligible hypothesis. He even attacks Réné Descartes (1637) and all the Cartesians for making the same mistake. They are in error, he adds, because they have taken for granted two distinct substances in man - the body and the soul. But, no one has seen the soul; it is a matter of faith. Consequently, this leaves one to only consider the body, which is a machine. Man, he argues, is therefore a machine. What is significant about this book by de la Mettrie is that it was the first clear statement of the belief that man is a machine.
Many philosophers continue to attribute this mechanistic view of the body to Descartes who strongly denied this concept. This contrast between Descartes and de la Mettrie is further evidenced by their views on the role that the senses play in cognition. De la Mettrie found solace in the writings of John Locke (1956) who believed that knowledge must come from experience. Descartes, on the other hand, argued that neither one's imagination nor one's senses can give one any assurance of anything. The senses, Descartes noted, are fallacious. The ideal method of philosophy for Descartes (1913) was to be found in mathematics. De la Mettrie saw no need for locating consciousness within the soul. The brain, he remarked, has its muscles for thing, as the legs have muscles for walking. This approach to medicine is known as iatromechanics. It is systemic pathology that attempts to deduce all bodily functions from the laws of statics and hydraulics. Iatromechanics existed before de la Mettrie (T?nnies, 1974:20-21), but it was this physician from Saint Malo who legitimated the concept in his famous tome on L'homme la machine.
De la Mettrie began his collegiate career ironically in Paris in the humanities and later studied rhetoric at Caens. He was a born orator who had a passion for poetry. Upon his return to Saint Malo in Brittany, he studied natural philosophy and was to later take the advice of his physician who recommended that he study medicine. De la Mettrie became a celebrated doctor because of his intellectual prowess. Early in his career he adhered to a mechanistic view of the body. Thought, he argued, is but a consequence of the organization of the human machine. His writings on this matter were published in several tomes, one of which is L'homme la machine.
With the advent of the cognitive sciences (Gardner, 1987) the ontological metaphor of THE MIND IS A MACHINE had a rebirth. The new machine was the computer. It was a machine that was completely new to mankind. Before this time, machines were built for specific purposes. But with the rise of the computer, the hardware remained the same and only the software, the program to run the machine, changed. What was important about this new machine is that it enabled investigators to simulate a wide range of experiments by merely changing the software. These early computers were called general problem solvers. The same machine could function as a different machine just by changing the software that ran the machine.
Many ontological metaphors are used to conceptualize a space as a container. What one sees becomes a visual field and this visual field functions as a container that is defined by one's field of vision.
The ship came into view
I have him in sight
I can't see him because the car is in the way
He is out of sight
He is in the center of my field of vision
There was no one in sight
Ontological metaphors are used to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states. However, how these are treated within an ontological metaphor differs.
Events Conceptualized as objects A race is an event and is viewed as a discrete entity. For example, "The race began"
Actions Conceptualized as objects Participants in a race (the container) are substances in a container. For example, "He is in the race"
Activities Conceptualized as Substances The activity of running a race is a metaphorical substance and hence is within a container object. For example, "He could not get out of the race"
States Conceptualized as Containers Various kinds of states may be conceptualized as containers. When one is in a state of love, for example, one is contained in that state. In this case, "He is into racing" refers to a state. The runner is contained in that space.
Just as a cup of water is a container which has a substance in it (water), so too can ontological metaphors define objects as containers with substances in them. One may put things (substances) into a container or take them out of a container.
He put a lot of energy into racing
He tried to get of out the race
He came out of the race as a winner
He entered the race
Another kind of ontological metaphor can be found in personification. The metaphor allows human beings to attribute a wide range of experiences to nonhuman entities. These entities are seen as having motivations, characteristics and activities.
His theory explained everything
The facts argued against his theory
Life cheated him of his happiness
Prices are eating up the profits
Cancer caught up with him
In all of these cases, the subjects of these sentences are personified. They are examples of something nonhuman in human terms. Another area is which ontological metaphors occur are in grammar. Linguists no longer look at grammar as a set of formal rules about language. The function of grammar is to organize human concepts. Hence, metaphors also exist within grammar.
GRAMMATICAL METAPHORS
The creation of grammatical categories has been studied by many cognitive linguists (Heine, 1999; Heine, 1991; Dirven and Verspoor, 1997). These studies lead to the realization that metaphors are used to construct new grammatical concepts and categories. This process is called grammaticalization (Heine, Claudi, and Hunnemeyer, 1991).This process is pervasive within language and it accounts for many new grammatical constructions within language. Before the rise of grammaticalization and the realization that grammar is highly metaphorical, linguists had difficulty in explaining simple constructions such as phrasal verbs in English. These are among the more difficult verbal patterns in English that challenge linguistic analysis. These verbs are followed by prepositions and the problem facing linguists has to do with how these prepositions are to be analyzed.
to break in, to break out
to break into, to break out of
to break up, to break down
The problem is one of properly analyzing the morphological forms that follow some verbs. If the preposition that follows the verb is to be treated as part of the verb, then it is called a verbal particle and the whole construction is called a verbal phrase (Spears, 1996).
John looked up the telephone number.
John looked the telephone number up.
Many verbal phrases are followed by particles that can be separated from the head of the verbal construction.
Verb + Prepositional Phrase Construction
John ran up the hill (up = preposition)
John broke into the house (into = preposition)
Oswaldo broke out of prison (out = preposition)Verb + Verb Particle Construction
John ran up the flag (up = verb particle)
John ran the flag up (up = verb particle
He broke down the door (down = verb particle)
He broke the door down (down = verb particle)
The more intriguing problem occurs within constructions whereby one does not know how to treat the morphological unit following the verb.
John ran up the bill
Mary broke up his marriage
Marcia broke in her new shoes
The war broke out
Is it a verbal particle (verb + particle) or is a preposition that belongs to the following noun phrase (verb + prepositional phrase)? In seeking a resolution to these questions, one should also ask other more revealing questions about these constructions. How, for example, does one explain the development of phrasal verbs in English? Where do they come from? Furthermore, how are these verbal expressions by semantically related? How does one discern whether the morphological unit involved is a verb particles or a preposition? These questions provide the focus of this re-investigation into certain complex verbal constructions in English. In order to better understand phrasal verb construction in English, one must first understand the role of metaphor in English, especially grammatical metaphors. In this essay, it is argued that there are three kinds of constructions in English that merit further clarification: verb + prepositional phrase constructions, verb + verb particle constructions, and two word or hyphenated verb constructions.
As noted earlier, what is significant about the use of metaphor in language is the fact that it is not limited to the creation of lexical items, but it is also used to create new grammatical constructions (Heine, 1987). For example, verbs of motion are used to navigate through physical space. In cognitive linguistics, such verbs belong to a movement schema (Dirven and Verspoor, 1998).
Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Location
John goes to school
John walks home
John runs to the park
The agent performs the action involved in moving towards a destination. There are many ways in which he can perform this action (walks, runs, goes, etc.). Such constructions are basic grammatical patterns and form the source of derived constructions. One may metaphorical extend this pattern by allowing the destination to be an event. The result is a new grammatical construction.
Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Event
Mary goes crazy
Linda goes to the party
Marcelo is going to laugh
The event may be mental (a mood, feeling, concern) or physical (the locale and the event itself). Another kind of grammatical metaphor developing out of verbs of motion describes future events. In this case the physical destination is not a present location, but a future one.
Agent Verb of Motion Destination: Future Locale or Future Time
John goes to S?o Paulo tomorrow
Sara is going to church on Sunday
Grammatical metaphors or grammaticalizations (Heine et al., 1991) are common in language. They provide the basis for new constructions within language. Since these related constructions are common to language, one should ask how they are categorized within linguistic theory. Before discussing prototype theory and its role in cognitive theory, it is important to understand how Verb + Preposition Constructions in English have been transformed historically into Verb + Verb Particle Constructions or even Verb + Clitic Constructions (two-word verbs). There are certain basic constructions that form a prototype for the creation of other kinds of constructions in language. These prototypes generate related senses of a construction that are used metaphorically. With the passage of time, these new constructions take on a meaning of their own and develop into new forms. In the case of Verb + Preposition Constructions, a prototype is employed in the construction of related forms. Eventually, the new forms emerge as two word verbs or Verb + Particle Constructions.
John ran up the hill (verb + prepositional phrase)
John ran up the flag (verb + verb particle)
John ran the flag up (verb + NP + verb particle)
The question now becomes one of distinguishing between two kinds of phrasal verbs, those that allow the verb particle to be relocated after the noun phrase and those which do not. The following examples do not allow such dislocation.
John ran up the bill
Mary broke up his marriage
Marcia broke in her new shoes
The war broke out
Hence, these are verb constructions that give the appearance of being verb + particle constructions, but they are not. They appear to be two-word verbs. They are verb compounds that are reminiscent of noun compounds in which some are hyphenated and some are not. There are three patterns for dealing with compound nouns in English:
Closed Forms: firefly, secondhand, softball, childlike, redhead, and notebook.
Open Forms: post office, real estate, middle class, full moon, and middle class.
Hyphenated Forms: six-year old, six-pack, over-the-counter, etc.
Given this tradition in English, one could argue that two word verbs function as hyphenated verbal forms whereas phrasal verbs do not.
John ran up the hill (V + prepositional phrase)
John ran up the flag (V + Verbal Particle + noun phrase)
John ran up the bill (run-up + noun phrase)
Currently, phrasal verbs are used for both verb + verbal particle and hyphenated verb constructions. Where clarification is need, the former will be referred to as phrasal verbs and the latter as two-word verbs.
John ran-up the bill (two-word verb)
Is there any evidence for such two-verb constructions? The answer is affirmative. One finds that when these constructions are changed into their nominal forms, they appear as hyphenated nouns.
Nominalizations: rip-off, spin-off, tip-off, write-off, show-off, etc.
The implications of these nominalizations merit further investigation (.Thomé-Williams, Ana and Robert N. St. Clair).
He wrote off the expenses. It was a write-off
He ripped off his customers. It was a rip-off
Now that the role of metaphor has been explicated within the context of cognitive linguistics, it is now time to turn to a relate trope, metonymy.
METONYMY
Whereas metaphor involved the combining of inputs from two or more semantic domains, metonymy refers to only one domain and its components. It turns out that metonymy has a greater function in human language than metaphor. In metonymy, one refers to a part to mean the whole of the intended domain or vice versa. Here are some of the common uses of metonymy (Thomé-Williams and St. Clair, 2003):
REFER TO A PART TO DESIGNATE THE WHOLE
Get your face over here. This construction is considered to be rude because it address a part of a person. It is a kind of depersonalization.
She married the crew cut A crew hair cut or a buzz hair cut is a very short kind of hair cut that was popular in the 1950s. In this context, she married a person, but his most outstanding or even disturbing feature is his hair cut.
Give us a hand This expression means that one wants others to join in to do work involving the use of one's hands. This could range from manual labor to simple manual tasks.
Lend me your ears This is a famous expression in Latin literature. It asks of others that they listen.
He wants to save face. This is a metaphorical concept characteristic of several Asian cultures. Its English equivalents is to save one's reputation, one's self image, or identity.
DESIGNATE THE WHOLE TO REFER TO A PART
Do you want more chicken? (piece of a chicken) One is not asking for the whole chicken, but only a piece of it.
He crossed the river (river refers to a part of the river)
The river is an ontological metaphor and as such it contains water that is flowing. One refers to a part of the river to refer to the whole concept of the river
Do you want pizza? (pizza refers to a slice of pizza) One is not asking for the whole pizza pie, but only a portion of it.
DESIGNATE SPECIFIC TO REFER TO A GENERAL CONCEPT
They shot the cutthroat (cutthroat for a murderer) This use of a metonymy refers to the particular act that a murderer committed. This use of metonymy provides a concrete image of the murderer.
I bought some new wheels (wheels for a whole car) This is a common expression in Modern English. When one buys a new set of wheels, it is metaphorically meant to refer to the whole car that came with those wheels. This expression differs from "buying a set of tire" which is not used metonymically.
They hired some new hands This is a reference to workers who do manual labor. Metonymy can be very revealing of people's attitude. A whole individual, in this case, is only seen in terms of the needs of others who want to hire him.
The law will arrest you (the law = policeman) The law is a common metonymical expression in Westerns to refer to the sheriff. Currently, it is used to refer to a policeman or the system of justice.
REFER TO GENERAL TO DESIGNATE SOMETHING SPECIFIC
The thief stole man wallet In this case the general category is thief and there are many kinds of thief. One kind, however, specializes in stealing wallets; viz. the pickpocket. Hence, the general term is used to refer to a special kind of thief.
The doctor operated on him The general category is the doctor. There are many kinds of doctors and the one who operates is called a surgeon. The use of this verb allows one to understand that doctor refers to surgeon.
The professor read his paper. There are many kinds of professors. If one is at a conference of historians or in a history class, the general term could easily be used to refer to a historian.
SUBSTITUTE A ROLE FOR A PERSON
The farmer came to town In some cultures, what one does for a living is an important status marker. One who farms for a living is a farmer. Such individuals live in rural areas and so this expression has several layers of hidden meaning.
The pitcher signed the contract There are many players on a baseball team. One of them is the pitcher. In this expression, the focus is not on the person signing the contract, but on the function that such a person performs for the team.
The catcher missed the ball Once again, there are many players on a baseball team and they perform different functions. One of them is assigned to catching the ball thrown by a pitcher. If anyone should not miss the ball, it is the pitcher. This sentence calls attention to the fact that this person failed to perform his proper function.
The Quarterback threw the ball There are many players on a football team. The one who is assigned to pass or throw the ball is the Quarterback. This sentence merely states that he is performing one of his proper functions.
The swimmer won the race Some people swim for relaxation and some prefer to compete. This use of metonymy specifies not only that one is a swimmer, but a certain kind of swimmer.
The lecturer read his notes One who lectures academically is a lecturer. Some university systems distinguish professors, from readers and lecturers. This sentence specifies the special role being performed.
The waiter disappeared again One who waits on a table is a waiter. In some countries the table is profiled. In Spanish, for example, the word for table is mesa and a waiter is called a mesero. In English, the person who waits on a table is profiled. What this sentence implies is the fact that waiters are not always available to serve their customer.
REFER TO A PRODUCT FOR THE PRODUCER OF THE PRODUCT
He read Goffman Erving Goffman is a noted sociologist from the Chicago School. He wrote numerous books. This producer of those books is used to refer to one or more of his publications.
He saw a Picasso at the museum Pacasso is a noted painter. His works can be found in various museums around the world. This sentence about Picasso refers to one of his paintings.
He played the Stradivarius Stradivarius is the best violin maker in the world. His products still remain and are highly praised. This sentence about Stradivarius is used to refer to one of his products.
He bought a Saturn Saturn is an American car company. It produces a line of different cars. In this sentence, the name of the company is used to refer to one of its products.
SUBSTITUTE THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE FOR ITS USER
He hired a gun to do the job The agent of this sentence hired someone to kill someone else with a gun. He refers to the instrument as a metonym for its user.
They changed the batter In baseball, batters are assigned to a sequence during their inning. A coach has the option to change that sequence of players who are going up to the plate to bat the ball. This sentence refers to the instrumental role that a person performs rather than to the name of that person who is to perform it
He met the skater A person who skates is a skater. The instrument that he uses to glide on ice is called his skates. In this sentence, the functional role of the skates is used to refer to the person who uses them.
The crown demanded an answer One of the functions of a king or a queen is to wear a crown on formal occasions. In this sentence, the instrument of royalty is used to refer to either the king or the queen.
SUBSTITUTE AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR HIS ACTIONS
Nixon bombed Hanoi Nixon was the President of the United States during the Vietnam War. He was also the Commander in Chief of the military and had administrative power over them. In this sentence, the bombing of Hanoi is not attributed to those in his command, but to the administrator of those actions.
Bush attacked Iraq Bush is currently the President of the United States. He is also in the role of the Commander in Chief of the military. Although his military forces bombed Iraq, this sentence refers to the administrator for his actions.
Napoleon lost the battle Napoleon was a European general who fought battles all over Europe. This sentence refers to his actions during one of those battles, the one that he lost. Here, the reference is made about the administrator of those actions.
Stengel won the pennant Stengel is the coach of the New York Yankees. Every year, baseball teams compete for the top position as the best team in the country. This is done by the actions of those under his command. The administrator is referred to in leiu of his actions.
REFER T0 AN INSTITUTION FOR THE PEOPLE REPONSIBLE
The Senate voted on that Bill Congress is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is made up of two voted members from each state in the union. This sentence refers to the institution rather than those elected officials who constitute it.
The Army instituted the draft The US Army is an institution that has the power to request Congress to institute a draft of civilians into the military for purposes of fighting a war. In this sentence, the reference is to the institution rather than to those in that institution who are responsible for initiating the process of a federal mobilization for war.
He fought the government The government is an mega-institution that is composed of many other institutions. In this sentence, the reference is to one of those many institution or even to the mega-institution itself.
The University raised its tuition. Academic universities are institutions that are made up of colleges. The board of trustees and the upper level of administrators of that institution have the power to raise tuition costs. In this sentence the institution is cited rather than those in the institution who control the process.
REFER TO A PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION
The White House denied the report. The White House is one of the federal buildings in Washington D.C. where the office of the President of the United States is located. There are people who work for the President and who issue reports in his name. In this sentence, one refers to the place rather than to those who work there.
Washington gave itself a pay raise again. Washington D. C. is a place where several federal institutions are located such as Congress, the White House, etc. Those who are in Congress, Senators and Representatives, voted themselves an increase in pay once more. The reference is not about the institution, but of the place where the institution is located.
Hollywood is making only adventure films Hollywood is a place in Los Angeles where the movie industry is located. Several film companies are located there. In this sentence, one refers to the play rather than to the institutions.
Wall Street is corrupted Wall Street is the name of a street in New York City where the Stock Exchange is located. Instead of referring to those institutions, the reference metonymically points to the place where those institutions are located.
REFER TO A PLACE FOR AN EVENT
Iraq is becoming another Vietnam Iraq is a country where a major war took place, an intervention brought about by the United States. Vietnam is another place where military actions were incurred by the United States. American citizens felt that the war in Vietnam was unjust. There is a similar ground swell of reaction against the intervention in Iraq. This sentence refers to one place where an event took place to refer to another place where it is believed that a similar event is taking place.
Remember the Alamo The Alamo is a military fort in San Antonio, Texas, where a major battle was fought against Mexican forces. Many lives were lost by Americans in that battle. This sentence addresses the place where the event took place. The place is used to invoke memories or stories of the event.
We are going to have another Watergate The Watergate is a building in Washington D. C. where the Democratic Party housed its headquarters during its presidential campaign against Richard Nixon, the Republican President. Nixon and his inner staff sent a group to break into those headquarters in order to gather counter information. This break-in was foiled and the trail was traced all the way back to the White house. Hence, this sentence refers to the possibility of illegal actions by one political group against another.
SUBSTITUTE THE CONTAINED FOR THE CONTAINER
Pass the salt When one says "pass the salt" he is referring to the container that holds the salt.
Do you want coffee? (a cup of coffee) When one offers coffee to someone, the reference is to a cup and its contents. One offers the substance by referring to its container.
Give me another Coke? (a bottle of Coke) Coca Cola is served in a bottle or a can. When one offers a Coke (a kind of coca cola), one offers the substance by referring to its container.
May I have some water? (a glass of water) Water is served in a glass or in a bottle. One asks for the substance and this implies the concomitant use of a container of that substance.
Metonymy is very revealing in that it portrays how one feels about another person. Lakoff (1987) has an interesting example involving predicate adjectives. He cites an example in which one is referring to a woman by the following expressions:
She is a Cellist
She is a lesbian
She is a communist.
In this case all of these expressions refer to the same person. Each predicate adjective construction refers to a different part of a person. Each makes a different statement about the same person. Predicate adjective constructions share this designative feature with metonymical expressions. Hence, when one says she is a servant, one refers to the function that such a person performs. The expression does not focus on other aspects of that individual. These attributions can be used either pejoratively or positively.
Pejorative Metonymy
She is a servant. One who is paid to serve another is called a servant. In this case, metonymy is used to highlight just one quality or function of that person. Implied in this metonymy is the dichotomy of rich versus poor, privileged versus downtrodden, etc.
He is the new hand The new hand refers to a manual laborer. This person is defined by what he can do for another person. Metonymy is used to highlight only one aspect of a full and competent human being.
Benefactive Metonymy
He is a new Dad Male human beings are complex. They accomplish many functions and play many roles. One of the more pleasant roles is that of being a father for the first time. In this case, the use of metonymy is benefactive. It refers to a positive experience.
She is a new Mother Female human beings are complex. They accomplish many functions and play many roles. One of the more pleasant roles is that of being a mother for the first time. In this case, the use of metonymy is benefactive. It refers to a positive experience.
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What one accomplishes through metonymy is to foreground some aspect of the total picture because it is important or relevant to the context of the situation. What is highlighted and placed in the foreground may refer to one of several attributes - the function performed, the product resulting from an action, the event that occurred, the institution, or the instrument. It is interesting to note that many morphological affixes share these metonymical properties. Prior to discussing those, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at Predicate Nominative and Predicate Adjective constructions.
OTHER METONYMIC CONSTRUCTIONS: Metonymic relations can be found in both predicate nominative (John is a student) and predicate adjective constructions (John is happy). The former is used to designate membership in a class and the latter to refer to a part of the whole, a clear metonymic function. Examples of the former construction are listed below:
PREDICATE NOMINATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
Martin is a student
Mary is a teacher
John is a Brazilian
Tigers are animals
What takes place in a predicate nominative construction? In one sense, one is saying that the individual involved is a member of a class. The class is designated by the predicate nominative construction. What does it mean to say that, for example, that John is a Brazilian? Surely his being is not limited to being a Brazilian. He may be a father, a teacher, an investor, and so on. What one finds in this construction is Venn diagram relationship in which B represents the class of Brazilian and A represents John and the intersection between these two represents the construction, John is a Brazilian. What does this mean? It means that one is dealing with reference to a part (being Brazilian) to the whole of a person (John). Hence, predicate nominatives are metonymic expressions. Predicate nominatives also refer to functions (John is a farmer), an event (Iraq is another Vietnam), or an institution (Washington raised the minimal wage), etc.
The other kind of construction that merits closer investigation is the predicate adjective pattern. In this case, one is making a statement about some quality related to a larger more comprehensive entity. Examples of predicate adjective constructions are cited below:
PREDICATE ADJECTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
John is sad What this sentence states is that John is in a state of sadness. John is the container and sadness is the substance that he contains. The more interesting question is whether or not sadness and happiness are binary adjectives. One may be either sad or happy, but one can be neither sad nor happy. If sadness and happiness are substances within a container, they function as polar adjectives. Either one substance or the other can be contained within John. However, one may say that John is both happy and sad. He is happy about one thing and sad about another. Hence, happy and sad cannot be said to function as bipolar or binary adjectives. They are states within a continuum of emotions.
John is tall Being tall is a state. What is interesting about this state is that it cannot be changed. It is a permanent state. In some languages, there are two kinds of linking verbs. One for temporary states and another for permanent states. In Spanish, for example, one may contrast the two which are translated into English as "John is tired."
Juan est? cansado (Verb = ESTAR) John is feeling tired.
Juan es cansado (Verb = SER) John is always tired.
Mary is pregnant Being pregnant is a binary adjective. One is either pregnant or not pregnant. There are very few binary adjectives in English.
The predicate adjective refers to some quality and this could also be represented by a Venn diagram. What is interesting about these constructions within the framework of metonymy theory is that both express the qualities of a whole person, a whole thing, or a whole event. Hence, regardless of whether these qualities are innate or ascribed, they are metonymic relationships.
MORPHOLOGICAL METONYMY: There are many metonymic relations that can be found among morphological derivations. These are called metonymic suffixes. These suffixes have grammatical meanings. Most investigations of suffixes have focused on how they change grammatical categories. This concern is understandable from a semasiological point of view. However, when one looks at how concepts are used to construct words, new patterns of meaning emerge. Those which are of interest to this investigation are those suffixes which function metonymically. This is accomplished by those suffixes that highlight a part of the whole. What is highlighted may be a function, an attribute, or a subcomponent of the system.
THE AGENTIVE SUFFIX: There are many suffixes that are added to verb to refer to the performance of a role associated with that verb. The one who works a farm performs the act of farming and is called a farmer. The following examples from English demonstrate how productive this process is. By means of an agentive suffix, a verb is transformed into a new word in which only a part of a person is defined by as a function. There are several interesting patterns of agentive suffixes in English and in and these are illustrated below:
Verb Form - dance; verb form + agentive suffix - dancer
The agentive Suffix is an Aspectual Marker,
All agentive forms are created from verbs and they all portray the use of the agentive suffix as an aspectual marker: walker, farmer, baker, etc.
Many English names have agentive suffixes. This is because people in the lower classes were identified by what they did for a living. There were three classes of people: clerus (clergy), milites (military), and labores (workers). Members of the working class were identified by their functions, by how they served the upper classes.
CITIZENSHIP SUFFIX MARKER: There are suffixes in English that designate that one is a citizen of a certain country. Being a citizen is only a part of the many attributes that a person may possess. Consequently, this suffix functions metonymically.
Country - Brazil; Country + Citizenship Suffix = Brazilian.
These suffixes function as aspect markers
Brazilian - A person from Brazil is a Brazilian
Cuban - A person from Cuba is a Cuban
Guatemalan - A person from Guatemala is a Guatemalan
New Yorker - A person from the New York is a New Yorker
Spanish - A person from Madrid is a Madridian.
Washingtonian - A person from Washington is a Washingtonian
Texan - A person from Texas is a Texan
Metaphor and metonymy play dominant roles in grammar. Many expressions that appear to be regular grammatical patterns are, in essence, based on figurative language. For example, predicate nominative and predicate adjective constructions are metonymic in nature. They refer to the relationship of the parts to a whole within a single semantic domain.
John is a student (Predicate Nominative)
John is happy (Predicate Adjective)
These expressions refer to a part of the many attributes of the subject of the sentence. In addition, these metonymic constructions can be used for metaphorical expressions.
John is an animal
The surgeon is a butcher.
As noted earlier, what makes these metaphoric expressions different from metonymic ones is that they bring together ideas, social scripts, patterns of behavior, and social roles from two separate domains and unite them into a blended cognitive mental space. In this blended space, some of the features of the inputs are used and others are not used. The result is a unique new expression, a metaphor, in which new features and patterns emerge.
PROTOTYPE THEORY AND LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES
How are categories defined? The major breakthrough in cognitive grammar occurred when both anthropologists and psychologists replaced the philosophical concept of a logical grammar with a more pragmatic model that was based on communicative intent. This focus on logical form had been such a dominant cultural imposition in Western intellectual history that it was very difficult to differentiate what philosophers wanted language to be from what it really was. The classical view of categorization can be traced back to Aristotle who felt that natural objects in the world could be categorized into groups and defined by unique attributes.
Major Premise: Socrates is a man
Minor Premise: All men are mortal
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal
This view of categorization has certain interesting assumptions. It is predicated on the belief that categorization is, in essence, a theory of reference. It is a way of discussing the real world of physical objects. It is based on the assumption that the attributes that define classes of objects are shared by all of its members. Furthermore, it was believed that the intension (the set of attributes) determines the extension of a category to which items are members. In other words, categories within classical philosophy did not have internal structure .
Why was classical categorization theory replace? What changed this reliance on traditional models of philosophical categorization came from the work of Eleanor Rosch (1978). In her visit to study the Dani in New Guinea, she found that the speakers of this language had only two color terms: mola for bright, warm hues and mili for dark, cold ones. After exposing the Dani to forty color chips in order to study their perceptual abilities, she confirmed that they indeed had a very different culture, a confirmation of her belief in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis . However, upon continuing her investigation, she discovered some rather surprising information. She noted that the Dani did physiologically recognize colors in a manner very similar to those of Americans. The differences in naming colors were perceptually structured in the same way others outside of this cultural milieu. They used similar strategies in the storage, remembrance, and recollection of colors. They differed in how they were categorized in their own language. Humans do not differ in how their nervous systems organize colors, but how they name them, place them into categories. Recent research on color categories argue that cultures differ as to the location of the focal points of ideal colors, i.e., the prototype colors for color categories differ across cultures because they have different focal points. In some cultures, for example, the colors of blue and green have focal points that are closer to each other and for this reason many shades of blue and green overlap and are seen as color confusion by those outside of the cultural matrix.
Rosch continued her research into other aspects of linguistic categorization. She was intrigued by the fact that in many cultures there are thousands of words for birds, but no one overall category for birds (Palmer, 1996). In the United States, for example, one can readily find a general categorization of all birds into a common class.
Superordinate Level: Birds
Basic Level: Prototype with the exemplar of a robin
Subordinate Level: blue bird, black bird, jay bird, cardinal ….
What does it mean to say that a superordinate level or a general class for birds does not exist? What Rosch found was that in these cultures exemplars or prototypes can be used for designate a whole class or category. It is as if native speaks of English referred to the class of all birds as robins.
Her findings no longer directly challenged the traditional concept of categorization. Others were soon to follow with other cultural examples of the new categorization system (Dirven and Verspoor, 1998).
Category: chair
Prototype: chair
Exemplar Kitchen chair
Non-Prototypes: swivel chair, office chair, high chair, arm chair,
wheel chair, desk chair, electric chair, etc.
What is interesting about categorization is that some of the senses of a category are closer to the prototype and therefore more naturally belong to the same class of objects. Others, such as electric chair, are marginal as a member of the class of objects categories as chairs.
Prototype Structures
The Category The category is really a container. The classical theory of a category is that is its defined by unique elements within each and every substance. In prototype theory, however, a category is defined in terms of its prototype.
Primary Substance This is the ideal example that constitutes the category. The prototype or ideal example is highly concrete in shape, form, color, and function. The ideal category for a bird in North America, for example, is the robin.
Sense or non-primary substances The senses are other members of a category. Some are closer to the prototype or exemplar and others are not. Those senses that are closer to the exemplar of the robin are bluebirds, cardinals, etc. Those that are farthest away from an exemplar differ in substantial ways. The penguin and the albatross fall into these non-typical senses of a category.
Cognitive psychologists (Howard, 1987) learned is that people do not categorize their experiences of the world in accordance with traditional logic as evidenced in creation of logical forms espoused by advocates of transformational grammar (Senft, 2000; Taylor, 1995). Humans create categories for things, places, events, and experiences. Their representations are ideal. For example, the category of bird is represented by an ideal bird, which in North America, is the robin. In Australia, the ideal category for a bird may be the canary and in Brazil, it may be the parrot. These ideal examples are called exemplars. What is important about exemplars is that they provide a richness of details associated with the human experience. So, if one mentions a bird, the category invokes an exemplar that connotes wings, a certain wing shape, a certain color, a certain kind of beak, flight patterns, food preferences, etc. Although one would like to believe that these categories refer to the real world (Kant's noumena) , it does not. Categories are phenomenological. They reflect the perceptual structure of the perceiver. Even though categories harbor prototypes, what constitutes a prototype is usually culturally defined.
In addition to categorizing experiences, events, and percepts in terms of a basic member or prototypes, they are further organized them with regard to superordinate, subordinate levels. A chair, for example, is a category by itself. However, it belongs to a larger category of furniture. The prototype represents the basic level for a category. It is the one that is most easily learned by children and most readily recalled by them.
What is interesting about this theory of categorical levels is that it accounts for lexical networks. Words, it has been argued, do not exist alone. They are part of semantic domains. They relate to each other within lexical networks. Hence, when one thinks of a door, other elements are invoked that are part of a door. This study of the relationship of the parts to the whole is called mereology. Hence, the lexical item "door" invokes such related concepts as "door knob, key, key hole, door jamb, front of the door, back of the door," etc. Lexical networks that have been investigated by linguists in the past were based on genetic relationships, diachronic relationships over time, e.g., the relationship that exists among words such as father, paternal, patronymic, etc. . The new approach to networking is functional and cultural. There are cultural reasons for creating lexical networks and these differ over time and place.
Diachronic linguistics is replete with how lexical networks change through time. One can find interesting examples of these changes within the history of the English language. For example, in Old English, creatures were defined in a category that was based on movement in space. This network structure is evidenced in the following Old English words:
vogel (bird) = movement in space
fisch (fish) = movement in water
wyrm (worm) = movement under ground
tier (animal ) = movement on land.
This spatial classification is interesting because the metaphor of space was a significant part of medieval thought. This metaphor even included the Great Chain of Being whereby humans where visualized as belonging to a vertical space in which the Pope was closer to God and the masses were closer to animals.
How does prototype theory work in linguistics? It is interesting to study the change of these lexical networks through time. In modern English, meat refers to the flesh of animals used for food. In Old English, mete simply meant food.
The mete shall be mylk, honey and wyne. (mete = food)
After mete, before mete, at mete (mete = meal)
boef vs kuh (beef versus cow; beef is mete or edible flesh)
lambe vs mutton (lamb vs mutton, mutton is mete or edible flesh)
It is mete and drinke (mete = food)
What changes over time is the exemplar. At one time the exemplar of mete was food. There were other senses of this word such as a meal, a kind of food (not a drink) and the fleshy parts of animals (boef, mutton). Over time, one of the senses of the category of mete emerged as the prototype of a new category, meat.
Old English Modern English Commentary
Category meat meat Meat [mete] meant food in Old English. In modern English it meant animal flesh. Hence, there was a shift in the ideal category or exemplar
Prototype: mete (meat)
The class is called mete in Old English and meat in Modern English
Exemplar Food (Animal flesh)
In Old English, the ideal example of mete was food;
in Modern English, the ideal example of meat is food from animal flesh
The was a shift from a non-typical example to an ideal example over the centuries. What was a secondary sense of food in Old English becomes the primary meaning behind the modern English word meat. This change of meanings over time raises even more significant questions about the social history of the world of Old English as compared to Modern English. There more interesting questions behind these prototypical shifts remain to be resolved within the context of social history. What culinary customs transformed this re-categorization from Old English to Modern English? Was this development based on a practice within one subcultural before it spread to others or was it an intrinsic part of the culture as a whole? The new cognitive model brings linguistic theory back into the center of research in the humanities.
Another interesting shift in lexical networks over time can be found in the two senses of the word dog between the 14th and the 16th centuries. During the earlier period, the general category was that of hounds. There were many kinds of hounds: poodles, spaniels, greyhounds, and dogs. The prototype of this category was the dog and the exemplar of the dog was the mastiff, a large strong kind of dog that was used to guard houses. Later during the 16th century, the major category was the dog. Under the new categorization, dogs included the mastiff, poodles, spaniels, and greyhounds.
14th Century 16th Century Commentary: Prototype Hound Dog In the 14th century, a hound was the name of a category that was best exemplified by the mastiff. In the 16th century, the category shifted from hound to dog and the new exemplar was the dog.
Exemplar Mastiff dog Shift in ideal representative of the class
Senses Poodles, greyhounds, spaniels, and dogs Mastiff, greyhounds, spaniels, and poodles Non-ideal examples of the class
Once again, one wonders what may what has transpired in this time frame to cause this shift in how the category of hounds was re-categorized as a category of dogs. The answer can be seen in the exemplars themselves. When the exemplar for hound (mastiff) was replaced by the dog (another kind of hound), this shift caused the category to be restructured and renamed.
COGNITIVE BLENDING THEORY
When Gilles Fauconnier (1994) began to work on the syntax of counterfactuals, he came to the realization that the use of models of formal logic failed to account for natural language semantics. He argued that what was needed in linguistic theory was not a model that was based on the capacities of the mathematical systems used by logicians, but a different model, one based instead on the capacities of the human mind. His cognitive model of language became known as mental space theory. In his model, referential structure is indicated by mental spaces. In his theory, certain expressions set up conditional mental spaces that are separated from reality spaces. Consider the following sentence:
If John has children, John's children are blond.
The marker "if" sets up a conditional mental space C that is separate from the reality space, R.
If R then C
What this sentence states is that if John has children then in the conditional mental space C, those children are blond. The presupposition holds for the mental space C, but not necessarily for the mental space R. What links domain R with domain C is a cross-mapping system of conceptual connectors. With this model, the domains are set up, structured, and connected. These connections are cross-domain functions that specify counterparts and projected structure from one mental space to another. R is called a reference trigger; C is the reference target and the arrow is the connector that performs an identity function. With the concept of mental spaces, Fauconnier (1994: 12) is able to account the following sentences:
In Len's painting, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
In Len's mind, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes.
Len wants the girl with blue eyes to have green eyes.
In his earlier writings, Fauconnier (1994; 1997) is concerned with the mapping of multiple realities, multiple roles, multiple connectors, and double space builders. Later, Fauconnier (1997) expands his model to account for mood (indicative, imperative, and subjunctive) in language. He also introduces the concept of blending (1997: chapter six). A blend is a third mental space that inherits structures from its input mental spaces. These input spaces are connected to a generic mental space. This generic space reflects some common abstract structures and organization shared by the inputs. One of the ways of understanding this connection can be found in earlier discussions of the metaphor: The surgeon is a butcher.
Input 1: the butcher
Input 2: the surgeon
Generic Space: what the inputs have in common
The blend: contains emergent structures not contained in the inputs
The metaphor resulting from the blend: The surgeon is a butcher.
There is much to be said about the roles associated with these input mental spaces. One works in a butcher shop full of the carcasses of animals and the other is surrounded by an expert team of assistants in a sterilized environment. The butcher hacks away at body parts with a meat cleaver while the surgeon uses a scalpel to operate on his patient. What Fauconnier wants to highlight is that information about the roles of the surgeon and the butcher can be found in the generic space. The input spaces are projected into the mental space of the blend where several processes take place. One of these new processes is Composition. The projections from the input spaces make new relationships available in the blend that did not occur before. There is also a process of completion which allows knowledge of background frames, cognitive and cultural models to be views as a part of a larger self-contained structure in the blend. The patterns triggered by the inherited structures are completed into the larger emergent structure. Finally, there is a process of elaboration in which the structures are elaborated or simulated (running the blend) in accordance with the new logic of that mental space.
In a later work, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) expanded their concept of conceptual blends. They addressed the phenomenon of imagination, not to celebrate it, but to make a science of it. They argued that conceptual integration is at the heart of the process of imagination. In the process of conceptual integration, for example, input mental spaces are projected into a blended space and develop emergent structures through composition, completion and elaboration. This fundamental cognitive operation, they argue, has not been studied and merits further investigation. What one finds in this latest book is a detailed discussion of the processes of conceptual integration, identity, and imagination. . Numerous examples are provided to illustrate the nature of this process.
THE BUDDHIST MONK: Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40-50) provide an example of the Buddhist Monk. In this scenario one visualizes a monk walking up to the top of a mountain. One also imagines this same monk waking back down from the top of the mountain. The question is asked about where along this path he will meet himself. In order to resolve this imaginary scenario one needs to establish one input in which the monk makes his journey up the mountain. One also needs to establish another input in which the monk descends the mountain. These input spaces undergo a partial cross-space mapping (the monk, journey up the mountain, the journey down from the top, the top of the mountain, the bottom of the mountain, the motion from source to goal and the links between these. A generic mental spaces maps onto each of these inputs and contains what they have in common, a moving individual, his position, a path, motion, and direction. In the fourth mental space, there is a blend between the two inputs. Each of the mountain slopes in the two inputs (the journey up and the return) is projected to the same mountain slope in the blend space. The two days of travel, one going up and the other returning down, is blended into a single day. From this blend there develops emergent structures that cannot be found in either input.
Composition: In the inputs there are two individuals, one going up the mountain and another returning back to the bottom of the mountain. However, in the blend, there are not two moving individuals but one.
Completion: New relations exist in the blend. Instead of having two individuals making a journey on separate days, what one finds is two individuals making the journey on the same mountain at the same time and on the same day. They share the same background frame.
Elaboration: This involves running the blend. In this simulation one finds two people waling on a path in opposite directions, one begins the journey from the bottom of the mountain and the other begins the journey from the top. The running of this blend is an elaboration. It is a new structure, an act of creation.
The Network: The geometric correlations of time, position, location, and different mental spaces form a network. They form a conceptual integration network of four mental spaces and their correlations. The generic and the blended spaces are related. The blends contain generic structures captured in the generic space. Emergent structures in the blend are generated through the composition of projections from the input to create something new that did not exist in the inputs. In the inputs one finds two Buddhist monks traveling on different days, one is going up the mountain and the other is coming down from the mountain. In the blend, they are the person traveling at the same time. Emergent structures in the blend are also created through completion in which the blend recruits a great range of background meaning, recruited frames and scenarios. Finally, emergent structures can also be found to occur in elaborations, the simulation in which one runs the blend. It is in the running of the blend that one resolves the problem of the Buddhist Monk meeting himself along a path. Hence, composition, completion, and elaboration account for the creation of emergent structures in the blend.
DEBATE WITH KANT: Another interesting example of cognitive blending occurs in the debate with Immanuel Kant, the note German philosopher who lived in the 1800s. He posits a situation in which a university professor claims that Kant disagrees with him. The cognitive frame in this case is a debate that takes place with a professor of philosopher who is not living. In order for this scenario to work, one must posit two input mental spaces, one for Kant and one for the contemporary university professor. In the generic space, one encounters the fact that they are both philosophers, both have established modes of expression, both deal with issues, etc. However, in one of the input spaces, Kant speaks German whereas his debate, the American philosopher, speaks English. Kant is no longer living and his American counterpart is. In the blended space, there are retorts, challenges, and rhetorical claims by both philosophers. In this blended space, they both speak the same language and the both exist in the present. The blend has a rich emergent structure. Once again, one has created a mental space in which new scenarios can be envisaged.
There are certain types and subtypes of vital relations that exist with the mental space of the blend. Among these are change, identity, compressions of space and time, cause and effect relations, entering the world of representation, role functions, analogy, disanalogy, similarity, category, and uniqueness (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 93-101). These categories provide a cognitive scientists with a research agenda, areas of investigation that merit further study. One should add to this list the function of generic space. This is a mental space that enables one to abstract relationships from inputs that can assist the network to develop a working blend. There are certain problems associated with this assumption. The first has to do with the role of memory within this cognitive network. In earlier writings, Fauconnier (1994) referred to this network of mental spaces as a model of short term memory. It is equivalent to the virtual memory that one encounters when turning on a computer. No matter what was created while the computer was in operation, the information will be lost if it is not saved before turning off the machine. The second problem has to do with long term memory. When one turns on a computer, the information that is uploaded functions as the equivalent of long term memory. This model does not adequately account for long term memory. It hints that it comes from generic space, but there are no strong claims on how such memory functions within the network. If this integrated cognitive network is to adequately account for blends, it must include long term information in the form of social scripts. This concept will be introduced shortly.
Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 120-137) argue that there are four kinds of cognitive networks that operating among mental spaces.
Types of Cognitive Networks
Simplex Networks This is a simple kind of integration network. It can be found as a frame that is used in the explication of family roles. Hence, this frame prototypically applies to human beings. Consider an integration network contains this frame of the family and in the other space there are two human beings, Paul and Sally. In the blend, one would arrive at the claim: Paul is the father of Sally. The mapping across these two input spaces has a Frame-to-Values connection. The role of the father connects to Paul and the role of the mother connects to Sally. What makes simplex networks function comes from the fact that the relevant part of the frame in one input (X is the Y of Z) is projected onto the values in the other space.
Mirror Networks
The Mirror Network occurred in the Buddhist Monk and the Debate with Kant. It is an integration network in which all spaces (inputs, generic, and blend) share an organizing frame. The organizing frame in the Buddhist Monk was the journey; and the organizing frame the debate with Kant was the rhetorical argument. The organizing frame in the mirror network provides a typology for the space that it organizes. This is evident in the Buddhist Monk example. Mirror networks can integrate many different spaces provided that they share the same organizing frame. Mirror networks can perform compressions of time, space, identity, roles, cause-effects, change, intentionality, and representation. This is because all of the elements within the network share the same frame. For example, time and space are compressed in the Debate with Kant.
Single-Scope Networks
In a single scope network, there are two inputs but each has different organizing frames, but only one of them is projected to organize the frame. What this means is that both frames must compete for integration into the blend. The example provided for this is a scenario in which two men are boxing in one input space and two business executives are competing in the other input. In the blend, the boxing frame dominates. In the cross-mapping, however, there is a mapping between each boxer and the executives. In the blend, one executive knocks out the other in a business venture. Headliens: Murdoch knocks out Iacocca..
Double-Scope Networks
Each of the inputs in a double scope network has a different organizing frame. Often these frames clash with each other. In the blend, an only part of each frame is included. The computer desktop provides an example for this type of network. The computer screen is treated as a desktop, a piece of furniture. On it one finds a waste basket, a filing cabinet, and computer commands (save, open, close, print, etc.).
MEANING AND LANGUAGE: As Lakoff noted earlier, metaphor is not about language. It is about thought. Meaning is not to be found in language, but in thought. What language does is to prompt the construction of meaning. Language is used to select structures and elements that go into a cognitive blend. If the blend can be elaborated, then it has meaning. Meaning comes from running a blend. We humans social construct reality, they are constructing cognitive blends. They enter into those blends and live in them. When they live in these blends, they function as social and cultural constructs. Meaning is the imaginative product of blending. Two people may experience similar inputs and derive separate blends from those experiences. For example, a professor should have a richer blend than his student because he has access to a greater depth of inputs and long term memory. Two individuals who interact with each other across cultures, will arrive at different blends even though they share the same inputs. In the next chapter, the implications blending theory for cognitive scaffolding will be discussed.
SIMILE: Given the concept of elaboration (the running of a blend), the difference between simile and metaphor becomes very clear. A metaphor has meaning because it has been elaborated. It has been subjected to cognitive simulation. Simile, on the other hand, is nothing more than a proposal for a blend. It has not been elaborated.
John is like an animal (Simile, not elaborated)
John is an animal (Metaphor, blend has been elaborated.
Cognitive blending theory is concomitant with current work in cognitive linguistics. It makes use of cognitive schemas and assumes that communication occurs through cognitive blends. Language is about the organization of thought; it is about cognitive blending; it is about invoking scenarios and negotiating them with others is a highly contextualized situation.
There are several problem areas with the current theory. One is that is meant to account for psychological constructs and as a consequence it does not account for social interaction among individuals. The following comments address these limitations.
SCRIPT THEORY
For decades linguists have focused on abstractions and universals in language. As a consequence of this concern for universal laws, they have overlooked the crucial role that contextualization plays in language. The richness of language can be found in its contexts. This awareness for context grew out of the work of Rosch (1978) who was the first to document how prototypes that are based on detailed exemplars form the the basis for the process of categorization. This realization also emerged from attempts by computer scientists to represent human thinking (Minsky, 1975; 1985). In order to have a robot perform human tasks, it needed to envision the world as humans do. Minsky (1985) used the metaphor of the society in the mind to illustrate how social concepts play an important role in how human beings think and act together under normal circumstances. They work from an image of society that is represented in the human mind. For Minsky, that image existed in the form of a computer program that knew and understood the world of human being, a social world. In order to create such a program in the computer, Minsky needed to provide a plethora of rich details about how human beings live, act, and think. It was this contextualization that enabled him to successfully accomplish his robotic research.
STRUCTURAL EPISTEMOLOGY: Another problem with most models of language is that they fail to incorporate non-verbal modes of processing and expressing information (Koevecses, 2002: 57-66). There are several reasons for this lack of theoretical concern with other modes of cognition. European culture is logocentric. It is a rhetorically based culture that assumes that knowledge primarily exists in verbal form. As a consequence, one find that the equation of language with thought underlies most linguistic thinking until recently (Fodor, 1982; 1983). One has to visit other cultures, especially those in Asia, in order to see how little verbal expressions matter while interacting with others. In many of these cultures, there are expressions about not trusting language. In Japanese, for example, one says that "speech is trash." They judge one's character by what a person does and not what he says. Many indigenous cultures also place more of an emphasis on nonverbal communication. In these cultures, silence is communication (Basso, 1970; 1990).
Structural epistemology is a cover term that emphasizes the fact all knowledge cannot be communicated unless it has some form of expression. If a concept does not have a corresponding form, it is ineffable. Behind the concept of structural epistemology is the recognition that there are many different ways available to human beings for self expression. One is not limited to verbal expression. Hence, the relationships between the contents of a sign system and its forms of expression are complex. In the field of Linguistics and its sister discipline of semiotics, it is assumed that the sign system consists of meanings that are embedded into forms, the conduit metaphor. Structural Epistemology expands that concept to include other metaphors of expression within the contexts of cognitive sociology. It not only incorporates the standard verbal metaphor of content being embedded into form, but it also includes the metaphors of resonance and visual space. These may differ significantly from the language metaphor (the conduit metaphor). For example, the metaphor of resonance comes from music. Many cultures express themselves in terms of musical metaphors (being in harmony, moving with the flow or the force of nature, etc.). Hence, meaning is transferred through resonance and empathy. Many cultures also organize themselves around metaphors of visual space and embed themselves into movements within that space (non-verbal communication, ideography, metaphysics of the quaternity, symbolic dance, and sacred art). As noted earlier, the study of Structural Epistemology is an attempt to understand the various ways in which human information systems are organized knowledge across cultures. It does not claim that only one metaphor of communication exists, such as advocates of semiotics and formal linguistics do. It allows several systems to co-exist and understands that within a given culture only one of these systems may be legitimated and advocated as the official metaphor of communication even though all three communicative metaphors may co-exist within a society. In addition to the cardinal metaphors of communication, the model of structural epistemology is also concerned with how transducers constrain and modify information. These transducers may be biological and social. Just as biological transducers operate within a limited frame within the electromagnetic spectrum, social transducers also operate within frames of knowledge and belief. All of these directly impact on how knowledge is processed, understood, and conveyed within social systems. Knowledge is mediated through cognitive categories and represented as language, resonance, and visual space.
The rationale for this different approach to communication systems comes from the distinction between the study of substance or structure and the study of form or pattern. In studying substance, one asks what it is made of. In the study of form, one asks what its pattern is. The former has to do with quantitative research while the latter is qualitative in nature. The study of patterns is important for human systems research because it reveals the emergent properties of a system. These are the properties of organization. Without organization, one does not have a system, merely aggregates. Vision, speech, and hearing all have their own theories of substance. What is being investigated here is their theories of self-organization, their emergent properties, and their non-linear networks. Hence, structural epistemology is about the emergent properties (the systemic properties) of linguistic, visual, and auditory networks within the context of human information systems.
THE THEATER OF THE MIND: Evidently, most of what Lakoff and his colleagues have considered in their theory of the human brain is the neocortex region. Linguists are aware that the mind is embodied, but they have not even begun to address seriously how these links with the tribunal brain account for motor schemas, cognitive schemas, integration and cognitive blending. The reason why linguists have failed in this attempt is obvious. They have not even begun to consider how the brain and its functions relate to human language. Much has been predicated on inferences based on the modular theory of first generation cognitive scientists. Even those who are operating within the second generation of the cognitive sciences have addressed this problem from the perspective of the neocortex rather than from the other parts of the triune brain. There is nothing wrong with this approach except that what linguists are engaged in is not a theory of the brain, but a theory of the mind, the neocortex. In particular, they are operating within a dramaturgical metaphor called the theater of the mind, a theory about language and its function within the neocortex (St. Clair, 2004). The theater of the mind is a dramaturgical metaphor that continues to resurface in the history of ideas (St. Clair, 2002, Chapter Four). One of the clearer statements of this concept can be found in the work of Erving Goffman (1959; 1974). He argues that human beings present themselves to others in the stage of life. They are playwrights in that they construct their own personal and social scripts, life goals. They are actors in that they perform the roles that they have created for themselves. They are critics in that they evaluate their own performance while in the presence of others. They are set designers in that they dress themselves and their environments to fit the roles that they have selected for themselves in life. In the cognitive blend model, it is assumed that several inputs are somehow selected and placed in a mental space where they under simulations. If the running of the blend works, understanding is said to result. What is missing is the fact that inputs into the cognitive blend do not only come from the context of the social situation, but is also orchestrated by a playwright, the individual who has his own script, stage directions, and audience. However, this playwright has to be able to rewrite his plays while interacting with others. This is because the others in his life, especially the significant others, are also sharing his stage and running their own theatrical productions. This social aspect of human interaction needs to be incorporated into cognitive blending theory. One does not stand alone on stage without an audience, stage hands, and fans. Life is predicated on a series of mini-dramas and it is argued within this framework that these mini-dramas constitute the scenarios or social schemas that motivate human interaction. Life is dominated by the metaphor of play, a dramaturgical metaphor.
It is important because the blend is where the theater of the mind occurs. After one has constructed a imaginative context, then one is able to refer to events, actions, and social scripts within that context. This is because the cognitive blend constitutes the theater of life. In his discussion on metaphor and metonymy, Kovecses (2002: 145) struggled with certain tropes. For example, he asks how one can distinguish between metaphor and metonymy since so many tropes suggest metaphorical origins.
Metaphoric Expression: The creampuff was knocked out.
Metonymic Expression: We need a new glove.
He claims that the metaphoric expression can be rephrased as simile; the metonymic expression cannot.
The boxer is like is like a creampuff.
*the third baseman is a new glove.
He concludes that this test clarification between metaphor and metonymy provide further evidence that these are two different kinds of figurative language and they have different kinds of functions. Metonymies operate within the same domain and have to do with the relationship of the whole to its parts.
They stood at the altar (part of the scenario for the whole)
She took the pill (the category for one of its members)
The crown addressed the people (synecdoche, a special case of metonymy )
He notes that metonymy is often used for participants who are involved in some kind of prototypical action. Instrument for action: to shampoo
Agent for action: to butcher, to author
Object involved in the action for the action: blanket the bed
Result for action: a screw-up
Manner for action: he tiptoed
What is interesting about metonymy is that it requires contextualization. This suggests that the process is closely related to visual thinking. One has to visualize a scene before articulating how its parts are closely connected to each other. Therefore, in metonymy one has to visualize the contexts of the situation. What one is trying to create in the blend is a stage scene or a play. Elements are chosen to be inputs into a possible dramaturgical blend. If the blend works, it becomes the context for numerous linguistic expressions involving metaphor, and metonymy. If the blend is a potential metaphor, it appears as simile, a possible blend . Consequently, the theater of the mind provides the context for the generation of other metaphorical and metonymical expressions after a blend has been successfully run.
THE VISUALIZATION OF CONTEXTS: Metonyms are highly contextualized. They require detailed visual scenes in which its various parts are related and integrated into a whole scene. The restaurant scene discussed in an earlier chapter provides such a situation. In a restaurant, there are people who perform certain roles and each of these roles comes with its own social script.
Explicandum Dramaturgical Blends
Bakhtin noted that when two people are conversing face-to-face, each sees what is behind the other. Each speaker, however, is not aware of what is behind him. In the theater of the mind, both place this background on the stage located between them. They use this shared stage in order to interact with each other and better understand the context of the situation. Each person acts as a playwright and creates his own theater of the mind. Each creates his own blend of what is happening. If these individuals create different scripts of the same situation, they will create separate blends. They will also play different social roles, and stage the events in disparate ways. Each has constructed a different social reality of the shared event. Each has a different script theory.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, the paradigm that constitutes the second generation of the cognitive sciences has been explicated. The changes that have taken place in cognitive linguistics are revolutionary. Linguistics is no longer the study of form. Communication is not about language, but about thought. Meaning is not to be found in words and sentences, but in the successful simulation of a blend. The implications of this new model for cross-cultural studies are numerous. In the next chapter, some of these will be discussed under the anatomy of social metaphor.
For more than two millennia, philosophers have down played the significance of metaphor as an instrument of cognition. With the advent of cognitive linguistics, however, there has been a renaissance in metaphorical thinking. In other words, analogical thinking plays a major role in human cognition. It is by means of analogical thinking that verbal metaphors are constructed and sometimes blended. It is by means of analogical thinking that tonal metaphors are generated. The circle of fifths in music theory, for example, involves the codification from one key into another. The first forms the source for the second. Finally, it is by means of analogical thinking that visual information is placed on a cognitive space to convey information.
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