The Basal Ganglia and the Serial Order of Communicative Signs

  Robert N. St. Clair, University of Louisville

Abstract

Communication systems are based on the serial order of signs and symbols. This organization is evidenced in language in the form of syntax and word morphology. Lieberman, a linguist, has argued that the limbic system provides the rationale for the origin of language as serially ordered behavior. His definition of the limbic system, it should be noted, included the basal ganglia. However, it is the subcortical area of the basal ganglia that has to do with the ordering of motor sequences. These concepts will be discussed and the complexity of serially ordered behavior is discussed as a physiological construct. Lieberman's claim is that by means of analogy, language evolved as a metaphorical extension of the physiological organization of behavior. What remains to be resolved in this construct is the question of agency and the role that abstract schemas play in motivating motor schemas.

 

Introduction

During the 19th century, both Broca's and Wernicke's areas were established as the seats of human linguistic activity. Broca's area, for example, is characteristically associated with speech production and sentence comprehension. Philip Lieberman (2000) argues that these traditional assumptions are wrong. He also argued that there is experimental evidence in which the striatal basal ganglia play a key role in the production of human speech, and the comprehension of sentences. He went on to claim that similar basal ganglia operations also provide cognitive flexibility needed to comprehend complex syntax. Language is a recursive motor activity and the organization and control of motor activity are basal ganglia operations.

Lieberman (2000, 1998, 1990, 1984)) has a long tradition of arguing again the innate language hypothesis of Noam Chomsky and his associates. Lieberman argues that language is not innate. It is learned. He also argues against the claim made by Fodor (1983) that the mind is modular. The functions within the brain are not compartmentalized into functional modules of brain activity. They are interconnected. He is also against the algorithmic models of symbolic processes that are unrelated to the biological nature of the brain. Lieberman is interested in developing a biological account of language and its evolution. For him, motor control constitutes one of the preadaptive factors that accounts for the evolution of human cognitive and linguistic ability. He argues for the evolution of an enhanced striatal sequencing engine and he argues that FOXP2, the language gene that regulates the embryonic development of the basal ganglia and related neural structures, is an ancient gene that emerged about 200,000 years ago and it was this gene that accou8nts for the evolution of language in humans.

Language is a communication system that is sequentially ordered. This is why Lieberman (2000) has argued that the evolution of language did not arise from the neocortex as a symbolic system, but from the reptilian brain where motor activities are ordered and executed. He also argues that language is associated with the limbic system because vocalizations are associated with emotional expressions. The position taken in this exposition of language and the brain differs somewhat from the pronouncements made by Lieberman. Rather than reject the significance of the "language organs" (Broca and Wernicke's areas), it will be argued that language is to complex and integrated within the neuronal system to limit it to those two functional regions of the brain. The limbic system, for example, provides a powerful relay system to other areas of the brain and the basal ganglia helps to coordinate and orchestrate serial behavior. The question of the ontogeny and the phylogeny of language is not the focus area of concern to this investigation and that will not be dealt with in this essay. What will be discussed, however, is the nature of analogical behavior as a metaphoric activity. Just an element of spoken or written language can provide the basis for metaphorical expression; it is argued that a similar phenomenon occurs amidst nonverbal behavior.

In particular, the basal ganglia provide the source for several praxiological metaphors, metaphors that are based on using one form of behavior as a source for the creation of a varied behavior or a metaphorically blended new behavior. Language is an overlaid function. Before investigating the role of the basal ganglia in the coding of natural action sequences, it is best to begin this journey into the claims made by Lieberman by looking at the role that the FOXP2 gene plays in language.

Language and the FoxP2 Gene

Nucleotide for nucleotide, genomes are rather similar between humans and their nearest non-talking neighbors, the chimpanzees (Ebersberger, 2002). As a matter of fact, it is known that human share 98.5 percent of their genetic material with the chimpanzees. So, why is it that humans are able to speak and chimpanzees are not? Chomsky (1972) attributed this difference to a unique faculty of language possessed by human beings. Simon Fisher, a Royal Society Research Fellow, read about the language instinct (Pinker, 1994) and began to speculate on the genetic basis of speech development. This gene hunting quest study lead to study of a new gene called FOXP2 (Marcus and Fisher, 2003). They argued that a mutated form of this gene led to speech and language disorders. Later, Erich Jarvis of Duke University Medical Center and Constance Scharff of the Max Plank Institute for Molecular Genetics in Germany found that birds share this same "language gene" with humans.(Meredith, 2003).

Upon closer examination, evolutionary geneticists compared the DNA sequence of the normal human FOXP2 with nonhuman primates and found that humans have a specific sequence variation that is not found in any other mammal. The human version of FOXP2 is a type of gene that regulates other genes. As a consequence, this gene has the potential to create a cascade of changes during the evolutionary process, the most important being vocal learning. Researchers have also found that this gene was expressed in the same area of the brain in both humans and song-learning birds, viz., the basal ganglia.

The Fox gene is not a conventional gene but a protein that binds to the promoter region of other genes. It facilitates the transcription from DNA to RNA. In the presence of the transcription factor, the gene makes proten.

Lieberman (2000) claimed that this was a "grammar gene." It is not.

Contrary to the expectations of linguists, FOXP2 is not a "grammar gene." Lai and her colleagues (2000, 2001) found that this gene belongs to a family of 60 FOX genes Mazet et alia, 2003). These are not conventional genes but a protein that binds to the promoter region of other genes and facilitates their transcription from DNA to RNA. In other words, in the presence of the transcription factor, the gene makes protein; in its absence, it does not. The gene contains a forkhead binding doman or a winged helix domain that allows genes to bind to the promoter region of other genes. Hence, FOXP2 is a transcriptor factor. It has the potential to affect the expression of an unknown but potentially large number of other genes. Hence, FOXP2 is not a gene for language. Neither is it a gene for grammar. The best that advocates of the innate language hypothesis (Pinker, 1994) can hope for is that this gene promotes oro-facial movements that could be instrumental in triggering the development of language.

 The Anbatomy of the Basal Ganglia

The basal ganglia are a collection of subcortical neuronal groups that are located in the forebrain. These groups play an important role in the control of movement. The three main divisions are the globus pallidus, the caudate nucleus, and the putamen. The latter two are referred to as the neostriatum because they are phylogenetically the most recent developments and also because they are functionally related.

Some anatomists have considered the associated nuclei (the amygdaloid complex) to be a part of the basal ganglia. This view is no longer held, however, by modern neuroscientists. Note that the subthalamic nucleus and the substantia nigra are part of the mid brain even though they share similar neuronal structures. What is important, however, is that these groups participate in circuits with the cortex and the thalamus to mediate aspects of motor control.

The caudate nucleus is a tail-shaped mass of neuron cell bodies. It constitutes one of the components of the basal ganglia and is involved in regulating voluntary movements. The caudate nucleus is one of the groups that participates in the mediation of various aspects of motor control.

The caudate and putamen receive most of the input from cerebral cortex. In this sense they can be seen as a portal into the basal ganglia. However, these connections are more complex and can be distinguished by regional differences.

The medial caudate and nucleus accumbens receive their input from frontal cortex and limbic areas

The caudate and putamen are reciprocally interconnected with the substantia nigra

The caudate and the putament send most of their output to the globus pallidus

The globus pallidus can also be divided into two parts: the globus pallidus externa (GPe) and the globus pallidus interna (GPi). Both receive input from the caudate and putamen, and both are in communication with the subthalamic nucleus.

The GPi, however, that sends the major inhibitory output from the basal ganglia back to thalamus. The GPi also sends a few projections to an area of midbrain to assist in postural control.

The basal ganglia are also active in selecting which response to make or which response to inhibit and because the information passes back and forth between the basal ganglia and the motor areas of the cortex, the functions of the basal ganglia resemble those of the motor, premotor, and prefrontal cortex. The functions of the basal ganglia include the integration of feeling and movement, the shifting and smoothing of fine motor behavior, the suppression of unwanted motor behaviors, setting the level of body anxiety, controls pleasure and ectasy and enhances motivation.

The Basal Ganglia as a Sequencing Engine

One of the more promising hypotheses about the basal ganglia is that it evolved to coordinate sequence of instinctive behavior and later it was modified to control learned behavior (Aldridge and Berridge, 1998). .How the basal ganglia neurally codes action sequences has been investigated by Aldridge and Berrige (1998, 2003). They studied the neuronal connections involved in syntactic chaining of motor activities, in particular the grooming behavior of mice. This syntactic chain involved approximately 25 movements that were linked in a fixed order of four phases. Once these grooming activities were initiated, they activated striatal neurons. The question that they asked was whether or not striatal activity initiate movements in a chain. The answer was negative. These activities code action syntax, but they do not initiate them. These neurons could only be initiated following neuronal activity and the onset of these movements intiated subsequent movements in the grooming chain. Hence, basal ganglia facilitate the action sequences but they do not play a direct role in movement initiation. What this evidence shows is that the basal ganglia function as a sequencing engine and not as language genes. It does not initiate or generate syntactic sequences (Aldridge and Berridge, 2003: 71). It does have a role in the implementation of the process, but the initiation and programming of the sequence occurs elsewhere in the brain. Dominey and Ramus (2000) have argued that although serial and temporal structures in language share a common neural architecture, abstract structures required for verbal schemata are distinct. Although children may readily learn recurrent temporal structures associated with sensorimotor activities, they fail to learn abstract structures. Marcus and his colleagues (1999) have demonstrated that abstract learning can only be achieved by a system that has specific representation capabilities for these abstract structures. Dominey and Ramus (2000) have postulated that this mechanism must be an Abstract Recurrent Network (ARN)). The key work here is "network."

Where is this Abstract Recurrent Network? Is it located in Broca's area? There is evidence that this area of the brain is associated with language activity. Borkheimer (2002), for example, For example, this area is associated with tasks involving naming, phonological judgments, semantic, and syntax. It is also activated during the acquisition of grammatical rules, the discrimination of speech sounds, the production of words, and prosody. However, the activation of this area in the brain does not mean that the neural substrates of the aforementioned functions are located in Broca's area or that this area functions as a language organ (Nishitani, eta alia, 2005). Networks are not located in any one place within the brain, but are disseminated in radial arrangements throughout the neural architecture of the brain.

Representations of Cerebral Cytoarchitectonics

When events occur, they are present. When they are observed and defined by others, they are re-presented. How things or events are represented is important. There are several ways of accomplishing this. In the graphs included in this essay, the brain is represented by means of different anatomical areas. Why is this done? This practice began with Franz Joseph Gall, (1758-1828) - the father of phrenology, who held that the brain consisted of many organs, each having a specific psychological facility. Modern physiologists and neurologists now know that there are no centers for vision or language, but the practice of locating areas of the brain as anatomical representations of brain functions still exist. Gall was right, but for the wrong reasons. The brain is a system of systems and each system is composed of small and elaborate interconnections. These macroscopic cortical regions and subcortical nuclei are made up of local circuits (neurons connected by synapses). The macroscopic cortical regions are located in different regions within the brain system and hence it is convenient to refer to these as anatomical areas. In this essay, the basal ganglia and the limbic system are such macroscopic regions. They are where functional areas of the brain are situated. Are these areas of the brain organs? No, they are locations of intercalated networks. Hence, brain anatomy may have begun with phrenology, but anatomical charts are no longer used for that purpose. They are used as macroscopic maps of functional regions of the brain. As one moves from the macroscopic level to the microscopic depiction of the brain, the focus is on neurons and their biochemical functions. Neurons have axons that send signals (neurotransmitters) to other neurons through synapses and they have dendrites that receive signals (neurotransmitters) from other neurons through synapses. On the average every neuron has 1,000 synapses, but direct neuronal connections are few. This means that the focus of neurological research tends to focus on subcortical areas of the brain such as the basal ganglia and the limbic cortex. What happens within those areas are represented in terms charts depicting their functions.

Re-Presentations are never Neutral

In mathematics, representations of events and structures are called functions, a term coined by Leibniz a point on a slope in his 1694 model of calculus (Pedro da Ponte, 1992). A function takes an event that is present and re-presents some aspect of that event mathematically. This distinction is important because within cognitive linguistics because Lakoff (1987) makes some very strong claims about metaphors and how they emerge from neuronal substrates. Metaphors are a kind of analogical reasoning. Analogies have to do with the representation of events or structures. The source of an event is restated in functional terms as a new form, one that highlights only aspects of that event.

How can neuronal substrates provide the basis for the ontological metaphors that Lakoff (1987) argues for? This journey from neuronal substrate to a verbal metaphor is a long one and the journey must begin with the study of the brain as a neurological system. .How are these macroscopic and microscopic systems represented? There are several possibilities. Functions, inverse functions (arc cosecant, ar cosine, etc), transformations (reflection, rotation, translation, affine transformation), mapping (correspondences, diagrammatic representations, depictions, locations within a map, polar maps, similarity), operations (identity, trigonometric functions, circular functions), threshold functions, and exponential functions. To claim that metaphors emerge from neuronal substrates leaves much undefined. Such claims fail to articulate just what is involved in this process and how these processes are represented. To add to this problem, there are many levels at which these representations need to be articulated. How do the microscopic local circuits of a cortical area relate to neocortical events that emerge as verbal metaphors? As stated earlier, the human brain is not a composite of organs. There is no language organ or a faculty of language within the brain. What one encounters is a mega-system of composed of subsystems. These systems are representations of functional events within the brain. So the question that must be asked is how does one re-present these events? The answer can be found by looking for neurological networks that function as a system or subsystem.

Neurological Networks

The view taken in this essay is that the mind is embodied. The old Cartesian separation of the mind from the body has led many to assume that the brain functions separately from the body. As Damasio (2000) has noted, it is not. As a matter of fact, this is the position taken by Mark Johnson (1987) and later by Lakoff and Johnson (1999). They are espousing a philosophical perspective developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). What they add to this perspective is a model of cognitive linguistics that is more concerned with how people think than with the mathematical modeling of language. Although this essay may concur with the philosophical intent of Lakoff (1987), it disagrees with how those claims are grounded. In the work of Lakoff, one infers from a representation of language that such a system is grounded in the neuronal substrates of the brain. The model that Lakoff is using has been clearly stated. He is arguing that language is not about linguistic forms but with the organization of concepts in the human mind. Since he has grounded his theory in this manner, he needs to find evidence for his claim within the brain.

The problem with this line of research on the brain is that it is also based on different representations of what happens when one uses language. The first generation of cognitive scientists (Gardner, 1987) sought to create a model of the brain based on their knowledge of computer systems. They argued that the brain is a computer. Hence, their evidence for the functional cytoarchitectonics of the brain comes from their vision of the computer as a calculating device. They assume that short term memory functions in the same way as virtual memory does in the computer. The problem with this model is that these researchers are imposing technological systems into a complex biological, electrical, and chemical neurological system. Lakoff's view of the brain favors this approach.

The approach of the embodied mind espoused in this essay is grounded in human physiology. It is argued that one must first understand physiological systems and their functions prior to looking for neuronal substrates of language. When there is evidence for the biology of language, it will appear as a complex system or subsystem within the brain. If there are neuronal substrates to language, these substrates function as complex networks rather than as anatomical units within a macroscopic representation of the brain. Philip Lieberman (1984, 1990, 1998, 2000) was one of the few linguists to attempt this approach. He grounded his work in the biology of language. He differs from Eric Lenneberg (1967), a Brazilian medical doctor who went on to do a doctorate in linguistics. Lenneberg believed in Chomsky's claims about the faculty of language. Lieberman did not. Currently, there are others who are working within this biological and physiological tradition (Baars, 1997; Stamenov and Gallese, 2002; and Rodriguez, St. Clair and Joshua, 2005). What does this tradition of the embodied mind entail? The brain is not just limited to the developmental model of the triune brain located in the cranium, but includes the spinal cord, the spinal nerves (cervical, thoracic, lumbar, sacral and coccygeal nerves), the cranial nerves (olfactory, optic, oculomotor, trochlear, trigeminal, abducent, facial, vestibulocochlear, glossopharyngeal, vagus, accessory, and hypoglossal), the autonomic system (sympathetic, parasympathetic, sympathetic nerves, iris, salivary glands, lungs and windpipe, heart, adrenal glands, liver, stomach and intestines and the parasympathetic nerves).

Verbal Syntax as a Praxiological Metaphor

Claims made by Lakoff (1987) merit serious consideration. However, how does one go about grounding his model of linguistics in neurophysiologic terms? First, one has to redefine what he means by neuronal substrate. It is not a place or an organ within the brain, but a series of neuronal networks. Just to produce the syllable [pa} requires a complex set of innervations within the neuromuscular system that must be well coordinated. There are innervations the nerves that are need accomplish a range of physiological tasks that must be timed perfectly. The lengths of the nerves to the various components needed in phonation vary and this means that their innervations must be timed in order to produce the intended syllable. Even though the pronunciation of the syllable [pa] may appear to rather simple, it is not. What lies beneath this phonation is a complex network of subsystems that are correctly timed.

In Linguistic Systems and the Physiological Classification of Verbs, the authors (Rodrigues, St. Clair, and Joshua) argue that verbs are not lexical entities, but are complex processes of neurological pathways between the body and the brain.

If such complexity is required for the simple phonation of syllables, what would be involved in the creation of a verbal metaphor? It is at this point that the problem becomes far more complex that one may have imagined. Earlier, it was argued that the basal ganglia will take a concatenation of activities and develop a motor schema around these actions. Once these actions have been incorporated into this sequencing engine, it may be called into action by merely beginning the sequence. There is one major problem within this sequence of events that needs to be clarified. If a motor sequence is incorporated into the basal ganglia as a motor schema, what created that sequence of actions? The motor sequence is a mapping operation. What created the map? There must be a higher level of activity within the brain that gave agency to those sequential events. What is that activity? Where did it come from? To add to this problem, consider the fact that a sequence may be used to create other sequences that are similar to the original. In the following examples regarding the Circle of Fifths, one motor schema forms the basis for the creation of a new motor schema. This is a special case of metaphorical reasoning based on motor habits (praxis). Hence, they are praxiological metaphors.

The Circle of Fifths as Metaphorical Motor Schemas

Musicians know that notes can be played on a scale and that some singers can vocalize higher on that musical scale than others. They use as a reference point the key of middle C on the piano. As one plays each key progressively on the piano, the result is a melodic scale based on middle C. As one begins with the middle C and plays one note after the other within that octave, the following progression of notes known as a scale. The next scale to emerge on the piano keyboard is the scale of G. It differs from the key of C by having one sharp. As one moves along to the next scale, what emerges is that it requires two sharps in order to preserve the musical scale. This addition of sharps is known as the Circle of Fifths. What does this mean? G is the fifth note on the C scale and the next scale after C begins with the fifth note. Hence, the sequence is known as the circle of fifths. Musicians adjust their playing to comply with the musical range of singers. Some singers command the C scale; others can command a higher range or a higher scale. The process of moving from one scale to another is called "keying."

Vibrations of energy are either in harmony or they are not. When they are in harmony, the constitute a musical chord. The C chord, for example, consists of the notes C, E, and A. There are also many major and minor chords that provide examples of harmonic structures.

The Circle of Fifths is an example of a kinetic metaphor. The C chord is used as the source to create a new chord sequence by adding sharps to the musical scale. This addition continues on a clockwise path. The reverse, the addition of flats is known as the Circle of Fourths. It moves on a counterclockwise pathe.

From the point of the basal ganglia, this sequence of notes on the C scale is internalized into a motor schema. What motivated this pattern? Was it the idea of the musical scale? Was it the actual interaction with a musical instrument in the process of playing that scale? As noted earlier, one follows a motor pattern that soon becomes internalized. When it is internalized, it functions as a motor schema. By initiating the pattern, the schema is triggered. What initiates this pattern? The answer at this stage can only be some abstract higher schema that commands it.

What controls the motor sequence? Is it the abstract schema? What takes the basic motor schema based on middle C and creates a new musical scale based on the key of G#? Is it the abstract schema or the motor schema? If it is the motor schema, then one has a praxiological metaphor; if it s the abstract schema, the one has an epistemological metaphor. Lakoff (1987) distinguishes between epistemological metaphors and ontological ones. It is his belief that ontological metaphors are guided by events that emerge from the neural substrates of the mind. If it takes an abstract concept of a sequence to create the motor sequence itself within the basal ganglia, then the claim that these motor actions are the basis for higher abstract thought, viz., verbal metaphors. The abstract sequence may have originated in the neocortex and not in the basal ganglia. This pattern of creating motor schemas by some kind of higher agency (intended, habitual, or otherwise) presents a problem for :Lieberman (1990, 2000) who argued in favor of praxiological metaphors. If the processes involved in this internalization of motor actions are the result of a mapping operation, then what serves as the map? Is it the abstract construct? It cannot be the motor schema as it functions as a product of some action sequence.

The Motor Theory of Speech

The strength of this model is based on the power of gesture as a means of communication among human beings. It says, in essence, that language began as a means of communication through gestures. How does one explain, according to this model, why gesturing systems in primates did not evolve into more complex vocalized gestures that are characteristically associated with humans? The nature of the vocal tract in humans differs significantly in humans from other gesture producing animals and this difference has led to the development of human speech (Lieberman, 1984, 1998).

Embodied Simulation and the Mirror Neuron System

Vittorio Gallese (Gallese, 2001, 2003, 2005, Gallese and Goldman, 1998, Gallese and Lakoff, 2005, and Stamenov and Gallese, 2002) Giacomo Rizzolatti (1996) and their colleagues at the University of Parma have identified an entirely new class of neurons, mirror neurons. They discovered that brain cells in the premotor cortex, the area that plans movements, fire right before the monkey grasps, manipulates, or reaches for something. What is revolutionary about their investigation is that these same cells fire when the monkey sees some another monkey or person do the same actions. What does this mean? It means that the neurons located in the premotor cortex, just in front of the motor cortex, recognizes the meaning of actions made by others (Rizzolatti, G. and M. Arbib. (1998). Hence, Rizzolatti has called these "mirror neurons" because they neurologically mirror an action.

Why is this discovery important? Why did V. S. Ramachandran consider this discovery to be the equivalent for neuroscientists that the discovery of the DNA code was for biologists? It is important because human beings also possess mirror neurons. It was Luciano Fadiga of the University of Ferrara in Italy who was the first to provide evidence that human beings have a system of mirror neurons analogous to system found in monkeys. It is also important because it provides a mechanism for the sharing of meaning. It is important because it explains how human beings are able to represent the mental sates of others. It is important because mirror neurons provide the bridge from "doing" to "communicating." It is important because it explains the biology of "intentional attunement." It explains the mechanisms behind "silent speech" and documents the function of mirror neurons in the left inferior frontal gyrus, a sector of Broca's area. It also correlates with mirror neuron activity in Wernicke's area in the brain. It explains the mirror neuron connections between what is acted and what is perceived.

What this discovery of mirror neurons provides is the fact that imitation and simulation are an integral part of a theory of the mind (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Simulations are embodied in mirror neurons. This finding provides a deeper level of understanding of the embodied mind hypothesis.

 Concluding Remarks

There are many claims being made by linguists about language and how it is related to the architectonics of the brain. Chomsky (1972) argued that language is innate and he claimed that there is a faculty of language. This bold claim was based in a series of inferences about how language is acquired, but it was never substantiated by biological and physiological evidence. Lakoff (1978) has argued that language theory has to be related to how human beings think and he has made numerous claims about how neural substrates within the brain are the basis for numerous ontological metaphors in language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Once again this is based on a series of inferences about the brain without actually doing neurological research. Philip Lieberman (1984, 1990, 1998, 2000) has approached linguistic theory from a biological point of view. In his findings, he argued that language emerged as an emotional construct within the limbic system and he particularly focus on the FOXP2 gene as a major contributor to the sequencing of events in the basal ganglia and by inference in linguistic syntax. The claims about FOX genes merit reconsideration. The basal ganglia is seen as a sequencing engine within the brain and the question that should be asked is what kinds of processes are involved in mapping other kinds of activities onto those sequences.

Another area of concern has to do with the embodied mind concept. Many linguists favor the embodied mind concept but they see the brain as a collection of organs. Their views of the brain are macroscopic and anatomical. They do not look into the substrates of the brain and deal with the functions and the circuitry of the basal ganglia and the limbic system. They fail to see how the brain is composed of systems and subsystems of neural networks. Lieberman was among the few who did so. He began his quest for an understanding of language by looking at biological and physiological systems within the brain. Others are following in this tradition (Stamenov and Gallese, 2002). The kinds of questions about language that linguists have about the brain are very different from those that physiologists and neurologists have. Even the way in which they choose to represent their findings differ substantially. If one begins with the physiological systems and look at how language relates to those systems, many different kinds of questions emerge. If one wants to ground linguistic theory on how human beings process information, then these linguists must immerse themselves into physiological research. One cannot rely on computer generated brain models or purely algorithmic models of language as a sign system.

Language and the embodied mind is the philosophical approach employed in this essay. By studying physiological systems, one is able to redefine the language paradigm by investigating how complex neural networks operate in the creation of human language. The problem that one is left with at this stage of investigation has to with biological agency. What creates the motor schema? Is the higher schema that initiates a motor complex an abstract schema in the neocortex? If so, how does it function? Does the higher function begin as an intended sequential order of behavior or is it mapped into the higher schema from the motor schema? The answer to these questions are now being addressed by researchers who are investigating the role that mirror neurons play in human communication systems Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).

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Robert N. St. Clair, Ph.D.
Department of Communication
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292

Walter E. Rodríguez, MD
Department of Physiology
Medical School
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292

Irving G. Joshua, Ph.D., Chair
Department of Physiology
Medical School
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292